Following the failure of the invasion of the Bay of Pigs, the Kennedy Administration continued to struggle with the problem of “Castroism” in the hemisphere. Longer-range efforts not specifically relating to the Bay of Pigs operation were carried out (Rusk 216).
Reasons Why the Bay of Pigs Invasion was Pursued
One argument for pursuing the Bay of Pigs Invasion was that Kennedy had no alternative but to approve the plan. For one thing, the training by the CIA and thousands of Cubans at secret camps had long been completed. The invaders were “overready” and to call off the invasion would have “demoralized” the anti-Castro exiles (Lasky 516).
Tim Weiner, a New York Times journalist, implied that President Kennedy had been in office just three months when the invasion took place and therefore did not have enough experience and understanding of the issue to make wise decisions (Weiner 2). Here, Weiner somewhat discredits the President and his officials for lack of experience and complete information of the CIA plans. Therefore, two reasons why the Bay of Pigs Invasion was pursued were because of lack of experience and recognized knowledge in the Kennedy Administration, and because the Administration believed there was no alternative.
IV. The Goal the Decision was Intended to Achieve
The main goal the foreign policy decision on the Bay of Pigs intended to achieve was containment of Communism. In 1947, President Harry Truman announced that the U.S. would lead a global effort to fight Communism. This policy later became known as the Truman Doctrine, which was why the United States started to provide large amounts of foreign aid to friendly nations, and alerted the world of the dangers of Communism.
Subsequently, in 1961, the United States’ trepidation was that Communism in Cuba would spread to other Latin American countries. Not only was this a political concern, but there was also a military concern in that the Soviets would exploit Communism in Latin America. With the Soviet Union’s aid, Cuba could build up their army and later become an influential power in other Latin American countries. Thus, the United States’ goal was to limit the spreading of Communism.
An economic goal of the United States in pursuing the Bay of Pigs policy was to gain back U.S. territory that had been restrained from the Cuban government. Many American landowners’ properties had been taken away without compensation after Castro came into power. When former President, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor Policy” had repealed the Platt Amendment in 1934 (which permitted American intervention in Cuba), U.S. business interests still dominated the Cuban economy and American companies controlled eighty to one hundred percent of Cuba’s utilities, mines, cattle ranches, and oil refineries, forty percent of the sugar industry, and fifty percent of the public railways. Castro’s government confiscated over a million acres of land from three American companies, including United Fruit. The United States tried to diplomatically resolve problems by cutting off trade, but failed for several reasons. Accordingly, the U.S.’ decision to undertake the Bay of Pigs foreign policy was due to economic, political, and military threats to American society.
V. Alternative Policies That Could Have been Pursued
Three alternative policies President, John F. Kennedy could have pursued in 1961 during the Bay of Pigs invasion were discontinuing Eisenhower’s plan altogether, resolving conflicts diplomatically, or backing the anti-revolutionary forces more aggressively with U.S. forces. According to Professor Rostow, the Washington team engaged in the operation begged CIA officer, Bissell, to ask the President to back the anti-Castro forces with American military power (Rostow 210). This shows that some Americans wanted a stronger attack. Consequently, the alternative here would have been to mobilize American forces against Castro more belligerently. This policy would perhaps have been more successful in overthrowing Fidel Castro if carried out.
CIA official, Hawkins believed that “Kennedy should have either supported the operation more openly and aggressively or canceled it altogether” (Hawkins 4). Therefore, two alternatives that Hawkins suggested were for the U.S. to back the exiles with more military support, or to cancel the operation. If the latter had been pursued, the U.S. could have tried to then resolve Cuban conflicts diplomatically. According to historian, Walter LaFeber, Kennedy should have ceased all invasion plans when he came to power in 1961 (LaFeber 220). In his novel, America Russia and the Cold War 1945-1990, LaFeber, like Hawkins, implies that the invasion was a major mistake and that the U.S. should have tried to resolve issues diplomatically.
