The British RAF was strong in terms of model and design and the Spitfire and Hurricane fighters were formidable weapon The Spitfire was an all-metal cantilever monoplane. The shape of the wing, which became its most distinguishing characteristic, was elliptical, reducing drag and increasing speed. The British had the benefit of fighting on their own territory, which is important in a strategic air war as fuel consumption is crucial and German fighters like the Messchersmitt 109E were only sufficient to give them a few minutes of combat over British targets. Therefore, even though Germany was numerically superior, with 1200 bombers and 1000 fighters to 900 British fighters, the light bombers were vulnerable and British design had proved to be stronger.
Therefore, decisions made by government, pre-war and pre Battle of Britain, had been vital to the success of the RAF as it had saved valuable aircraft. However, despite the rescue of 300,000 troops from Dunkirk, many heavy armaments were left behind and on the return to Britain had only one Canadian division equipped. Hitler had mistakenly withdrawn his Panzers from action for three days and instead of using the opportunity to take tens of thousands of British and French prisoners, they were able to escape across the Channel. This is an important mistake made by the Germans as these troops, although unarmed, were vital for the defence of Britain by September. Britain undertook a rapid scheme of rearmament. Production peaked in June and this ‘spurt’ lasted through the crucial period with one hundred new spitfires and hurricanes a week. Vickers and Hawker were producing 500 Spitfires and Hurricanes each month while Messerschmitt was producing only 140 Me 109s and 90 Me 110s. This space in which Britain was able to rearm was also an important strategic mistake by Hitler. He had taken too long to plan his next attack and had allowed his enemies to recover from the defeat of France. Hitler had internal conflicts with the army having it’s own plans and being critical of the Navy. The Royal Navy was considerably stronger than the Kreigsmarine. Churchill had taken what he had considered as one of the most difficult decisions during the war in deciding to destroy the Vichy French Navy on July 3rd 1940 so that the Nazis were unable to access them to attack Britain. The Kreigsmarine had also lost many ships during the Norwegian campaign, having been seriously defeated in the two battles of Narvik with ten of the destroyers with a high proportion of Dietl’s force being sunk in the Narvik fiords. This reduced naval strength could have been one of the reasons why a strategic air war was chosen. This strategic mistake may have cause hostility between the Kriegsmarine and Hitler and delayed decisive strategic planning for Operation Sealion. Arguments between the Navy and the Army continued for months and could have been a potential reason as to why contemplating their attack had taken so long.
It is also questionable as to why Hitler chose a strategic air war to attack Britain. By the summer of 1940, Germany had several options yet a route was taken to attack the RAF: the force which had kept the Luftwaffe away from the soldiers at Dunkirk. Goering was over-confident, with an arrogant belief that Britain could be brought ‘down on its knees’ by any simulacrum of a ‘hard blow’ that he directed against it, and the Luftwaffe had never been designed for strategic, sustained and especially not independent aerial warfare. The previous successes of the Luftwaffe had been of the Blitzkrieg type only and the bombers had not been designed to ‘Carpet Bomb’ large areas. Therefore, the impact that the Bombers could have on Britain was limited, particularly when fuel supplies only allowed brief combat. An important mistake that Goering made was to underestimate the importance of radar. Much of the South and East of England had radar stations which could detect the German bombers, therefore destroying the element of surprise. However, when the radar station was out of action on the Isle of Wight, Goering called off attacks, despite having a perfect opportunity to attack the coast with little defence. Radar fed out over one hundred miles and meant that the British pilots could do standard patrols without wasting fuel, time or energy. With the information of height, distance and formation the British were at advantage before take off.
The Luftwaffe bombed RAF aerodromes and communication systems and the RAF began to lose heavily with many of the fighters being bombed on the ground and the aircraft factories being unable to keep up with losses of the magnitude they were experiencing. Six out of seven of the major airfields in the South West were badly damaged, yet Goering, probably not realising how close they were to victory switched offensive to bombing London in retaliation for the bombing of Berlin. This is a crucial decision taken by Germany as after the fortnight from 24th August to 6th September Britain was so close to defeat and the change of offensive actually saved the country, not only militarily but in the general morale of the country. Therefore, the German mistake of a change of tactics was an important factor in the survival of the British. Despite reducing industrial production in Britain, the German bombers suffered heavy casualties in daytime raids and were forced to change to night bombing.
It is arguable as to whether the strength and efficiency of the RAF was the direct cause of Britain’s success. The mistakes of Goering, underestimating radar and withdrawing just as Britain was nearly defeated, were fortunate for Britain. It is true that the attack of Berlin by the RAF spurred the Germans to begin the Blitz on the capital, yet this could not necessarily have been a planned offensive as the reaction of the German Luftwaffe was not predictable. The RAF did defend Britain, and shot down many German aircraft yet even when the country was almost beaten, the morale did not sink. When the Blitz began in September 1940, the morale only raised, a direct juxtaposition with the defeatist attitude of the French. Churchill played a huge role when discussing why Britain defeated Germany. He swore to the country:
‘We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills, we shall never surrender…’
Churchill was not Prime Minister throughout the whole of 1940 yet when he came to power his attitude and powerful speeches raised public morale. His positive attitude to the public that Britain would win created, ostensibly at least, a positive morale from a whole country that the Germans would be defeated.
Hitler, however, had a more half-hearted view towards the attack on Britain. He had only hoped for a short war and the original date for the completion of a war economy had been approximately 1942. Hitler had never wanted to attack Britain. It is possible that Hitler had trusted Goering in believing that an air attack would be the quickest option. Perhaps he had hoped for a mental defeat, and that Churchill would sue for peace. However, evidently, this did not happen. Perhaps Hitler opted for a strategic air war for fear of the Royal Navy. The Kreigsmarine had been severely damaged in Norway, both with ships and crew, and the notorious British Navy may have been a deterrent.
When answering whether it was the strength and efficiency of the RAF that frustrated the German attempts to defeat Britain in 1940 it can be said that there were other more significant factors. The RAF had better equipment and had the advantage of fighting on British soil yet many of the planes were bombed on the ground and 6 out of 7 of air bases in the South East were attacked. It is fortunate that the Luftwaffe changed strategies just as the RAF was close to defeat. Therefore, it can be concluded that what ‘frustrated the German attempts to defeat Britain’ was in fact their own mistakes, that the key factor was German military miscalculations. At several points they had the opportunity to weaken their enemy. At the beaches in Dunkirk they could have used Panzers and more attack in order to reduce the enemy numerically. Yet, they did not. Instead they chose to attack from the skies, where the RAF, at this stage ‘ruled the skies’. They took too long to decide their attack, giving their enemy time to rearm. Instead of attacking when they were weak this lull in attack allowed Britain to strengthen their troops. When Germany did decide to attack, they withdrew from offensive when their enemy was at it’s weakest and underestimated what was possibly Britain’s most valuable tool: radar. It may be possible to say that the RAF played a major contributing in the eventual defeat of Germany in 1945, but the Nazi’s could have had victory overall and at a much earlier stage in 1940. However, Germany’s mistakes, underestimations and delays prevented this and hindered the efforts of many millions of German servicemen. The strategic decision of an attack via air may not have been the initially mistake as by the beginning of September, the Germans were winning. The downfall in Nazi strategic planning fell in the actions and tactics during the battle and therefore, whilst the RAF fought courageously and kept with technological advances, this did not serve to save Britain. Indeed, the factor, which saved Britain and consequently frustrated German attempts to defeat her, was in fact their own strategic mistakes.