Introduction - US policy to Southeast Asia in general

In 1943, Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed a trusteeship principle, in which the subjugated nations of Asia would prepare themselves for self-government, under the supervision of the imperial nations. FDR had ‘genuine humanitarian principles’ and was aware of the conditions under which colonial people sometimes lived. He also realised that the colonial system was detrimental to US interests. According to Robert McMahon, FDR altered his thinking in late 1944. ‘This policy shift reflected the President’s essential pragmatism in the face of a complex amalgam of crosscutting interests.’

Most historians are agreed that, in the immediate post-war years, the USA’s main concern became the protection of war-torn Western Europe from the possible spread of Soviet communism. The USA’s view of the world becoming two polar opposites was exemplified in George Kennan’s 1946 “Long Telegram”. Sami Abouzahr: ‘at this stage, Indochina itself was of little importance to the US state department.’What was important was the rebuilding of Western Europe on US terms – politically stable, economically vibrant and militarily resilient.

The Communist takeover of China in 1949 and the start of the The Korean War in 1950 exacerbated this fear and heralded a new intensification in US involvement in all of Southeast Asia, as the Truman administration became convinced that the whole region had become a battlefield in the wider Cold War, its countries perceived to be threatened by Chinese / Soviet communist expansion. This heightened alarm was not helped by the unexpected Soviet atomic bomb test in 1949.

Nationalist activity had intensified in the period following the Japanese invasion, which exposed the weaknesses of the Imperial powers, convincing many that they were not invincible.

Further reading reveals that The USA appeared to adopt differing, seemingly dualistic strategies of involvement in the region, especially after 1950. By this time, The Philippines, Burma, Thailand and Indonesia were independent, with new nationalist rulers. Vietnam was still a French colony and Malaya a British one. The US got tough on the insurgencies, whilst supplying ‘economic and defence assistance, technical support, political advice, diplomatic backing, even such intangibles as understanding, patience and sympathy’to the newly formed independent countries. In answer to the title question, and in attempt to unravel the complexities of Washington’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia, this essay will examine more closely US strategy regarding two countries – Vietnam and Indonesia – throughout the time of decolonisation.

Vietnam

During World War 2, Roosevelt did not want to see France take back Indochina from the occupying Japanese. According to Abouzahr, Roosevelt had a ‘strong sense of anti-colonialism’ and was prepared ‘to accept the forces of nationalism in Asia’but the task of rebuilding Western Europe took priority to anything that was happening in Indochina, in the immediate post-war years. At this time the US was more anti-communist than anti-colonial.

France featured highly in US plans for post-war Western Europe. These plans included the build up of a sizeable military force on the continent, enough to meet a possible Red Army threat. This meant West German re-armament, and a contribution of manpower from France. Washington knew that this was a lot to ask of the French, so they were obliged up to a point to “keep France sweet” – to co-operate with French policy in Indochina, albeit for their own motives.

American aims of seeing an economically healthy France were being thwarted by her struggle against the Viet Minh nationalists in Indochina, which was damaging the economy and weakening the government. By 1952, the war was costing France twice as much as the amount of aid received by the Marshall plan.There also existed the seemingly real fear of communists making inroads into French politics in this climate of ‘economic stagnation and political instability’. The US was aware that assisting France overseas in her colonies would ‘play into the hands of the French Communist Party’

The French public were split over the war in Indochina. ‘French Liberals were disheartened and embarrassed by their new colonial war’ – they pressured the government to grant independence to the Viet Minh, but failed. To some, the war had become ‘a campaign of national status’.

Sami Abouzahr believes that Marshall aid funds to France were channelled into the war in Indochina, but Washington did not officially endorse this. To Abouzahr, The French could not have maintained the war without it – therefore French post–war recovery was further hindered, with American money being used in Indochina rather than for the recovery projects it was intended for.

Indochina became a difficult contradiction in American foreign policy. Washington knew how important the colony was to France, and foresaw the danger of communism gaining a foothold in the region. If France were to abandon Indochina, communism could spread throughout Southeast Asia. The alternative was to endorse and support French colonialism, with the French economy and military forces necessarily shifting focus away from Western Europe and risk the same thing happening there. Which was the least palatable outcome?

Andrew Rotter also writes that US policy towards France’s return to Indochina was ‘ambivalent’. He states that continuing French colonialism could also ‘radicalise the opposition’, with the subjugated people becoming more receptive to communist ideas – further complicating Washington’s dilemma. ‘Between 1945 and 1948, the American position oscillated between these two poles.’