Secretary of State, Rusk, was also opposed to the Bay of Pigs invasion at the time. In his autobiography, Rusk states that he was opposed to the entire operation, meaning that his ideas coincide with LaFeber’s ideas. He believed that the United States should have backed out of the plan and tried to resolve conflicts diplomatically. However, Rusk was also troubled by that idea because if they had conducted the operation overtly, it wouldn’t have given the U.S. the chance to mobilize overt support that “we might have gotten from other nations” (Rusk 215). Therefore, three possible alternatives to the Bay of Pigs Invasion were canceling the operation, resolving conflicts diplomatically, or invading Cuba more forcefully.
VI. Reasons Why Alternative Policies Were Not Pursued
Rostow’s policy to back the exiles with U.S. military forces more forcefully wasn’t pursued for several reasons. Firstly, Kennedy “was not about to throw the full strength of the carrier-based aircraft into the battle,” because he didn’t want to reverse his fundamental position that this was a conflict between Cubans, not a war between the United States and Cuba. Secondly, the option of moving from an invasion to a guerilla operation was ruled out by geography and the choice of the invasion beach. Thirdly, a political concern for the United States was that the plan might have caused other nations to take part. For example, Rusk feared that the plan would provoke the Soviet Union to take action against American forces. Fourthly, the United States wasn’t officially permitted to go to war with Cuba. Rostow, stated that, “there was an ancestral sense that the Monroe Doctrine had been unacceptably violated,” and that “there was no basis in American foreign policy… or in international law that justified the United States going to war because a Latin American nation had gone communist.” This means that this alternative policy was not an American interest due to the Monroe Doctrine (Rostow 210).
In addition, in economic terms, the costs of U.S. military forces were also a major concern. The plan had already escalated to a full-scale invasion with a budget going from four to forty-six million dollars. Therefore, there were four major political, geographic, economic, and social motives why the decision to back anti-Castro forces with U.S. militia was not pursued.
Moreover, if the foreign policy decision started by Eisenhower had been discontinued altogether or resolved diplomatically, Kennedy would probably have been charged with “having lacked the courage to back an enterprise that Eisenhower had prepared to eliminate communism from Cuba by the action of brave Cubans” (Rostow 114). Hence, if Kennedy had called off the invasion, he would have distorted his image as a strong, influential president. He probably would have been blamed for Castro’s continued existence in Cuba. Because of multiple security leaks in this huge operation, the world already knew about the preparations, and the Government and CIA’s embarrassment would have been public. Consequently, the alternative to discontinue the Bay of Pigs Invasion was not pursued for political and social motives.
VII. The U.S. National Interest in the Bay of Pigs
The results of the Bay of Pigs Invasion contributed to the national interest of the United States in embarrassment, loss of millions of dollars’ worth of U.S. property, loss of millions of dollars on military forces and Cuban exile training, and serious damage to the U.S. prestige. According to Howard Hunt, author of Give Us This Day, the decision was a means of prevention of the dangers to the American interest that might have arisen from Castro’s Cuba. Some of these consequences were Cuba’s training and infiltrating rebellious guerillas, the invasion of neighboring states with Soviet arms, Soviet missiles aimed against the United States, an attack on Guantanamo or the Panama Canal, communist radio propaganda, and an example of economic and social development that would be attractive in Latin America. Thus, Castro’s regime was considered a threat to the United States economically, politically and socially (Hunt 138).
In 1959, a rebel force led by Fidel Castro overthrew the American-backed dictator, Fulgencio Batista. Here the Democrat-Republican agreement to prevent or overthrow revolutionary governments whenever possible, became very evident. The revolution was a direct threat to American business interests due to the many Americans that owned property in Cuba. This was a direct economic threat to U.S. national interests.
In addition, this decision contributed to World Peace in disturbance by increasing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. The outcome of this debacle, led to the establishment of a threatening Soviet military presence in Cuba, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the “brink of nuclear war.”
VIII. Evaluation of Sources
A difficulty in objectively analyzing JFK’s foreign policy decision of the Bay of Pigs Invasion was the reliability of the sources and analyzing them. According to Davidson and Lytle’s definition of history in their book, After the Fact, history is “the act of selecting, analyzing, and writing about the past. It is something that is done, that is constructed, rather than an inert body of data that lies scattered through the archives” (Davidson and Lytle xxi). Thus, history is limited either by an incomplete factual record or by a selection of facts influenced by an ideology.
