'No power wanted war, but all were willing to risk one.' Discuss this comment on the crisis of July-August 1914.

Once the decision for war had been made, Vienna, even if it made no attempt to dissuade Russian intervention, was still very careful not to provoke it. It took two weeks from the time it was decided to issue an ultimatum, to the time of actual issue. A main reason for the delay was the fear of a unified (and therefore probably hostile) response from Russia and her ally France, whose President and Prime Minister were on a state visit to St. Petersburg. Further, following Franz Joseph’s order for mobilisation on the 28th July, no movements were ordered near to the Russian border so to deny Russia any pretext for intervention.

However, by the end of July there were many indications that Russia would intervene. On 16th July Vienna received an unmistakeable warning from the Russian Foreign Ministry that with ‘unquestionable resolve’ Russia would stand by Serbia in the face of Austro-Hungarian aggression. A similar warning from Poincare to the Austrian ambassador in St Petersburg that ‘Serbia had friends’ did nothing to deter Vienna from its course of action. By 31st of July the Common Ministerial Council met again following news of Russian mobilisation but, determined to stay their course, they consciously risked a general war with Russia (and therefore France) to fight a local war with Serbia.

Russia was also a troubled state in 1914 following six decades of military defeat ending with the catastrophe at the hands of Japan in 1904-05. This was followed by a number of diplomatic defeats to Germany and Austria-Hungary in the early twentieth century, notably in 1908 during the Austrian annexation of Bosnia.

The July Crisis for Russia only began in earnest with the publication of the ultimatum to Serbia on the 24th July 1914. It was on this day that Tsar Nicholas II convened a meeting of the Council of Ministers to decide Russia’s reaction to the Austro-Hungarian aggression. It is clear from this meeting that the Russian decision-makers were well aware of the gravity and scope of the crisis. Sazonov, the Foreign Minister spoke first, stressing Germanys’ role and expansive ambitions in encouraging Vienna. He also spoke of how Germany viewed Russian moderation in the past ten years as weakness (which in truth it was) and that the time had come to make a stand. He said that Russia had made ‘immense sacrifices’ to secure the independence of the Slav people and if she abandoned under threat her ‘historic mission…she would have to take second place among the powers.’ Crucially though, Sazonov recognised that such a firm policy meant a real risk of war with the Central Powers.  This sentiment was echoed throughout the cabinet.

One other important belief held by the ministers was that peace was in no way guaranteed by concessions or a conciliatory stance. The conclusions of the cabinet can be summed up adequately through the words of the chairman of the Council of Ministers Goremykin who said ‘it was the Imperial Government’s duty to decide definitely in favour of Serbia’; that firmness rather than conciliation was likely to secure peace but if it failed to so ‘ Russia should be ready to make the sacrifices required of her.’ It would be fair to say then that Russia, whilst not actively seeking a war with Austria-Hungary, was prepared to support Serbia militarily against any aggression from Vienna.

Although well aware of her possible intervention ministers were keen not to fight Germany. However as was apparent by the end of July, the ministers had been misled by military leaders who had failed to highlight the impracticability of partial mobilisation. Due to inflexible military planning, general mobilisation was the only way of effectively fighting Austria-Hungary but it also meant mobilisation on the German border. This was seen as a cassus belli in Berlin, for whom general mobilisation led automatically to war. On the 29th July Berlin warned St Petersburg that unless she ceased military preparations, Germany would be forced to declare war on Russia. Sazonov, astonished at the conciliatory tone of Serbia’s response to the ultimatum saw Vienna’s declaration of war as a clear sign of German connivance; in his view war with the Central Powers was inevitable. It was therefore with full knowledge of German intervention that Sazonov, War Minister Yanushkevich and influential Minister of Agriculture Krivoshein convinced Nicholas II to order general mobilisation on the 30th July 1914. The Tsar knew that general mobilisation did not risk war, it meant war, a war that Russia did not want but felt it had no choice but to fight.

Traditionally Germany has been apportioned a large amount of blame for the start of the war as it was seen as the nation with the most to gain from a major war. German leaders were gripped by what has been termed the ‘topos of inevitable war,’ which combined with Germany’s declining relative strength (it was believed that German continental hegemony would be lost to Russia by 1916) contributed to the ‘now or never’ viewpoint of German military leaders in July 1914. Additionally a sense of isolation for Germany in the world arena and concern about Anglo-Russian military and diplomatic attempts to encircle the Reich set the scene for the ‘blank check’ offered to Austria-Hungary.

The so-called ‘blank check’ was one of the key links in the chain that if broken could have probably prevented the catastrophe of July 1914. The Kaiser and Chancellor Bethman Hollweg explicitly recognised the possibility of Russian intervention in any conflict with Serbia but this was a prospect that did not alarm the German military.  They were also aware that any confrontation with Russia would necessarily mean conflict with France and probably Britain due to the inflexibility of the Schlieffen Plan, the only German military plan for a conflict with Russia. Nevertheless the blank check policy effectively provided the two competing parties influencing German decision-making, Bethman and the Foreign Office on one side and the military leaders headed by Chief of Staff Moltke on the other, with a win-win situation.

