The GPU (secret police) collected lists of peasant complaints. This alarmed the party. In several areas of the USSR its policies were being defied. The party leadership blamed the influence of ‘kulaks’ and made a decision in 1926 to destroy the kulaks as a class.
How?
- Taxed more heavily.
- Children denied education.
- 1928 – many given hard labour.
- Had their property confiscated.
This showed how far the Party were willing to go in order to achieve their main goal: socialism. Kulaks did not like this as they were benefiting greatly from the half-Capitalist, half-Socialist policy that was the NEP.
However, at the same time, between 1925 and 1928, Russian agriculture showed considerable growth.
- Land under cultivation increased by more than 25%, and in some areas, herds of cattle and horses by almost 33%.
- Increasing prosperity – this meant that more and more peasants fitted into the kulak bracket.
In contrast to this, state farms were much less productive, less well run and usually ran at a loss.
It was this situation that led to the procurement crisis of 1928. For the previous years, there had been increasing confrontations between peasants. The party stepped up its propaganda against the kulaks, making them seem like a danger to society. There was already class-war in the countryside before collectivisation.
Stalin thought that collectivisation would go hand in hand with industrialisation and this would then make the USSR a great economic power. However, Stalin and the rest of the regime knew that they could not completely control the rest of the population, especially peasants.
Industry:
During the civil war and the period of War Communism, industrial production fell. When the NEP was introduced in March 1921, it did not immediately lead to a drastic change in industrial organisation because most industry remained nationalised.
There were lots of strikes in the 1920s:
- Workers were paid badly.
- Although workers had the right to ask for wage rises, they were rarely given them.
- As the inefficient companies lost money, more and more workers were cut.
By the mid-1920s, industrial production had risen slightly compared to the 1921 figures, but in most cases it still hadn’t reached pre-1913 levels. Workers were unmotivated and had to work outdated machinery meaning that productivity fell. Businesses were more interested in getting reimbursed from the State for their losses, rather than making good quality goods. There was little incentive for workers and bosses to be efficient and profitable.
The Communists tried to address the problems…
- 1926: Supreme Council of National Economy created. State enterprises contributed to a fund ran by this organisation. This should have meant that more profitable businesses would subsidise those less fortunate businesses which was hardly sustainable.
- When the government realised the seriousness of the problem in 1927 and 1928, there was a drive to increase efficiency of businesses. However this was not done properly – an increase in targets but no increase in wages meant that there were some strikes. Situation was also made worse by inflation.
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Strikes were particularly bad because the working class was held up to be the vanguard of the drive towards Socialism. However, instead of being enthusiastic, workers became increasingly disillusioned with the bid to become a Socialist country. Workers boycotted factory committee elections and trade unions, and unemployed workers protested → many arrests.
However, the authorities would not admit that they were to blame, as that would be saying Stalin was wrong. Instead, class enemies were frequently made scapegoats.
High production costs resulting from inefficient industry meant that prices were higher, so people would not buy products. Inefficiency rather than high wages caused the crisis.
Stalin’s motives for rapid economic change:
- The country could not move into a Socialist future without the economy changing.
NEP propaganda:
The regime needed to mould the population into feeling a certain way, so that they were ready to accept new policies when they came their way. As they were, many peasants were not happy about the changes coming in Russia, which showed Stalin his need for the use of propaganda.
- All aspects of life were monitored by the Agitation and Propaganda Department (schools, newspapers, arts and media). Agitprop stopped ‘politically incorrect’ material being shown and also promoted the party line. However, the guidelines were not always followed – foreign films, although claimed to be bourgeois, were shown more than soviet films as these were unpopular.
- Komsomol (Party Youth Movement) was an important part of the party organisation increasing in size. The Komsomol along with other organisations like the women’s organisation engaged in a wide range of propaganda campaigns – eg. Promotion of various days of revolutionary celebration.
- Education was strongly targeted. The Communists set up their own party schools, but also influenced what was taught in other schools. Entries to university were screened to make sure people from the right class background got in.
- Religion was accused of being a class weapon of the bourgeois class.
However, religious life, if anything became more active so in the end the Communists were forced into more serious measures such as destroying many churches in 1929.
The NEP and Soviet Socialism:
The change after Lenin’s death involved compromises…
- Much less emphasis on nationalism and more focus on the USSR.
- The initial class warfare after the revolution was replaced with a more inclusive approach to society.
However…
- The party did not have resources, and the mass of the population was not enthusiastic enough, to ensure that its attempts to direct and formulate policy were widely accepted, particularly when people did not see improvements in their day-to-day life.