According to Rotter, ‘Roosevelt gradually softened his anti-colonial position’, held during the War and there was a shift in US policy away from the Trusteeship principle. In late 1944, the British, French and Dutch were told by the US that they could go ahead with their ‘reassertion of sovereignty in South East Asia’It appears that the US were unwilling to alienate the Western powers with any policy of traditional anti-colonialism, thereby possibly jeopardising closer post-war cooperation between Washington and the wartime alliance, which according to McMahon was ‘indispensable’.

Harry S. Truman, becoming President in 1945, ...

This is a preview of the whole essay

Harry S. Truman, becoming President in 1945, ‘instinctively appreciated and supported America’s historic identification with the principles of self-determination.’ He felt a sense of traditional anti-colonialism, according to McMahon, and did not wish to alienate growing nationalist movements and possibly turn them towards the Soviets. However in 1945, before the war broke out, Charles de Gaulle was told by the new Truman administration that they ‘would not stand in the way’ of restoration of French sovereignty in Indochina.This further illustrates the contradictions inherent in US policy toward Indochina.

In the early stages of the conflict, America favoured a policy of ’Non-intervention and neutrality’ towards the situation in Indochina, but this ‘was never truly impartial’ argues McMahon.As evidence for this bias, he cites Ho Chi Minh’s numerous letters of appeal to the Americans without a response (US talk of self-determination throughout the War years had fuelled his ambitions and those of other nationalist leaders – they looked to the US for support), also American equipment was supplied to the Dutch and French to fight nationalism in Indonesia and Vietnam respectively, with the Made in USA labels removed. There existed ‘a manifest tilt towards the colonial powers’during these early stages, despite a proclaimed policy of neutrality.

Preoccupied as they were with the security of Western Europe, the nationalist situation in South East Asia in the immediate post-war years ‘seemed to Truman and his senior aides an annoying, and potentially divisive, sideshow’Ideally, the US hoped that the colonial powers would yield to the tide of nationalism, that moderate, pro-Western nationalist movements would eventually come to power throughout Southeast Asia and that economic links with the former powers and the wider world would remain undisrupted.

But adding to Washington’s difficulties were the communist leanings of the Viet Minh – Ho was not the “moderate” leader the US would have preferred – and also the lack of an alternative, non-communist movement.

The ending of America’s ‘tacit support’ of France, and the beginning of what Fredrik Logevall calls ‘direct US involvement’ came in early 1950 – the US ‘opted to prop up an embattled colonial regime in order to prevent a communist victory and also to retain French support in the European theatre of the Cold War’

At a Paris meeting in May 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson pledged assistance to France and “The Associated States of Indochina”: ‘The United States recognises that the solution of the Indochina problem depends both upon the restoration of security and upon the development of genuine nationalism and that the United States assistance can and should contribute to these major objectives.’… ‘The United States Government [is] convinced that neither national independence nor democratic evolution exists in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism.’

At this time the USA stepped up economic and military support to France and recognised the Bao Dai government, installed by the French in 1949 to rival the Viet Minh. This change of US policy occurred mainly because ‘more and more, Washington officials saw Indochina not as a colonial issue, but as part of the global anti-communist struggle.’Elie Abel and Marvin Kelb also believe that the Truman administration came to see the conflict as a struggle between America’s oldest ally and communist forces as a proxy war – a ‘front in the world-wide struggle to block the expansion of Russian power and Russian doctrine.’

Other South and South East Asian countries thought differently. They would not have been impressed by this change of language; they refused to recognise the Bao Dai government and continued to hold the opposite view from that of the US, regarding the war ‘as a nationalist struggle against colonialism, finding it much less easy than the Truman administration to overlook France’s unwillingness to grant Vietnam full independence.’

George Herring blames US shortsightedness and an obsession with communism, for inextricably linking Ho with the USSR and subsequently seeing his organisation as Soviet-controlled and with wider, more sinister aims beyond Vietnamese nationalism. Herring: ‘The administration refused to do anything to facilitate a communist triumph in Indochina’ so, for the first three years of the Indochina war, ‘the United States maintained a distinctly pro-French “neutrality”’, providing covert support to French forces.

The US were also concerned about the possible collaboration with Communist China and the Viet Minh. (Ho’s forces were indeed supplied with weapons from Mao Zedong’s regime, which were deployed effectively against the besieged French in the decisive defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.) Exacerbating this was a fear that the Chinese minorities, scattered throughout the entire Southeast Asian region, were potential agents of communist China. Chinese troops were, after all, used in large numbers in the Korean War.

