Throughout his work, Duncan Wilson presents the story of Tito, who was once known as Josip Broz. He explains that Tito, a veteran of World War I and a committed revolutionary in his early years, earned his rank as a distinguished member of the Yugoslav party's Politburo and by 1937 became its secretary general. The young leader's insistence on operating politically within the boundaries of Yugoslavia brought him success in organizing the Communist Party on a national basis and increasing its membership to 12,000 by the outbreak of World War II. When Nazi forces occupied Yugoslavian soil in 1941, Tito raised and led guerrilla bands, or partisans, which effectively fought against the Germans, Italians and the royal government-in-exile, commanded by General Draza Mihajlovic. As the partisan ranks grew in number and their successes gained notoriety, Tito became engaged in high-level international politics with the British, American, and Soviet Powers. Wilson states that “In September 1943 a full scale military mission was sent to Tito’s headquarters under Brigadier Maclean, and military supplies for the Partisans were organized on an increasingly large scale.” (28). Wilson argues that it was here that the Yugoslavian revolutionary seems to have begun his feud with Josef Stalin.
Wilson continues by explaining that, although Tito established military assistance arrangements from the British and Americans, he was not able to do so with the Russians, who continued to downplay the strategic importance of his partisans, even after Great Britain had officially recognized them as the premier anti-Axis military force in Yugoslavia. He writes, “Military, technical and medical contacts between the British and the Partisans were close and often cordial.” (29). He also argues that Tito’s vociferous criticism of this Kremlin policy compounded by his incessant demands for Soviet aid agitated the paranoid and egomaniacal Josef Stalin, and set the stage for Yugoslavia's later difficulties with Moscow. On a political level, “in November 1943 Tito took some crucial steps toward establishing himself as the head of a national government for Yugoslavia.” (28). In that year, Tito was promoted to the rank of Marshal of Yugoslavia, as Premier. Following the Russian liberation of Belgrade in 1944, the military might of the Yugoslavian Army was such that Tito felt sufficiently confident to secure the immediate departure of the Red Army from Yugoslavia. In 1945 Tito became President of Yugoslavia, a position he held until his death in 1980.
On the topic of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, a subject that Wilson explores in detail, he argues that “Tito's loyalty to Moscow was real but was not based on subservience.” (44). Thus, as the war came to an end he prodded the patience of Stalin further when staking Yugoslavia's claims to Trieste without delay in opposition to Soviet policies. This put Tito and Stalin on a collision course that would not find remedy. Wilson also states that “Stalin wanted to bring the Yugoslav regime into line with the other much more subservient governments and parties in Eastern Europe. Tito himself and his immediate subordinates must be replaced by more pliable characters. This was the essence of the matter.” (51) This shows how Tito’s policies had an affect on both the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.
Wilson further argues that, despite his independent and confrontational demeanor towards the Soviets, the West branded Tito acted as a Soviet puppet when he authorized the 1946 execution of Mihajlovic as a Nazi collaborator. He also imprisoned the Roman Catholic Archbishop Aloysius Stepinac, which was “designed to settle accounts publicly between Tito’s regime and the Catholic Church.” (41). Tito also supported the Communists in the Greek Civil War, and the shot-down two US planes over Slovenia. Tito's continued defiance to Soviet economic and political demands on Yugoslavia coupled with his rather unorthodox methods of operating politically within his country soon resulted in his condemnation from Stalin. On 28 June 1948, he was officially denounced and his party, the CPY, was ejected as a member of the Cominform. In order to bring the mutinous state and its leader into compliance with the Soviet directive, Stalin concocted an economic blockade, sedition, border incidents, and threats of military invasion all to no avail, as these threats served only to further unite the Yugoslav people behind Tito. The extrication of Yugoslavia from the Communist international impacted the Yugoslav Communist leaders profoundly. Their emergence from this event did not result in an embrace of Western ideology, but a redirected and entirely innovative form of theoretical Communism that harbored sweeping decentralization, an increase in individual liberties, and an eventual independence and opposition to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
Because Duncan Wilson makes an effort to present only facts about the events which took place in Yugoslavia from the time before World War II to the time of the publication of the book, there is little room for biased. It is, therefore, a good historical source for the extended essay. It is clear that the author strongly supports his main arguments through a detailed description of data, documents and evidence. He uses footnotes to explain unfamiliar and important details and refers to most of the significant details concerning Yugoslavia. It is important to note that Wilson’s experience in Yugoslavia was strictly diplomatic and although personal ties could have been made, he attempts to disregard them and use documents and data about topics related to the development of Yugoslavia shortly before and during Tito’s reign to depict the situation in Yugoslavia.