- It was not yet clear how many major issues would be resolved.
There were some things to consider…
- The USSR needed to quickly become stronger and more self-sufficient both in industry and agriculture.
- The USSR needed to become militarily strong; this depended on more industrial power.
- Stalin and the regime must be able to prove that living in a Socialist economy would offer a better standard of life.
Planned industrialisation
The Soviet economy, 1918-28:
- Economy was devastated during the civil war, but recovered under the NEP.
- Industrial production was not sufficient to make the USSR an industrial nation nor to pave the way to Socialism.
The Five Year Plans:
Communists determined to industrialise the USSR as it would lay down the foundations for a Socialist Russia. The industrial revolution would provide the wealth which would then enable the construction of a society that would provide a secure existence for the Soviet people → Marxist theory; all wealth should belong to the people instead of to capitalists who exploited ordinary people to line their own pockets.
Reasons for the plans:
- Sort out the grain shortage of 1927-8.
- Lead the USSR into Socialism.
- Buy western technology to make production more efficient.
- NEP inefficient.
- Provide more technology for agriculture to speed up agricultural efficiency.
The Shakty Trial:
A group of engineers working in the Shakty coal mines in the Donbas region were accused of sabotage and treason. The Central Committee declared that this incident showed ‘new forms and new methods of bourgeois counter-revolution against proletarian dictatorship and against socialist industrialisation’.
In reality, these engineers were just scapegoats for the disasters of the USSR’s economy.
The plans would replace the existing system that meant that the market determined economic priorities. The Communist State justified its prominent role because it claimed to be representing ordinary people’s interests, rather than the interests of a privileged minority.
Class conflict was a large issue at this time as an important part of industrialisation meant more purging. For example, in the Donbas region, over half of all engineers and technicians had been arrested by 1931.
A five year plan was approved by the 16th Party Congress in April 1929, although the plan was then backdated to October 1928.
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The First Five Year Plan 1928-32 (should have been completed in September 1933 but was deemed to have been completed in December 1932) focused on the development of heavy industries such as coal and steel – things which could be used to make other products.
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The Second Five Year Plan 1933-7 was built on the infrastructure provided by the first plan. It focused more on consumer goods than the first plan, but nevertheless heavy industry remained the main priority.
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The Third Five Year Plan begun in 1938 but was disrupted by war in 1941, had a particular focus on the needs of the defence sector, because the Nazis in Germany were becoming more of a threat.
The impact of industrialisation to 1941
An overview of the plans:
A historian gave this overview of the overall economic performance of the plans:
1928-30: Heavy industry expanded at an accelerating pace, with increasingly ambitious targets. Collectivisation was occurring at the same time. The labour force expanded during this period.
1930-2: Expansion was strained as the USSR struggled to meet the over-ambitious targets. Industrial production slowed, and there was also a temporary halt to collectivisation. Government adopted a more realistic approach to expansion.
1933: Most of the USSR was suffering from famine, but the 1933 plan was more realistic. Priority was to be given to completing projects begun during the first Five Year Plan.
1934-6: Economic development was spectacular – many new factories came into operation, whilst agriculture began to recover Labour productivity and the standard of living improved, with consumer rationing abolished in 1935.
1937-41: Economic policy was focussed on rearmament, but was affected adversely by the terror. People had more money to spend, but fewer things to spend it on.
The First Five Year Plan, 1928-32:
Such good progress was made during the first part of this plan that targets were increased in December 1929, with calls to fulfil the plan ahead of schedule. The emphasis was on strengthening Soviet defences against a hostile invasion. Key features of the plan:
- Several huge projects. Eg. Construction of Magnitogorsk, a steel-producing city built from nothing mainly by young Communists.
- Resources were targeted on heavy industry – small-scale industry like enterprises catering for domestic goods for the home were starved of resources and declined.
- Priorities within the plan meant that consumers’ needs were neglected. It was often difficult to buy a pair of shoes in the 1930s – not enough made/distributed.
- Impressive gains in several areas of heavy industry (engineering) but not all targets were met in steel and chemicals production. Textile production fell due to a shortage of resources.
- Problems were caused by gaps in the infrastructure – road and rail transport were inadequate to meet the demands of industry. Transport and housing were inadequate to cope with the increase in numbers of town dwellers.
- Rapid increase in urbanisation.
- Shortage of labour (as opposed to unemployment under the NEP). Many new workers were inexperienced peasants and there were too few specialists such as engineers. Problem was partly solved by recruiting skilled workers from abroad.
- Workforce changed in character – more convicts and women added.
- Wages rose but there were not many goods to spend the money on. The peasants were paid low prices for their grain.
