, a private agency funded by Congress, broadcast attacks on Communism directed to . A strategic alternative to rollback was , and the Administration adopted containment through National Security Council document NSC 162/2 in October 1953; this effectively abandoned the rollback efforts in Europe. Eisenhower relied on clandestine CIA actions to undermine hostile small governments and used economic and military foreign aid to strengthened governments supporting the American position in the Cold War. A successful rollback was the CIA's Operation Ajax in August 1953, in collaboration with the British, which assisted the Iranian military in their . . The US involvement in Korea is also important to justify the fact that USA’s foreign policy, before Eisenhower, was aimed at confronting communism in the Third World countries. Eisenhower himself had increased use of covert operations countries that would destabilise the forces of communism, such as those in Iran.
He also had a policy of ‘brinkmanship’ in which the USA would threaten with nuclear war if the USSR spread communism. It meant the USA would not shy away if the USSR threatened with nuclear war, and from the 29th of August 1949 the arms race had begun when the Soviets successfully tested their atom bomb at Semipalatinsk. This policy can be seen implemented when Eisenhower rejected the Rapacki Plan of 1958, which the Soviets made hoping to get a nuclear-free zone in central Europe. Following the Soviets’ successful launch of Sputnik, the first ever space satellite, on the 4th of October 1957, it showed that the USSR was cable of sending nuclear rockets across continents and could spy on the US. However by 1960 Eisenhower had the first solid-fuel nuclear , polaris, and was confident in US nuclear superiority and could implement his policy of ‘brinkmanship’ more effectively.
Superpower relations collapsed further when on the 1st of May 1960 a U-2 spy plane flown by Gary Powers was shot down over the Soviet Union. The pilot survived and Khrushchev tricked the Americans, Eisenhower claimed it was a weather reconnaissance plane, however Khrushchev knew the truth. Eisenhower rejected Khrushchev’s demands of punishing the U2 pilot and only suspended the flights. The meeting broke up in acrimony and the Paris summit was cancelled. Eisenhower also confronted the British and French over the Suez canal crisis of 1956 where he refused to give support and thought they were there in order to regain their disintegrating empires in the Middle East and Africa. Eisenhower called a ceasefire on the 6th of November by diplomatic and financial pressure. This is a great example of Eisenhower confronting the areas of the cold war in the best interest of America.
There was however an element of Eisenhower choosing to coexist with the Soviets as seen in the Hungarian uprising in October 1956, where he did not choose to intervene. 2,500 Hungarians died as a result of the rebellion and they were promised by a US backed radio that they would receive help, no such help was given and the revolution was brutally put down. Henry Kissinger says Eisenhower behaved like a ‘spectator’ and ‘there were no diplomatic notes, no pressure, no offers to mediate. Nothing.’ Eisenhower in his defence says it would have resulted in general war, which we can never be no to be true but it is certain that he did not want to take action in this case despite his ‘New Look policy. Critics argue that an important opportunity for rollback was forfeited in October–November 1956, when Hungarian reformist leader Imre Nagy announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and when he and Hungarian insurgents called on the West for help against invading Soviet troops. Eisenhower thought it too risky to intervene in a landlocked country such as Hungary and feared it might trigger a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. His Secretary of State mistakenly believed that Imre Nagy sided with the Soviet Union. Therefore it is evident that Dwight Eisenhower was able to confront communism at the periphery, as seen in Egypt and Iran, but he would not attack at the centre as seen in his abandonment of Hungary.
Europe formed a relatively stable area in the cold war during Eisenhower’s administration. Rebellions against communist rule in eastern Europe provided opportunities for American intervention in the region and the loosening in the Soviet bloc. However shortly after Stalin’s death there was a general anti communist strike in Berlin in June 1958, demanding better living standards, the Soviets acted by tanks driving into the city putting down the protest. Eisenhower did not help protect and free these people as he had promised and it would seem here that he did not want to confront the communists. In both cases of Hungary and East Berlin Eisenhower did no more than broadcast anti-Soviet propaganda and the demands of the rebels on Radio Free Europe which promised help that never came.
Eisenhower also invited Khrushchev to visit the USA in September 1959 and he accepted, this shows that Eisenhower had desire to improve superpower relations. However he did not let Khrushchev into Disneyland on health and safety grounds, but Khrushchev thought that it was a nuclear weapons base, which meant relations became sour. Other examples of Eisenhower wishing to co exist with the Soviets is how he agreed to an armistice in 1953 to the Korean War resulting in peace talks. Eisenhower also allowed French forces to withdraw from Indochina at the Geneva Conference in April 1954 which showed he respected the Soviets sphere of influence. Dulles however was concerned that the agreement confirmed communism in North Vietnam, his verbal endorsement was given reluctantly.
Eisenhower put forward an early diplomatic initiative called ‘Atoms for Peace’ in 1953, which proposed that both superpowers should give a part of their nuclear stockpiles to the UN. They would then generate nuclear energy; this was rejected by the Soviets.
Eisenhower also went to the Geneva Summit in July 1955 in which Khrushchev and other world leaders were there. He hoped for good co-operation with this new ‘Geneva spirit’. However Khrushchev did not accept Eisenhower’s ‘Open skies’ policy, which meant spy planes would be able to fly over each other’s territories. There was an agreement at this summit where there would be cultural exchanges of scientists, musicians and artist between the two superpowers.
In 1955 the US and USSR found common ground over Austria, the country was not a very important area internationally speaking, however it can be seen as an impact of Khrushchev’s ‘peaceful co-existence’. Austria regained its sovereignty and took its place as a united and neutral state in Europe. The agreement was initialled in May 1955 and Dulles and the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov appeared together on a balcony in Vienna. They did reach an agreement, which clearly demonstrates that there had been ease in tensions over this matter because it could have easily resulted in Eisenhower not wanting to co-exist.
In conclusion, many historians see Eisenhower as American’s finest post war president as he managed to contain communism successfully. He had enlisted West Germany into NATO and its firm stance on the issue of Berlin had prevented the Soviets driving the Western powers out of the city. Eisenhower was sceptical of using his ‘rollback’ and ‘new look’ policy as it may have lead to nuclear war. He confronted the Soviets to a point, by dominating in the arms race and psychologically confronting them with the Free Europe radio. The reality behind his “tough talk” was however unveiled during the Hungarian Crisis when he refused to do anything in order to aid the revolution, when he helped Nasser during the Suez Crisis, trying to make him towards USA rather than USSR, suggesting that he was looking for diplomatic ways of winning the conflict and showed a move towards conciliation in Berlin. He fought communism at the periphery but was worried an attack at the centre would lead to a hot war and therefore was forced to coexist with the soviets but would confront at the periphery.