Herring also holds American shortsightedness to blame for viewing nationalist uprisings in Indochina and other South East Asian regions as a concerted effort, controlled by Moscow. This false conclusion, according to Anthony Short, was based on ‘circumstantial evidence’, namely communist uprisings around the same time in Burma, Malaya and the Philippines, and an internal communist rebellion against the Indonesian Republic in Madiun, Java in September 1948. Short: ‘A Threat was perceived [by the US]: a co-ordinated, Kremlin directed offensive.’

In reality, far from receiving directions from the Kremlin as the Southeast Asian section of a global communist collaboration, Ho’s relations with China and the USSR were ‘often fractious’and far from being a Soviet controlled singular offensive, the different insurgencies, whose objectives varied, were actually homegrown in their respective countries.

But from around 1950 – and from this “black-and-white” perspective - the US could view their actions in South East Asia not as supporting colonialism, but as implementing a pre-emptive containment policy, protecting vulnerable nations from the encroachment of global communism not only in Western Europe, but also in South East Asia, protecting trade links and US military bases in the area. Also, the USA’s ‘first line of defence in the Pacific’, i.e. Japan and the Philippines, appeared threatened by a “communist” victory in South East Asia. The region, therefore, needed defending against this menace, and Indochina was regarded as key to that defence. The domino theory ‘quickly became an article of faith’.In 1950, after assessment of all this, US neutrality - such as it was up to this time - was effectively ended.

US intervention was requested at Dien Bien Phu, but despite Dwight D. Eisenhower being ‘no less inclined than Truman had been to see the French struggle as an extension of America’s Cold War effort’, this was turned down by Congress, although seriously considered by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Instead, Congress ‘insisted that France had to pledge to move swiftly to grant Vietnam independence’. Dulles would have preferred the French to continue fighting.

Indonesia

There was a marked difference in US policy between Indonesia and Indochina, mainly because Sukarno’s Indonesian Republican movement was “anti-communist”. This was in contrast to the Viet Minh which, if not a dyed-in-the-wool communist organisation, was certainly coloured with communism. This and their links with China, plus the fact that their leader had visited Moscow was enough to convince the Americans, who as we have seen, regarded Ho as a Soviet agent.

The belief was reinforced after the aforementioned internal communist rebellion in Java was suppressed with force. This marked a shift in US support – Robert Lovett, US undersecretary of state, by December of that year ‘was convinced the republicans had proven their opposition to communism and felt Dutch claims that they were holding the line against Soviet expansionism were false and self–serving.’This was certainly a factor in the US decision to support the Indonesian nationalists.

Also, unlike the French domestic political situation, that of the Netherlands showed comparative stability. The Dutch could, in this respect, be “pushed harder” than the French, without fear of total collapse of their government. The French had their own internal “Cold War”, the French Communist Party winning 26% of the vote in November 1946 elections. The French government needed to be handled carefully.

But despite Dutch domestic politics showing stability, Petra Groen argues that the Dutch economy certainly did not, stating that in 1947 military commitments in Indonesia had ‘brought The Netherlands to the brink of financial bankruptcy.’

The USA threatened to discontinue its supply of Marshall aid to Holland, in response to instances of Dutch pre-emptive “police action” - the use of military force against the Indonesian Republican Government in July 1948 and December 1949 for alleged violation of the British-instigated Linggajati agreement, which recognised the authority of the Republic, and planned for a future federal Indonesia.

This use of force also brought Condemnation from the United Nations. According to Groen, The Netherlands consequently became ‘the pariah of Europe.’Conversely, Sukarno’s Republic gained international sympathy. This was likely to have given the nationalists new impetus, as they became convinced that their irredentist campaign was a genuine struggle for freedom against a guilty oppressor.

Also, Britain ‘impressed on Washington the need for a solution in Indonesia’, as they were ‘horrified’ at the potential repercussions of the “police action” – that it could strengthen the resolve of communist elements throughout the region, thereby endangering Britain’s own interests there.

Before the offensives, the USA had only carefully broached the issue of Indonesia. With the second police action, the Truman administration shifted its policy, due in part to a ‘vocal minority’ in Congress who threatened to discontinue funds channelled to Marshall Aid, incensed as they were by these strong-arm tactics. If the Dutch did not behave in Indonesia, they would not receive money. Washington therefore applied more pressure, fully aware of Holland’s dependency on Marshall aid to redevelop her economy. Again, America’s near obsession with rebuilding Western Europe is demonstrated.

