During the tumultuous and uncertain period following the break-up of the Soviet Union, American and Russian nuclear policymakers recognized the need to make some new and important measures in order to decrease the amount of accumulated nuclear weapons in their arsenals (figure 1.) In July 1991, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev agreed to withdraw tens of thousands of forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons. On this occasion they have signed the START-I (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) with the final aim to ensure parity in the number of nuclear warheads of these two countries. For the first time, decisions were made on physical liquidation of nuclear warheads and on preventing future military use of fissile materials (Belorus, 1997: 162) (also-picture 1). The limitations of START-I are shown in figure 2. Signing of a new Treaty was a major shift in Russo-American relations and their nuclear strategies. This new phase of arms control indicated that the arms race was slowing down, thus the threat of the accidental nuclear war was reduced. This change of direction in Russian nuclear policy was a step forward towards a better confidence building between the nuclear giants, and recognition that only with mutual efforts, the progress in nuclear disarmament and arms control can be made.
One of the major features of Russian post-Cold War nuclear policy was the signing of the START-II Treaty in January 1993. The Russo-American adherence to the fulfilment of START-I was confirmed, and the states agreed to implement further cuts in the number of strategic arms. The Treaty was aimed to reduce the number of nuclear warheads from 6000 to a maximum of 3500 for each side by the end of 2007 (figure 2.). The number of warheads deployed on SIBMs (short-range intercontinental ballistic missiles) was not to exceed 1750, and the MIRVs (Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) were to be destroyed completely (Belorus, 1997: 165). Entering the second phase of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks was a significant characteristic of the development of the Russian nuclear strategy, as it paved the way for future negotiations on greater reduction in the Russian and U.S nuclear arsenals under START-III accordingly. The result was a positive feeling on both sides because the relationship between the United States and Russian Federation seemed to progress.
START-II promoted the increased efforts of both sides towards a nuclear disarmament. However, Benson (1998) suggests that this Treaty creates a larger asymmetry between the two nuclear superpowers. On the one side the Treaty makes it easier for both actors to reach the lower numbers of nuclear warheads by permitting selected types of ICBMs and all SIBMs to be reduced from multiple warheads to a single one. On the other side, the imbalance is created because Russia has to eliminate all of its delivery systems, while United States in fact just reduces combat vehicles of its strategic forces (Benson, 1998: 595). Podvig on this issue comments (2000) that START-II has no chance of entering into force because of too many unresolved disputes between United States and Russia, such as the disagreement over ABM (anti-ballistic missile) Treaty. Despite much criticism it receives, START-II Treaty overall contributes to strategic stability and reduces both countries’ capabilities to make explicitly damaging counter-force nuclear strike. (Berry, 1987: 37). It also strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime, reduces the risk of accidental nuclear conflict and aids in confidence building in Russo-American relationship. For example, the Black Brant XII incident occurred in 1995, where Norwegian-U.S. joint research rocket was mistaken by Russia as a nuclear attack. Yeltsin did not act immediately, primarily because Russia was guaranteed some form of partnership and security by START Treaties and it felt confident in its relationship to Washington. Thus the retaliatory counter-attack was not carried out, and the breakout of the accidental nuclear war was avoided (Dvorkin 1999: 2).
The issue of Russian New Military Doctrine followed START-II Treaty in the same year (1993). It concentrated more on internal than external threats to Federation’s security. The concept ‘Kontzeptzia’ and the main tenants ‘Osnovnye Polozhena’ gave priority to economic progress and elaborated national interests of Russia as regional superpower, great power and nuclear superpower (Dvorkin, 1999: 5). This doctrine allowed Russia to use nuclear weapons first in an attack by a nuclear weapon state and any of its allies, but stressed the internal threats as the major threats to national security. Russian New Military Doctrine was the expansion of its post-Cold War nuclear strategy. Even though the concept of nuclear weapons use was extended, the doctrine indicated Russia’s feeling of higher security from external threats. Therefore, better relations with the United States were established and their mutual confidence was raised.
The next important phase in development of Russian nuclear strategy was the U.S-Russian summit in March 1997, where the framework agreements were signed for START-III Treaty. Belorus (1997) suggests that this summit helped both countries to solve the number of sensitive problems, such as the restructuring of SNF (Strategic Nuclear Forces), the number on nuclear warheads on strategic delivering vehicles (assigned to 2000-2500 units) and the reduction time was extended to 31. December 2007. Belorus (1997) stresses the importance of initiating and implementing START-III, -IV and –V in Russian nuclear strategy, in order to include all nuclear weapon states to eliminate all nuclear weapons. He then proposes that only a small nuclear arsenal should be left in hands of United Nations to deter international nuclear terrorists. This would increase cooperation between all nuclear states and the possibility of any kind of nuclear conflict would virtually disappear (Belorus, 1997: 171).
