Is it fair to describe Bevin as a great foreign secretary?

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Iain Leith

How fair is it to say that Ernest Bevin was a great foreign secretary?

 In 1945 the Labour Party was unexpectedly elected to power with Britain facing grave financial and social problems in the aftermath of the war. Indeed, it was stated by Keynes that with the ending of “Lend Lease” Britain faced a “Financial Dunkirk”. With Britain teetering on the edge of bankruptcy, Ernest Bevin was appointed Foreign Secretary, to the surprise of the public and to Bevin himself. Hugh Dalton had been widely expected to take up the role, with Bevin heading for the Treasury. Yet it was Bevin’s reputation for speaking his mind, and his experience in hard bargaining, that Britain would need after the war. Clement Atlee the Prime Minister knew Bevin’s strengths and foresaw the problems that would ultimately lie ahead in places like India and Eastern Europe. If anyone could stand up to the Soviets it would be Bevin, The ex leader of the TUC and former minister of Labour. After 1945, Bevin was responsible for the broad outline of all major foreign policy initiatives. His ideas were clear.  He wished to salvage what he could from the remnants of the Empire yet preserve Britain’s super power status. This in itself may seem contradictory, given that Bevin oversaw the biggest period of decolonisation in British history.  However, Bevin realised the urgent need for Britain, for both economic and strategic reasons, to cut its international commitments, while maintaining a bond with those countries in the Empire who had acquired independence.     Bevin had many critics within the British Establishment. It was claimed that he was an egotistical bully who was, “intellectually ill-equipped for the foreign office and whose strong prejudices could easily be moulded to the wishes of senior officialsOn the other hand a firm supporter of Bevin is the historian Frank K. Roberts. Roberts states “Bevin realised our weaknesses, was aware of the need to include America in European affairs and construct a stronger Western Europe in order to “share the burden”. His first great achievements, according to Roberts, were his securing of the Marshall Plan and the OEEC using his enormous negotiating skills. Additionally, Roberts believes Bevin brought good international experience to the role of Foreign Secretary and a robust practical common sense not always found in professional diplomats. The record of Ernest Bevin as Britain’s Foreign Secretary has been the subject of considerable debate amongst historians. Bevin faced a series of problems in international relations, arguably more complex than any Labour Foreign Secretary had ever faced before.  He faced them at a time when Britain was in the immediate aftermath of the massive dislocation and disruption of the Second World War and when the international situation was tense and unpredictable. Whether he betrayed his principles as a socialist or whether he displayed the courage and vision of an international statesman in making difficult but inevitable decisions is a matter of particular controversy.

The first major challenge that Bevin faced as Foreign Secretary was steering India towards independence. By the 1930s,  Nationalists such as Ghandi called for independence. The defeat at Singapore by the Japanese was a turning point in Asian colonial history. The scale of the defeat highlighted the vulnerability of the European colonial powers in general. The false belief in the superiority of the white races was ended at Singapore once and for all. Britain therefore promised India full independence after the Second World War, in order to guarantee support during the war against the Japanese.  Clement Atlee was intent on fulfilling the promise, and with Bevin’s approval, appointed Lord Mountbatten to see through the process. This in itself was a wise tactical decision in dealing with the sensitivity of the situation with India towards the end of the war and repairing some of the damage caused by British military commanders. “The insensitivity of Lord Wavell towards the Indian leaders and his disastrous relationship with Whitehall was a source of constant embarrassment”.    Mountbatten, the last Viceroy, was well respected by Hindu and Muslim alike.  He wanted to create a United Federal India as the best way of dealing with India’s internal problems, but the Muslim leaders would not accept the majority Hindu rule. Despite months of protracted negotiation, no settlement on a Federal India was put in place. Bevin gave full negotiating powers to the new Viceroy and set a firm deadline for an agreement and settlement of Indian Independence.  Eventually India had to be partitioned, creating Pakistan, East Pakistan and India itself. To ensure a British withdrawal by 1947, Bevin’s decision in backing Lord Mountbatten with full negotiating powers was crucial, as any other decision would almost certainly have meant the outbreak of civil war and the deaths of millions.  British withdrawal witnessed India become the world’s largest democracy.   India also remained loyal to Britain and became a strong member of the Commonwealth.  Kenneth Morgan stated, “It was decolonisation without trauma,” referring to the smooth pattern of leaving the colonies without the protracted infighting that the French were to face in Algeria or the chaos of the Belgian Congo.  Yet Morgan is perhaps overstating the case.  Although potentially much worse scenarios were possible, one million people were still killed due to the partition of India when millions of Muslims and Hindus fled to their respective countries. Recent historians, such as Narendra Singh Sarila, are quite happy to blame the British for all of India’s and Pakistan’s problems, even in relation to the current threat of terrorism that prevails in the continent today. Singh points out that it was “British insecurity and Bevin’s errors of judgement that were as ultimately responsible for Partition.” She makes no reference to the fact that both Wavell and Mountbatten produced a plan for the creation of a united India, nor does she admit that when given the choice of a free united Federal India, both sides backed away from the British plan. Ultimately, Bevin was left with little choice other than partition.  However without Bevin’s courage in allowing Mountbatten full negotiating powers, Britain would have taken much longer to withdraw and many more lives would have been lost. The Muslim delegation would never have accepted a united India, where they would have been in a minority. As Jinnah, the founder of an independent Pakistan, stated in his message to congress, “Any idea of a united India could never have worked and in my judgement it would have led us to terrific disaster”. With these words one can only praise Bevin for having the foresight to ensure not only the partition of India but also the swiftness with which it was achieved.

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Bevin’s response to other problems in the Middle East adds to the case for his defence. Preceding the First World War, Britain had secured a mandate over Palestine, but by the 1930s there were calls for a Jewish state to be established in the area. After the Second World War, huge pressure was placed on Britain by the USA to allow more Jewish immigration into Palestine. America had been a leading advocate of the case for a Jewish state, partly for political reasons due to the powerful Jewish lobby in the USA and partly in genuine response to the ...

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