It can also be argued that the 1905 revolution transformed the autocracy in social terms. After the 1905 Revolution, strikes became more organised – after the failure of 1905, it was as if workers had learnt they needed to strike as one unit, as opposed to previously where there was no unity, and 1905 was when this started to happen regularly – for example, the Printer’s strike in late September 1905 which quickly turned into a general strike. This was also the time when Soviets emerged, seizing control of essential services, power, hospitals and food distribution in the cities. Strikes continued after 1905 also, illustrating the importance of this increased organisation. Government repression may explain why strike action, peaking in 1905-06, declined steadily over the next 6 years. However, the sudden explosion of strikes again in 1912-14 could be explained by the Lena Goldfields Massacre in 1912, and led to a general strike in St Petersburg in July 1914. More social transformation brought on by 1905 were Stolypin’s education reforms of 1908. For the first time, every Russian child was to attend Primary School which illustrated the desire to instil ideas of the autocracy and the Tsar’s rule from an early age, showing a fear of future opposition to the autocracy. Once again, this stems from the 1905 revolution. This was also a transformation as it was Government spending, not the Church; spending which rose from 19 million roubles in 1905 (1.8% of the budget) to 76 million roubles in 1914 (4.2% of the budget)
Militarily, it can be said that the 1905 revolution transformed the autocracy. For instance, the mutiny of the sailors on the Battleship Potemkin directly blamed the Tsar for defeat in the Russo-Japanese war. This was the first time the Tsar’s moral authority had been put in doubt, and showed the first few initial signs of the loyalty of the armed forces starting to waver. In these terms, the 1905 revolution was hugely significant as it marked a turning point from unquestioning loyalty amongst the forces, to the situation where the Tsar was directly blamed for Military failure.
It could further be argued that politically, the 1905 revolution transformed the autocracy. This was the first time in the history of Tsarism that a Tsar had had to consider the realistic possibility of a democratic government such as the Duma proposed by the October Manifesto. It goes without saying that the October Manifesto was the largest potential transformation of all for the autocracy in the 1905 revolution. The promise of an elected Duma, the right to vote for all Russian men, all new laws to be approved by the Duma, freedom of political parties, to join trade unions and have freedom of speech was a huge transformation. It was only down to the fundamental laws that stopped this being the start of a move to democracy for autocratic Russia. The October Manifesto was also a transformation to the autocracy by means of splitting the opposition – thus the Tsar managed to preserve the autocracy in the short term, but also in the hope of in the long term splitting the parties’ interests from one another. Only the workers were left unappeased; they gained nothing from the Manifesto and continued to strike against the Government. At this point, the Tsar still had the support of the army, which he used to crush the final workers uprising in December of 1905 – the workers were isolated from other revolutionary groups. In the years following 1905, membership of trade unions and the most radical political parties dropped considerably – from 300,000 in 1907 to 40,000 in 1913. Again, this could easily be a sign of Government repression rather than contented workers post 1905, especially given that they did not actually benefit from the 1905 revolution and continued to strike. One final aspect of the political transformation was the slow decrease in support for the Tsar by the nobility – this would grow with the influence of Rasputin. Even more disastrously for the Tsar, the rise in numbers and knowledge of the intelligentsia was a serious change gradually over this period.
On the other hand, it could be seen that the 1905 revolution did not transform the autocracy in economic terms. For example, although 3.5 million peasants were persuaded to migrate to virgin lands in Siberia, the majority of peasants did not withdraw themselves from the mir, only about 20% had done so by 1916. Population growth, up by 21% 1900-1910, put yet more pressure on increasingly limited resources: methods in the countryside remained backward and the production of food could not keep pace with the growing population. Stolypin’s reforms were, by and large, too little too late: agricultural changes were too limited as there were not enough Kulaks to create a sufficient buffer against discontent. Russia was still behind other countries in terms of its exports and imports; the economy was still heavily run by government intervention – as Pobedonostsev stated “the continuation of the regime depends on our ability to keep Russia in a frozen state”. Furthermore the aim of the Tsar to merely preserve the autocracy stood in the way of true modernisation and in these aspects the autocracy had not particularly changed.
Socially-wise, it could be argued that there was not a transformation of the autocracy from the 1905 revolution. After all, peasants continued to destroy crops and attack landowners which had always happened in the past for Russia as soon as there was discontent. This shows that there was no real change in the behaviour patterns of many social groups post 1905, thus these were not transformed at all.
From a military aspect, it can be argued that there was not a transformation of the autocracy from the 1905 revolution. Though the 2nd Duma in particular argued for military reforms, the Duma was dissolved and therefore although military reforms were already in place, the events of the war illustrate that these did not go far enough – the 1905 revolution should have been all the motivation the Tsar needed for him to want to modernise the army as quickly as possible, especially given the rearmament process Russia was going through.
Politically, the same argument can be said. Russia wasn’t actually that democratic at all, but for the Tsar it was all about making sure in the eyes of the Russian masses and Russia’s allies there was an image of democracy. This was good for the Tsar’s main aims of preserving the autocracy, as it suggested he was appeasing the masses’ requests. However, with the fundamental laws, the Tsar had ‘created the Duma, not to be directed by it, but to be advised’. Essentially, the Tsar had regained complete control, and the Duma became a puppet organisation before it even sat, a total u-turn for the Tsar. On top of this, the property qualification meant that very few factory workers had access to the ballot box, but there was at least some representation for everyone, including 31% to the relatively small class of landowners, 42% to the peasants and 27% to the towns. The fact that there had always been nationalist movements before, for instance the 1897 Jewish Bund/Union and the 1863 Polish Rebellion, illustrated that political opposition was no new concept to Tsardom. Although the October Manifesto did allow the wealthy middle class a vote, it meant that the Tsar could preserve power by once again splitting the opposition – the middle class intelligentsia could have been a dangerous leadership basis for a potential revolution, the concept of divide and rule evident here. The first two Dumas being deemed too radical indicated the Tsar’s notion for them being an advisory body, a link to the outside world away from his family – and changes to the electoral laws allowed a far more tamed Duma in the 3rd and 4th sittings. However, this meant only1% of the population elected 300 out of 442 of the Duma members, so shows that really nothing had changed since 1905 in this aspect.
It is certainly fair to say that to some extent there was not much of a transformation of the autocracy from the 1905 revolution, with aspects such as the ever-slow pace of reform bringing down the half-hearted attempts of modernisation by Nicholas II. Generally, as ever with Russia, its backwardness held it back. However, the 1905 revolution did transform the autocracy in several ways. For example, economic and social reforms started the slow process of keeping up with the times – as Stolypin said, if Russia had had 20 more years they would have been fine. Unfortunately, however, the war did not wait 20 years to arrive on Russia’s doorstep. The October Manifesto was a clear indication of the pressure building up, and resultantly the Fundamental Laws and dissolving of the first two Dumas would not cause the workers’ strikes to settle down. Pressure from other groups, even the declining support of the aristocracy showed that sooner or later, due to events in 1905, an even bigger transformation would occur than before.