- Preference for industry over agriculture – agriculture expected to provide materials for industry, workers for expanding industry, food for the workforce and exports to pay for industrial imports.
The optimal version of this plan was adopted in the end. However, the plan did not run smoothly:
- There was never one coherent plan.
- Not carefully thought out.
- No clear objectives.
- No cost analysis.
- No realistically targeted resources.
- Impact of re-allocation of resources ignored.
- No attention paid to the difficulties the plan might face.
- Many imperfections of the plan not analysed and fixed.
The first plan was a great experiment, and there was no precedent from anywhere for it.
The Second Five Year Plan, 1933-7:
- Much better prepared than the first.
- Less chaotic and less ambitious.
- More realism in the planning due to the fact that it was being drafted in 1933 when the USSR was suffering from great famine.
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Successes in this plan due to the USSR starting to benefit from improving infrastructure laid down by the first plan → Magnitogorsk only came into full production during this plan.
- Big gains in industry, construction and transport.
- Productivity and wages both rose and prices fell – (maybe due to the rise in goods to buy, but also possibly due to the propaganda incentives like the Stakhanovite movement).
- Impressive improvements in the generation of electricity, coal and rail transport.
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Workers had more incentives → more goods to buy.
- Many workers were now more experienced/better trained.
- The targets still proved too optimistic and were not met.
- Plan did not meet its aim of higher real wage rates.
The failures in the plan were mainly due to the higher priority increasingly given to defence.
The Stakhanovite movement:
On 30 August 1935, Alexi Stkhanov did a five-hour shift, cutting 102 tonnes of coal with his pick. This was 16 times the average a shift. He was immediately hailed as a Soviet hero and given a large bonus. It was ideal propaganda for a society trying to create a new civilisation based on teamwork and selfless sacrifice. Many years later, it was revealed that it was just a propaganda stunt – Stakhanov had a team of several workers to support him.
The Third Five Year Plan, 1938-41:
Prepared during 1937-8, although not formally adopted by the 18th Party Congress until March 1939. It had ambitious targets – a 92% rise in industrial production over five years. It also promised to expand the provision of secondary education throughout the USSR.
- The approach of war meant the original targets could not be met.
- Shortages of skilled labour and shortage of oil amounted to a crisis.
Further impacts:
The working of the plans:
Most of the decisions about planning were made at a high level – by Stalin. Very few private businesses existed in the 1930s and those that did were deprived of resources and state run businesses got their orders from the centre. Businesses had to carry out ‘the plan’ →set out details of wage rates, prices, output etc. Gosplan coordinated the plan at the centre.
The impact of the terror on the economy:
Hundreds of officials were removed from Gosplan and other similar agencies. Twelve thousand workers were promoted to their places. The Central Statistical Administration was closed in 1929 and Gosplan took over its activities, so that statistics could be altered etc.
In July 1940, a law was issued saying that poor quality production was a criminal offence, meaning businesses in theory would need to worry about quality of the goods, not just quantity.
Impact of industrialisation on the Soviet economy to 1941:
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By 1941, the USSR had an industrial base which allowed it to withstand the German invasion and then eventually win the war → this was due to industrial power combined with other factors like Stalin’s leadership.
- The Soviet economy between 1928-40 probably grew at 5-6% each year.
- Many developments were begun from almost nothing.
- R. Davies: “The armaments industry of the 1930s was the most outstanding success of the pre-war Soviet economy”.
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Geographical shift in industry → more and more moved to the Urals and previously undeveloped Central Asian republics.
- Considerable population shift. Between 1926-39, urban population increased from 26 to 56 million people (most migrated from countryside to towns for a better standard of living).
- By 1940, women made up 39% of the workforce, as opposed to 24% in 1928. Between 1928-32, the industrial workforce doubled.
- The Soviet economy could not maintain both a massive defence capability and a high standard of living at the same time.
- Although production increased, the quality of most goods (esp. consumer) was poor.
Must be kept in mind that soviet statistics were unreliable and often deliberately exaggerated from 1933 onwards, grain output was measured in ‘biological yield’, the maximum possible yield as the grain stood in the fields.
USSR claimed to have achieved Socialism as a result of the 1930s industrialisation.
This was because by Soviet definition, Socialism meant ‘social’ ownership of the means of production → all people collectively ‘owned’ factories or shops or the state did on behalf of the people.
As early as 1929, less than 1% of large-scale industry was in the private sector, and the few remaining factories were closed in 1930.
To Stalin, the ideological motive for industrialisation appears to have been equally as important as it being a drive for production and national strength.
