Bevin’s response to other problems in the Middle East adds to the case for his defence. Preceding the First World War, Britain had secured a mandate over Palestine, but by the 1930s there were calls for a Jewish state to be established in the area. After the Second World War, huge pressure was placed on Britain by the USA to allow more Jewish immigration into Palestine. America had been a leading advocate of the case for a Jewish state, partly for political reasons due to the powerful Jewish lobby in the USA and partly in genuine response to the horrors of the Holocaust,. Moreover, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 had in fact committed Britain, “to the establishment of a separate Jewish homeland.” However, Palestine was inhabited by Arab Muslims which meant that increased Jewish immigration would inevitably lead to a civil war. Britain was in difficulties by 1946. They realised the strategic importance of the Arab states in securing future oil supplies, but on the other hand America held strong bargaining counters in the form of Marshall Aid and loans which was helping Britain through the “Financial Dunkirk”. After America demanded that 100,000 Jews be allowed immigration certificates for Palestine, Bevin attacked this by stating, “American foreign policy is dictated by Jews in New York,” and by emphasising that, “Britain will not be pushed around.” Bevin stood firm, even when the decision to turn away a boat carrying 4000 Jews resulting in him being called a racist. Palestine was on the brink of civil war and both sides pointed the finger of blame at Britain. British soldiers had the difficult task of keeping peace between Arab and Jew and were often the target of sustained terrorist attacks. For example, the King David Hotel was bombed by the Jewish Stern Gang in July 1946 killing nearly 70 British soldiers. Bevin realised the futility of Britain’s position and quickly decided to hand the problem of Palestine over to the United Nations, with Israel claiming immediate independence. One negative view of this decision is that Britain was simply interested in cutting her losses by leaving before a settlement was agreed and has thus caused future tensions, wars and distrust in Britain’s motives. On the other hand from a British point of view, Britain avoided responsibility for the creation of a Jewish state; this guaranteed a continued link with the Arab states that ensured the access to vital oil supplies that the British post war economy depended upon. Bevin’s responsibility as Foreign Secretary was to protect and enhance British interests abroad. By handing the problem of Palestine over to the UN he can be said to have done so. Bevin also involved the international peacekeeping body as it was intended to operate. There is no doubt that Palestine was not Bevin’s finest hour, but to have allowed British troops to be sacrificed in the middle of two uncompromising peoples would have been a terrible mistake.
When Labour took over in 1945, Britain ruled over almost 700 million people across the Empire. However, by 1951 when they lost office this figure had fallen to 90 million. The scale of this change was enormous and in some ways seems a major loss of British power and prestige. Nevertheless, more positively, those colonies who gained independence such as Burma generally joined the Commonwealth, turning it from “an all white man’s club,” to a “multi racial body based on equal relations.” . The growth of the Commonwealth was important if Britain was to hold its place in “the Big Three,” international powers. The prominent historian Kenneth Morgan states, “After 1945, the Commonwealth basked in a post-Victorian glow of growth and development.” Although the pace of decolonisation was quick, Britain did generally manage to withdraw smoothly. Bevin was desperate not to be drawn into prolonged fighting, as France had been in Algeria, and largely due to his skills this was achieved. The pace of de-colonisation began to slow down and Britain still had important interests in Africa, South America, the West Indies and many islands dotted around the globe. Historians argue that in order to maintain its “great-power status”. Britain passed the Colonial Development Act. This saw money being pumped into colonies to improve living standards, Kenneth Morgan states in his book “The People’s Peace”, “The Colonial Office became a hive of activity for young development economists and planners.” Perhaps the Act was intended to keep the countries from calling for independence or, more cynically, to create the impression that Britain remained a great power. When Bevin was appointed Foreign Secretary his clear aim was to retain as much of the Empire as possible, as any other policy in his view would have made Britain look weak to a degree that it plainly could not afford. However with debts of nearly £4billion (the equivalent in today’s money would be some £105 billion) Corelli Barnett argues, “It was a waste of money! It constituted a wide open mouth into which the Labour Government chose to stuff annually £20 million of capitol investment, so urgently needed to modernise Britain.” Barnett’s argument is simple. If Britain had not continued to chase its great power status but had focused on improving the country’s economy, Britain would have fared far better economically and would not have unnecessary foreign burdens which the country could not afford to defend. Sir Henry Tizzard’s view matched that of Barnett when he argued, “We are not a great power and never will be again. We are a great nation but if we continue to behave like a great power we will also soon cease to be a great a nation.” Chasing great power status was arguably one of Bevin’s greatest mistakes which attracted significant criticism. On the other hand, it can be argued that Britain had to stand firm and continue to project an image of a super power to reduce the threat of aggression from the Soviet Union in Western Europe. Bevin had strong anti-communist beliefs coupled with a distrust of Russia and was determined not to allow the Soviets further than Berlin.
