Eisenhower’s arrival to the office prompted a re-examination of how the United States should respond to the International Communism – the ‘New Look’, the main objective of which was to prevent the spread of communism outside the areas where it was already established. Seemingly new and suddenly confrontational policy is really a continuation of Truman’s policy against communism. Americans continued to act in a similar way (building up the web of anti-Soviet alliances designed to encircle the Soviet Union and stop the spread of communism), and the only real difference was an increased reliance on nuclear weapons. Eisenhower threatened the Chinese with the nuclear weapons in 1953, which probably resulted in the sooner ending of the war. So, Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’ was only a continuation of Truman’s policy on communism and increased pressure through nuclear power was only in the means of peace and national security? Even if so it evidently confronts communism, and I would say even in a harsher manner when it used to be under Truman.
Just weeks after Eisenhower became president, Stalin’s death brought what appeared to be a significant changes in Soviet international policy. Stalin’s successor Nikita Khrushchev, who established himself as the main leader in the Kremlin in 1955, called his policy ‘peaceful coexistence’ and was calling for negotiations to settle East-West differences and to rein in the arms race. Eisenhower, however, remained skeptical of Soviet rhetoric. Anyhow, the leaders negotiated over a peace treaty in Austria and Eisenhower then agreed to a summit of Soviet and Western leaders in Geneva, July 1955 (the first such meeting since the Potsdam Conference in 1945). The ‘Spirit of Geneva’ eased tensions between the Soviets and the United States even though the conference failed to produce any significant agreements. Khrushchev refused to accept Eisenhower’s ‘open sky’s’ initiative, but regardless to that Eisenhower would start U2 flights, which will lead to an incident in 1960. Eisenhower is acting only in the interests of his own country, not willing to compromise with the Soviets, ready to break his word.
‘Peaceful coexistence’ did not extend to Eastern Europe. In November 1956, Soviet tanks ruthlessly suppressed Hungarian uprising. American propaganda agencies such as Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America had encouraged Eastern Europeans to resist. Yet Eisenhower decided not to take action to aid the Hungarian freedom fighters since any intervention carried the risk of a U.S.-Soviet war that could lead to a nuclear exchange.
Eisenhower hoped to achieve a detente with the Soviet Union and hopes rose after Khrushchev visited the United States in September 1959 and met with Eisenhower at the presidential retreat in the Maryland Mountains where they spoke of ‘peaceful coexistence’ and possible mutual disarmament. This summit produced no arms control agreement, but it did lead to good will and optimism known as ‘the spirit of Camp David’. Khrushchev invited Eisenhower to Russia and they agreed to meet again in Paris in May 1960 to cement their understanding.
The summit collapsed, however, due to the dispute over the U-2 incident. As the meeting with Khrushchev approached Eisenhower authorized another U-2 flight over Soviet territory. It crashed on May 1, 1960, and Gary Powers (the pilot) stayed alive and was captured, confessing the aims of his mission. Not knowing that the Soviets had captured the pilot, the State Department and the White House issued a series of cover stories that the Kremlin exposed as lie. Despite his embarrassment, Eisenhower took responsibility for the failed U-2 mission and asserted that the flights were necessary to protect national security. Khrushchev tried to exploit the U-2 incident for maximum propaganda value and demanded an apology from the President when they met in Paris. Eisenhower refused, Khrushchev stormed out of the meeting, and the emerging detente became instead an intensified Cold War.
Eisenhower prosecuted the Cold War vigorously even as he hoped to improve Soviet-American relations. He often relied on covert action to avoid responsibility for controversial interventions. In 1951, the Iranian parliament with Mossadegh in the lead nationalized the oil. Eisenhower worried about Mossadegh’s willingness to cooperate with communists, and so the CIA helped overthrow Mossadegh’s government and restore the Shah’s power, giving the U.S. corporations an equal share in the Iranian oil industry. A year later, the CIA helped to overthrow the elected government of Guatemala. However, when in 1956 a series of uprisings happened in Poland in Hungary, Americans promised to help Hungarians against the Soviets. However when Soviet Union finally engaged, and ruthlessly suppressed the rebels, the States did a little bit less than nothing, in effect betraying Hungarians. This shows, that even though Eisenhower was willing to confront communism at the periphery and use his power to pose a threat, he was not going to act in the center of the conflict, or in other words, he was not willing frontal confrontation with the Soviet Union, wasn’t ready to start a real war.
In 1956, the Middle East question brought Eisenhower into confrontation with his most important allies: Britain and France. It all started with Nasser – nationalistic leader of Egypt who used both American and Soviet help, and then nationalized the Suez channel, which belonged to British and French companies. England, France and Israel decided to send troops there. Eisenhower was outraged. He thought the attacks would only strengthen Nasser, allowing him to become the champion of the Arab world as he opposed the aggressors. Eisenhower quickly condemned the attacks and used U.S. diplomatic and economic power to force all three nations to withdraw their troops. United States prestige in the Middle East rose. But Eisenhower hardly made good use of this advantage, as he announced a new program, known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, to provide economic and military aid to Middle Eastern nations facing Communist aggression. This Doctrine was welcomed by Lebanon and Saudi Arabia but denounced by Egypt and Syria as American plot to dominate the world. Used once in '58 when American troops went into Lebanon and protected government against Egyptian rebels.
In conclusion I would like to say that despite all little steps made towards peaceful coexistence it all was really confrontational and both Eisenhower and Khrushchev understood this, playing their little coexistence game just to show that they are good (they are trying to coexist) and others are bad (this propaganda was massively used in both countries: Americans were saying that Soviets are the aggressors and vise versa). There were no real agreements made on coexistence while Eisenhower was constantly acting confrontationally towards communism throughout his office. He was not ready or willing to step into real conflict as it could lead to world destruction, but pinching the Soviets when he had a chance to do so. In my judgment, yes, Eisenhower’s cold war diplomacy was based on confrontation.
by
rtrukhin1 (student)