The successive act by Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, was the issue of National Security Concept, which stated that Russia does not need to achieve the military parity with the West. In terms of nuclear strategy, this was a clear indication that East-West antagonism was disappearing and it reduced the pressure on Russia in following rapid military and technological developments of United States. In terms of nuclear strategy, the concept allowed use of nuclear weapons only if the existence of Federation came into question. This phase in Russian nuclear and military strategy was an important point in the domain of arms control issue, because it demonstrated that tense Russo-American relationships were eased and the countries were working together towards a global disarmament.
Russo-U.S relationships were seriously influenced by international crises such as the Kosovo crises. U.S strategy for attacking Yugoslavia despite strong objections from Russia and without the approval from the United Nations, points out the increased role of NATO within international community and indicates NATO’s expansion to the East. Wallander (2002) suggests that the ‘experience of NATO enlargement at Russian expense proved to the statist security elite that U.S was unreliable’. This unilateral act of U.S.A in international crisis management confirmed worries of 1997 Security concept and undermined the liberal arguments for ‘equal partnership with America’. NATO intervention in Kosovo conflict and its aggression on a sovereign country affected Russian relationships with U.S.A negatively. Russia felt vulnerable, angry, disappointed and threatened by NATO expansion to the East. NATO could endanger its own territorial integrity in the future, in case of domestic crisis due to ethno-separatist aspirations. Kosovo crises was a catalyst for a direct response from Moscow and affected Russia’s nuclear strategy and confidence-building with U.S. Therefore the following year, Russian president Putin came up with a New National Security Concept, which was a blueprint for a national and nuclear security of Russian Federation.
Russian national security blueprint document replaces 1997 security concept, and displays a shift in Russian nuclear strategy. As a comparison, the 1997 national security concept allowed the first use of nuclear weapons only ‘in case of a threat to the existence of Russian Federation’ (McCain, 1989: 58). New concept allows such use (of nuclear weapons) to ‘repulse armed aggression, if all other means of resolving the crisis have been exhausted’ (Podvig, 2002: 4). This document expands the types of external threats to Russian security and lowers Russia’s nuclear threshold for permitting the use of nuclear weapons. The blueprint for Russian security indicates the change in the nature of its nuclear strategy, as the Jan. 14 issues of ‘Nezavisinoye voennoye obozreniye’ (http://www.english.pravda.ru) reports: ‘A vital task of Russian Federation is to exercise deterrence to prevent aggression on any scale and nuclear or otherwise, against Russia and its allies. The Russian Federation should possess nuclear forces that are capable of guaranteeing the infliction of the desired extent of damage against any aggressor in any conditions and circumstances’. This clearly shows the shift in the intensions of Russia to totally eliminate its nuclear weapons, thus the shift in Russian nuclear strategy. New Security Concept opens a new chapter in Russo-American dialogue, which was inflicted with mistrust due to NATO 1999 intervention in the Balkans.
Another dispute in relationship between the two nuclear superpowers was the U.S 2001 declaration of withdrawal from 1972 ABM Treaty and its intention to build-up a National Missile Defence (NMD) system. ABM Treaty provided Russia with status, partnership and security, and the Federation considered it as a matter of principle and a vehicle for asserting its position in international affairs (picture 2.) ABM Treaty limited U.S counter-force capabilities and created the guarantee basis for Russian confidence building with United States in the mid-nineties. Even though Russian president Putin changed his decision to withdraw from all nuclear disarmament treaties as a response to U.S withdrawal from ABM, Russia had speeded up the build-up of its missile defence system- Triumf S-400 (picture 3.). Despite the claims by Russian military and political leadership that American NMD is currently not technically possible, there is a difference between said and done. Russian nuclear strategy took another turn, and instead of mutual efforts towards nuclear disarmament, Russia is now working towards modernisation of its nuclear capabilities and nuclear weapons.
There is a current deadlock on US-Russian agreements in terms of further nuclear disarmament. These nuclear giants are still operating within the old army control negotiations framework, which provides few incentives for solving the problems that exist today. Although Russian nuclear strategy in the post-Cold War era was evolving through mutual treaties to build-up more confidence with United States, the underlying political issues did not resolve the controversies. The failure of United States and Russia to make a better progress towards nuclear disarmament and end nuclear testing, cleared the ground for India and Pakistan to engage in a new nuclear arms race (Hartle & Sikonen, 1991:101). Many analysts urge all nuclear countries, especially Russia and United States to collaborate towards a further nuclear disarmament, better arms control and prevent international terrorist organizations to reach nuclear materials. Russian post-Cold War nuclear strategy contributed to overall reduction of nuclear weapons (from 60.000 to 35.000) (Dvorkin, 1999: 17), however the risk of accidental nuclear war is still real and the threat of nuclear proliferation is greater than ever.