Bevin also realised it was essential to keep the USA involved in European affairs. Kevin Jeffrey’s backs Bevin by stating in his book, “The Atlee Governments,” “There was a growing conviction that Britain’s post war security and economic recovery depended upon Washington.” Bevin knew Britain would need America to stave off the threat of Soviet domination and perceived that if America fell back into isolationism it would be catastrophic. Bevin’s view of the Soviet Union was made clear when he fully supported Churchill in his controversial Missouri speech when he famously stated that, “An iron curtain has descended across the continent.” American support was secured by Bevin in two stages. Firstly with Britain unable to afford the cost of defending Greece from Communist control, he begged America for support. Moreover, to entice Washington, he pointed out to the Americans that if Greece toppled it would create a domino effect. Turkey would be conquered by the Soviets and eventually the Middle East. This would have been disastrous for America as they, like Britain, now relied on the Middle East’s oil supplies to support their economy. Handing the oil fields over to the Soviets was unthinkable in Washington. Immediately, the Truman Doctrine came into force, stating that America would fully support any country trying to establish a democracy and fight against Communist control. Two years later, to “keep the Americans in and the Russians out,” Bevin was instrumental in setting up The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), to ensure peace and stability in Europe. The Treaty became the bulwark of British defence and indeed that of Western Europe, including France. The eventual success of NATO is borne out by the fact that no major conflict has been fought in Europe in over 60 years. When called upon, NATO has generally been efficient. For example in 1994 NATO air strikes helped bring about the end to the conflict in Bosnia which was followed by the Dayton Agreement. Bevin’s role in ensuring American support and creating NATO was a master stroke. He established security in Europe and gained America’s financial support in the economic rebuilding of Europe (Marshall Aid). Additionally, he safeguarded British interest in the Mediterranean, meaning that Britain would have vital continued sea communications with the Far East as well as the Middle East’s oil supplies. Once more Bevin negotiated the best possible solution for Britain.
Although Bevin and the Labour Party were in favour of some form of European Unity after 1945, they were not keen on Britain being part of it. Labour’s manifesto stated, “We in Britain are closer to our kinsmen in Australia and New Zealand on the far side of the world than we are to Europe.” Also, “Western Europe could never compensate for our Empire economically.” The belief was that the buying power of the Empire and Commonwealth could not be matched in Europe. Both parties would later admit this was a mistake. However, at the time this may have been seen as necessary, due to the fact that the European economy was in tatters. Martin Roberts aruges that, “Two years after the war ended, the European economy was on the point of collapse.” Labour wanted to see a strong Europe emerge. However it appeared that more immediate benefits lay in the Empire and Commonwealth. The first seeds of European Unity came when billions were poured in to Europe through Marshall Aid and Bevin set up the OEEC to decide how it would be spent. Once again Bevin had shown foresight and knew that problems in Western Europe would not be solved by American investment alone. Marshall Aid was given to Europe in order to stop the spread of Communism. The idea was, according to Martin Roberts that “a poverty stricken Europe was more likely to fall into Communism than a prosperous one.” Setting up the OECC allowed the money to be efficiently distributed where it was need most. Western Europe’s relatively high living standards were to some extent due to Marshall Aid and it was Bevin who built the foundations. Surprisingly America was prepared to offer Marshall Aid to all European countries including the Soviet Union. Marshall himself stated at Harvard, “Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Any government willing to assist the task of recovery will find co-operation on the part of the United States government.” Later in 1947, he set up the Brussels Pact to block German rearmament. The public in Britain saw this as a firm move towards avoiding future conflicts within Western Europe and Bevin himself was praised by the British public for his inexhaustible efforts. In 1951, when Britain was invited to join the Coal and Steel Community, Bevin stated that the offer “had been dropped on me like a tonne of bricks.” This would have seen Britain combine its coal and steel industry with France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and Luxemburg. In fact, Labour had nationalised the industries in Britain and were weary of further European commitments. However, their failure to do so is sometimes seen as Bevin’s biggest mistake. After 10 years, Britain’s economic growth was being outstripped by 30% per year by the original 6 countries in the community, due to the elimination of trade barriers and tariffs on the coal and steal. It took until 1973 (after two French rejections) when a desperate Britain, led by Harold Wilson, was allowed to join, by which time the massive growth and potential benefits had on the whole been lost. Although the failure to join the ECSC is regarded by many as Bevin’s biggest mistake, it was difficult to see how such involvement in Europe at that time, in its critical financial position, would have benefited Britain. Labour had nationalised the industry in Britain and had a clear plan as to where they wanted to take the country. This didn’t involve Britain being unified with Europe, and in this respect the criticism of Bevin is harsh.