The police action offensive triggered off a new intensity in the guerrilla insurgency. The nationalists appeared to be gaining the upper hand and Washington became concerned over the possible materialisation of “radical elements” within the movement. US “Paranoia” of Soviet-style communism is again apparent.

What was common to US policy towards both the Dutch and the French was the reluctance, despite the threats, to actually cut off Marshall Aid funds to both countries. According to Rotter, at the time there still existed an ‘indecisiveness’ or ‘deep ambivalence toward the conflict between nationalism and colonialism in Indonesia.’ The US were still unwilling to force the Dutch to relinquish their colony, they only ‘persuaded’ them. Despite Congress becoming ‘impatient with the Dutch’, ‘the administrations policy remained cautious.’

To McMahon, the US threat was the pivotal factor in the Dutch transfer of sovereignty to the Republic in April 1949. McMahon: ‘that US policy smoothed the path toward Indonesian independence is indisputable.’ The USA put economic pressure on the Dutch and they yielded. Rotter agrees: ‘The Dutch got out of Indonesia, and US pressure was a factor in their withdrawal.’ But to Rotter, Washington’s main dilemma again came down to ‘Freedom for Asians or stability and prosperity for Western Europe.’

Pierre van der Eng, however, plays down the significance of the US threat. He argues that this was only a “catalyst” which prompted the Dutch to review their situation in Indonesia; economic considerations played the main role. The Dutch, according to van der Eng, realised that their economic interests would be better served by relinquishing their overseas territory.Van der Eng blames “imperial”, rather than “international” forces.

Before the second police action, US policy was arguably biased toward the Dutch. Marshall aid had served to temporarily strengthen their position in Indonesia. The reasons for the Truman administration’s bias are similar to why it adopted a pro-French policy, according to McMahon. Namely, ‘the heavy European orientation of Truman’s foreign policy during this period.’ Of the wider overall containment strategy, McMahon especially cites the European element. He believes that Holland’s cooperation in the realisation of this strategy was ‘important, if not crucial.’ Rotter holds a different view – to him, a further reason for America’s eventual alignment with the Indonesian Republic ‘was the relative insignificance of the Netherlands to the revitalisation of Western Europe’.

Conclusion

This essay has examined some contrasting US policies toward Indochina and Indonesia, and attempted to analyse the reasons for them.

All research points towards the Soviet expansionist threat to Western Europe as the USA’s main concern, in roughly the decade following World War 2. This was combined with the (slightly) lesser concern that “the” communists had designs on Southeast Asian countries, with the perceived consequences exemplified in Eisenhower’s “Domino Theory”. These fears underpinned virtually all decisions taken by Washington regarding the Southeast Asian colonies, it could be argued. With hindsight, this perception that the Soviets were hell-bent on global domination can very easily be dismissed as alarmist paranoia and an American tendency to oversimplify things, but in the early years of the cold War, it would have seemed a very real fear.

Therefore, in answer to the title question, it would be unfair to speak of “American anti-colonialism” being “at its height”, as the new post war International balance of power forced the hand of the US, gave the administrations new priorities and dictated that American anti-colonialism take a back seat to American anti-communism. This is not to say that anti-colonialist sentiments were no more – indeed, US decision-makers had no room for Imperial colonialism in their plans for the post-war world, as they considered it an outmoded, antiquated, exploitative system – but the more immediate Soviet “threat” looked about to disrupt these plans, and had to be dealt with first.

Bibliography

Aldereth, Maxwell: The French Communist Party: A Critical History (1920 – 84) Manchester University Press, 1984

Groen, Petra M. H: Militant Response: The Dutch use of Military Force and the Decolonisation of the Dutch East Indies 1945 – 50 in: The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History Vol. XXI, no. 3, (1993)

Herring, George C: America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950 – 1975 McGraw-Hill, 1996

Holland, R. F: Eurpean Decolonisation 1918 – 1981: An Introductory Survey McMillan, 1985

Kalb, Marvin and Abel, Elie: Roots of Involvement: The United States in Asia 1784 – 1971 Pall Mall Press, 1971

Logevall, Fredrik: The Origins of the Vietnam War Longman, 2001

McMahon, Robert J: The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War 2 Columbia University Press, 1999

Roadnight, Andrew: United States Policy towards Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower years Palgrave, 2002

Rotter, Andrew Jon: The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia Cornell University Press, 1987