Selecting and analyzing certain sources was quite difficult because they are all subjective to a certain degree. For example, documents written by officials who were directly involved in the Bay of Pigs Invasion are most likely skewed by personal sentiments and lack of objectivity. Although they may not be very reliable, these primary sources such as Dean Rusk’s autobiography, As I Saw It, are extremely valuable in that they present straightforward and careful accounts of the Invasion. Dean Rusk was the Secretary of State during the Bay of Pigs Invasion and had much influence in the foreign policy decision. In his autobiography, Rusk explains the events that lead up to the Invasion, and he reveals his opposition to it. He states that he “regretted not forcefully opposing the Bay of Pigs” (Rusk 212). However, fact remains that he did support the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961. There is no mention of suggesting alternatives to the President at meetings. Rusk spends much of the chapter explaining what Kennedy should and shouldn’t have done, and criticizing the entire Administration. This adds to the historical study of the topic, but is limited in scope because Rusk’s motive may be to try to rationalize his mistakes and to rewrite a historical record. When he wrote this book in 1990, most CIA documents were already available to the public. Thus, his account may be a mere apology for the debacle, knowing that he cannot deny any facts.
Many Americans, including Hawkins, believed that a stronger attack would have been appropriate as an alternative decision. In his recount of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, former CIA official, Jack Hawkins, explains that a more massive attack would have led the U.S. to victory. Hawkins wrote the article, “An Obsession with ‘Plausible Deniability’ Doomed the 1961 Invasion of the Bay of Pigs From the Outset,” thirty years after the invasion in 1991. He wanted to “set the record straight” because he felt that some published works about the Bay of Pigs have been inaccurate in important aspects. Since Hawkins was involved in the undertaking of the Bay of Pigs Invasion in a capacity, he was knowledgeable of its full scope. Therefore, his account has great validity as a primary source, although due to Hawkins’ direct involvement in the operation, he may have had some skewed perceptions. Again like, Rusk, his work is most likely subjective, due to his association with the CIA. Hawkins also criticizes actions that were taken in 1961, although he supported them at that time. Both, Rusk and Hawkins, take different viewpoints and support opposite actions. Rusk would have rather backed out completely, and Hawkins would have rather had a stronger attack. Both of them must be embarrassed about the failure of the attack and are probably rationalizing the Bay of Pigs Invasion actions.
Victor Lasky, author of J.F.K. the Man & the Myth: A Critical Portrait and Seeds of Treason, presents a highly controversial picture of Kennedy in this biography. However, in the foreign policy decision of the Bay of Pigs, he subtly supports the President’s actions. He defends Kennedy in his Bay of Pigs decision by arguing that he had no alternative. This shows that the author is not completely one-sided in representing President John F. Kennedy. Nevertheless, Lasky’s biography on Kennedy’s was published in 1963 before the release of archives on the Bay of Pigs in the 1980’s. This is a severe limitation because Lasky did not have the advantage of time and hindsight. Lasky’s work is less balanced than LaFeber’s, America Russia and the Cold War 1945-1990. There were many more documents and information available to LaFeber in 1991, than there was to Lasky in 1963, regarding the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Therefore, one could deduce that LaFeber’s work is more reliable. LaFeber uses a more objective approach to give a more critical view of Kennedy’s actions the Bay of Pigs Invasion, where Lasky merely supports the President.
IX. Conclusion
In conclusion, the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961 to overthrow the government of the Cuban ruler Fidel Castro by United States-backed Cuban exiles was a debacle. The goal of this foreign policy decision was to stop the spread of communism. Several alternative policies that could have been pursued were discontinuing Eisenhower’s plan altogether, trying to resolve conflicts diplomatically, or taking it to the other extreme and backing the anti-revolutionary forces with U.S. military forces. However, due to political, economic, social, and geographic motives, these policies were not pursued. As a result of the invasion of the Bay of Pigs, the U.S. suffered immense humiliation which contributed to the detriment of the national interest of the United States.