The more dovish Bethman saw an opportunity to ease the deteriorating domestic situation regarding the monarchy combined with the possibility of a strengthened international position from a stronger Austria-Hungary. Bethman genuinely believed that a local war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was possible. There was a belief in the German government that the Tsar would not lend his support to royal assassins, that Russia was not ready militarily or financially for a major war and that France faced similar domestic pre-occupations. Moltke accepted this policy because if it failed, he would have the war he had been long advocating.

The one condition of the blank check was that Vienna act very fast; Berlin wanted first to achieve a fait accompli and then to be friendly towards the Entente. Bethman was well aware that the inherent risk of this policy grew the longer Vienna took. With Vienna’s decision to issue an ultimatum on the 7th July it became clear that Bethman would not achieve the fait accompli. On 21st July 1914, he wrote to his ambassadors in the Entente capitals; ‘We urgently desire a localisation of the conflict; any intervention by another power will, in view of the divergent alliance commitments, lead to incalculable consequences.’  Nevertheless the Chancellor clung on to the policy believing that Germany had no choice given the worsening balance of power for Germany. When the Kaiser and military leaders returned from holiday on the 26th July 1914, Bethman realised that he could not back down in the face of Russian intimidation both for domestic and international reasons. He decided that war was inevitable and shifted his emphasis to creating a favourable military climate for Germany.

France had a central role in providing the context that ensured the July Crisis developed into a major war. It’s Dual Alliance with Russia and Entente Cordiale with Britain provided Germany’s diplomatic isolation. A series of colonial disputes and funding Russian military expansion heightened Franco-German relations. However in the July Crisis itself France was a relatively minor player in comparison to Austria-Hungary, Russia or Germany. During most of the crisis, President Poincare and Prime Minister Viviani were literally at sea, sailing to and from St. Petersburg leaving no one in Paris capable of making critical decisions. Kiesling argues that France’s goal in 1914 was precisely to avoid making decisions;

‘Any action taken in that highly incendiary situation could contribute to igniting a conflagration that France did not want and for which it did not wish to be responsible.’

        

This view has to be balanced against the fact that, during Poincare’s visit to St. Petersburg, it is likely that firm adherence to the Dual Alliance was confirmed.  Indeed France could not afford to do otherwise. Poincare saw that to abandon Russia would mean almost certain defeat at the hands of Germany, should conflict erupt. This would then leave France totally isolated on the Continent. Similarly, even restraining Russia would have damaged the balance of power by allowing Austria-Hungary to gain prestige, and Russia to lose it.

        With hindsight, France’s diplomatic decisions mattered little, she would have been embroiled in the war either through alliance commitments or as the incidental victim of the Schlieffen Plan. She did not want war, there was no domestic, political, financial or military gain to be had. However she had to offer support to Russia, a policy that no doubt made war more likely than less. France was worried that any hesitation would ‘erode the fragile understandings’ with Britain and Russia that were the mainstay of her security against Germany. In this context she had no choice but to embrace the dangerous opportunity to support Russia whether it meant war with Germany or not.

    Britain, unlike the other four powers discussed was not directly threatened by the events of the July Crisis. Had she acted differently, continental Europe would still have been embroiled in a major war and for these reasons her entry into the war is less relevant to this essay. Britain took no decisions that risked war, she took a decision to enter it. This decision was taken with no room to manoeuvre, she was presented with a situation in which she had two possible ways to react. As late as 1st August 1914, a majority of Cabinet members did not want to go to war with Russia and France. Eventually, the ‘old elite’ prevailed to persuade the cabinet that British intervention was necessary as she could not afford to see the balance of power in Europe change in Germany’s favour. Similarly, if an abandoned France and Russia were victorious, it is likely that the post-war balance of power would also weigh against Britain. After much debate, cabinet and parliamentary splits, it was the German invasion of Belgium that ensured Foreign Minister Grey got the intervention he wanted. He led Britain into a war she did not want but felt compelled to fight. The only risk she took was in believing that the war would be over by Christmas.

To say that no power wanted war would be incorrect. It is fair to say that certain elements of government in all powers did not want war, such as Bethman in Germany and Tisza in Austria-Hungary. However the reality is that military leaders and some politicians in Germany did want war and got it albeit through the failure of a less drastic policy. It is again fair to say that, with the exception of Britain, the leaders in each capital were explicitly willing to pursue policies from which a major war was a possible, even likely outcome. In Germany, Bethman’s brinkmanship provided the momentum for pro-war factions to get their way. In Austria-Hungary, the leaders wanted a localised war, not a major war but were aware of the possibility of escalation. In Russia, the Tsar knew that general mobilisation would virtually guarantee a war with Germany. In France, Poincare was aware that his support of Russia would make war more likely. The British decisions did not risk war, they meant war. There was often a lot of miscalculation as to the severity of the risks taken but it would be totally wrong to say that in each of the critical decisions, the decision-makers saw no risk.

 

 

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