Short, Anthony: The Origins of the Vietnam War Longman, 1989

Van der Enge, Pierre: Marshall Aid as a Catalyst in the Decolonisation of Indonesia 1947 – 1949 in: Journal of South East Asian Studies Vol. 19 (1988)

Word Count = 3150

McMahon, R. J: The limits of Empire: The United States and South East Asia since World War 2 Columbia University Press, 1999 (P. 11)

Ibid (P. 12)

Abouzahr, Sami: The Tangled Web: America, France and Indochina 1947 – 50 From History Today, October 2004 (P. 50)

McMahon: The limits of Empire… (P. 48–49)

Abouzahr: The Tangled Web… (P. 50)

Ibid (P.51)

Herring, G. C: America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950 – 1975 McGraw-Hill, 1996 (P. 11)

Kalb M and Abel E: Roots of Involvement: The United States in Asia 1784 – 1971 Pall Mall Press, 1971 (P. 56)

Abouzahr: The Tangled Web… (P. 51)

Rotter A. J: The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to South East Asia Cornell University Press, 1987 (P. 93)

Ibid (P. 93)

McMahon: The limits of Empire… (P. 12–13)

Ibid (P. 27)

Ibid (P. 26)

Herring: America’s Longest War… (P. 10)

McMahon: The limits of Empire… (P. 27)

Ibid (P. 27)

McMahon: The limits of Empire… (P. 28)

Logevall, Fredrik: The Origins of the Vietnam War Longman, 2001 (P. 18-19)

A Section of Acheson’s speech is reproduced in Logevall, (P. 101). Within this primary document are many telling phrases. It shows anti-colonial sentiments –The US hoped that France would end their ruling of Indonesia, but are prepared to support them for the time being in the immediate goal of “restoring security”, i.e. fighting communism. It is significant that Acheson mentions this first, indicating US priorities. In the longer term, “genuine nationalism” should prevail, i.e. moderate, pro-Western, “democratic” nationalism.

This section of the speech also highlights the US perception that the insurgency in Indochina was part of a wider, “imperialist” strategy, controlled by the Soviet Union. Acheson’s speech concerns Vietnam, but these sentiments could be applied to any country in the region whose nationalist movement contained traces of “communism”.

Logevall: The Origins… (P. 17)

Kalb and Abel: Roots of Involvement… (P. 55)

Logevall: The Origins… (P. 20)

Herring: America’s Longest War… (P. 13)

Short, A: The Origins of the Vietnam War Longman, 1989 (P. 73-74)

Logevall: The Origins… (P. 20-21)

These US fears were almost certainly unfounded. On a visit to Moscow in 1950, Ho was given a less-than-warm reception from Stalin. Evidence indicates that the Soviet leader was much less concerned with Southeast Asia than he was with Europe at the time. Also, despite receiving Military aid and sanctuary for Viet Minh troops from the Chinese, Ho preferred to keep them ‘at arms length’; he would not have welcomed Chinese interference in Viet Minh internal affairs.

It could be fair to describe the Viet Minh as “nationalists first, communists second”.

Quotes in this paragraph from: Herring: America’s Longest War… (P. 16-17)

Quotes in this paragraph from: Logevall: The Origins… (P. 21-22)

Rotter: The Path to Vietnam… (P. 82)

Adereth, M: The French Communist Party: A Critical History (1920 – 84) Manchester University Press, 1984 (P. 139)

Ibid (P. 34) Also, in Marshall Aid as a Catalyst… (details in bibliography) Pierre van der Eng states that the second “police action” was funded by Marshall aid (it actually cost the Dutch more than they had received) and offers this as a further reason why Dutch foreign policy became very unpopular at this time.

Roadnight, A: United States Policy towards Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower years Palgrave, 2002 (P. 62)

McMahon: The limits of Empire… (P. 33)

Rotter: The Path to Vietnam… (P. 83 – 84)

McMahon: The limits of Empire… (P. 32)

Rotter: The Path to Vietnam… (P. 84)

Van der Eng, Pierre: Marshall Aid as a Catalyst in the Decolonisation of Indonesia 1947 – 1949 in: Journal of South East Asian Studies Vol. 19 (1988)

Van der eng would disagree with Rotter’s view that the Netherlands did not feature highly in US plans for the revitalisation of Western Europe. To van der Eng, the US believed cooperation of The Netherlands was ‘essential to the success of the [European Recovery] programme’ and this explains why the US were reluctant to carry out their threat to cut Marshall aid.

McMahon: The limits of Empire… (P. 32)

Rotter: The Path to Vietnam… (P. 82)