There was considerable admiration for Russia in left wing quarters in Britain, and in particular in the Labour Party, after the Second World War. Both were left wing socialists and the Russians had “borne the brunt of Nazi aggression,” during WW2. However Bevin was personally anti-communist and did not trust Stalin’s motives. Kevin Jeffrey’s states, “It became clear the Anglo-American-Soviet wartime alliance was breaking down.” Bevin was now aware that it was not Germany that was the greatest threat to European stability, but the expanding Soviet Union. The relationship between the two countries deteriorated as Russia began to create satellite communist states such as, East Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania, the Baltic States and Poland. The imposition of Communism in Eastern Europe, along with how to deal with Germany after 1945 was a continuous source of provocation between Britain and the Soviet Union. Bevin knew that securing a strong German economy was essential. On the other hand, Stalin was intent on bringing Germany to its knees and utterly destroying its economic and military power for ever. Bevin pushed for the four zones in Germany to be linked economically. However Stalin refused and consequently Germany was firmly established as two countries, East and West, separated by an “iron curtain.” In 1948, when the Allies united Western Germany, it culminated in the Soviet Union implementing a blockade around Berlin, stopping the Allies getting aid to the people of the German capital. This was the Soviet Union. “Flexing its muscles.” Berlin was seen by the Russians as an embarrassment, as it was an island of capitalism in a communist stronghold. The embarrassment of Berlin had infuriated Stalin and as Archibald Evans states, “The Soviets were determined to demoralise the people of Germany.” The Allies were forced to strike back against the Soviets without risking engaging in combat and the allies decided the only possible answer was to airlift aid into Berlin on a daily basis. By the end of 1948, 6000 tonnes of aid a day was being flown in to Berlin, costing Britain - a bankrupt nation – millions of pounds. Barnett argues, “It cost the British tax payer nearly £10 million to keep Germany fed, a cost ultimately we could not afford.” The Airlift saw the beginning of the Cold War that raged until 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and the Berlin Wall was torn down. Although no direct fighting between America and the Soviets occurred, conflicts such as the Korean and Vietnam wars were subsequently used by both sides to undermine each other. Without Bevin’s firmness, Molotov the Soviet Foreign Secretary, whom Bevin called a “crook” would have bullied his way into dealing with Germany as Russia wanted. Arguably the people of Germany should be grateful for the determined work of Bevin in opposing Soviet policy in Germany His efforts confirmed that the German people at least held some hope of a future unified Germany again.
In conclusion, Bevin managed to reduce Britain’s commitments abroad by withdrawing from the Empire and by adhering to Labour’s key idea of Self-government. By pulling out of colonial commitments, he both recognised the limits of Britain’s power while at the same time preserved Britain’s world status as the Empire was transformed into the Commonwealth. The continued establishment of Britain’s place in “the Big Three” of world powers was achieved through “Decolonisation without trauma” as Morgan stated. Bevin was equally successful in drawing America into Europe and the Mediterranean, thus ensuring that America filled the vacuum left by Britain. Overall Bevin cleverly manipulated American power to secure British interests. Marshal Aid, Truman Doctrine and consequently the halt of further Soviet expansion can all be attributed in part to Bevin’s leadership and capacity to negotiate with leaders such as Molotov. Bevin’s reluctance to appreciate the potential of the European ideal, in that he maintained an isolationist stance on behalf of Britain, was perhaps his “greatest mistake”. As Acheson stated, “He felt that Britain was too superior to join the ECSC”. Nevertheless, he did begin the process of European unity by organising Marshal Aid and setting up the OEEC. The second most telling criticism levelled against Bevin was his reluctance to grasp that Britain was no longer the power that she once was. Barnett argues that we committed massive amounts of our economies resources in the pursuit of “our dreams and illusions of world power status.” Such a policy was ultimately harmful for Britain’s long term economic survival in positioning the country to address the growing economic threat that one day would come from of the re-emergent Germany and Japan. It hindered Britain’s economic growth and arguably sacrificed the long term future of Britain as a great economic power. Future generations would perhaps pay the price for Britain’s illusions in the form of lower economic growth, more limited prospects and a lower standard of living than European counterparts. Bevin clearly realised the threat posed by the USSR, and was right to form the Brussels Pact, blocking German rearmament and the NATO alliance which has had unrivalled success. Bevin lived up to his reputation and did not back down from the Soviet threat. Allied with his relative success in managing the difficult process of de-colonisation in very difficult circumstances, the legacy of Bevin as a great Foreign Secretary is undeniable.