Some of the regime’s objectives were achieved, some not:
- Rapid expansion of industrial production, mostly in areas of heavy industry like coal and steel.
- Some high-quality achievements e.g. in defence production.
- The USSR became almost self-sufficient in some areas like machine tool production.
- Some degree of industrial modernisation.
- Not all targets were met, e.g. in the chemical industry, through inefficiency.
- Although quality did improve, many products remained of poor quality.
- Targets for consumer goods production not met.
Interpretations of industrialisation:
Some economists accept that Stalin’s methods resulted in significant gains in industrial production in a short space of time, even though impossible targets could not be met. However also argued that this method was not the only one → alternatives might have avoided the destruction and waste, the weakened agricultural sector and the accompanying terror if there had been a more gradual and less-ambitious approach. Many of the successes could have been achieved without the terrible by-products of Stalinism.
M. Malia thinks that Stalin achieved his main objective by 1936, in that he was able to replace the capitalist system of production characteristic of countries like the USA and Britain. However, he argues that the Soviet achievement was largely improvised and did not have any moral virtues which Socialism had traditionally preached.
Impact of industrialisation on Soviet society:
Peasants affected in two ways:
- Either, they remained as peasants living in the countryside on collective or state farms. Much of their produce taken by the state, even though they worked hard. Those who had small private plots did better, since they were allowed to eat the crops themselves or sell it in private markets.
- Or, they moved to the towns either voluntarily or because they were forced off the land. It was easy to find work in the city because the factory workforce was rapidly expanding.
Workers:
Many had been unenthusiastic about their conditions under the NEP and welcomed the prospect of better conditions → industrialisation seemed to give meaning to otherwise boring work. Some workers benefited from better education and many experienced a rise in the standard of living.
On the other hand, less enthusiastic workers suffered. Absenteeism was punished and there were other tough methods of work discipline. In the mid-1930s, workers carried a labour book that recorded their background, their labour history and any breaking of the rules.
Women:
Women were vital to the success of the plans → about 10 million women joined the workforce during the 1930s. Women were less well paid and they received fewer training opportunities and many had home responsibilities as well.
Political and economic motives for collectivisation
Soviet agriculture:
Farming was not very productive by western European or North American standards.
At the start, Lenin allowed peasants to take over the land, which they were seizing for themselves anyway. However War Communism meant that the Communists seized crops from the peasants in order to feed the Red Army.
Under the NEP, things improved. Peasants had to pay taxes but they could sell their crops on the open market.
In 1928…
The relationship between the regime and the countryside became tenser for several reasons:
- Many Communists felt it was wrong that peasants owned their own land.
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More food needed to be grown to support the industrial progress, which was not good as the amount of grain being procured was actually falling by 1928 → agriculture had been recovering more quickly than industry since 1921 meaning there were not enough things for the peasants to spend their money on.
- Agriculture still inefficient and small scale. Stalin thought collective farms would increase efficiency.
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The right side, (Bukharin) believed that peasants should be encouraged to ‘get rich’ under the NEP and the resulting prosperity would pay for the industrialisation. The left side (Stalin) thought this was too slow and dangerous → rapid collectivisation would force the peasants to fall in line.
By following such a ruthless policy, Stalin would also be removing his last political rivals, such as Bukharin, and securing his position as leader of the USSR. That’s why political, economic, ideological and personal motives all influences Stalin’s decision to collectivise agriculture.
Stages of Collectivisation:
- 1929; the government issued new procurement quotas, with punishments for peasants who didn’t keep up with them.
- During 1929, the government launched a strong propaganda campaign against kulaks, trying to create a rift within the peasant class between poor and better off farmers.
- By the end of 1929, the government had begun a programme of forced collectivisation. Stalin declared that kulaks must be ‘liquidated as a class’ and they were not permitted to join collectives.
- Peasants driven into collectives by local Communists, backed up by the security police (OGPU).
- Strong opposition from the peasantry led Stalin to a temporary climb-down in March 2930. He declared in an article called ‘Dizzy with Success; that local officials were too confrontational in carrying out collectivisation. Many peasants were allowed to leave collectives, provided they were not kulaks. (This was only temporary; allowed peasants to sow their spring crops then they were forced back into collectives. By 1937, 93% of peasant households had been collectivised).
There were large amounts of opposition to the collectivisation as most of it was forced. Many peasants burned their crops and killed their livestock instead of handing it over to the state. Around 10 million peasants died as a result of them opposing collectivisation.
The typical features of a collective farm (kolkhoz):
- 240,000 collective farms by 1940.
- Average collective contained 76 families.
- From 1930, the old village council (mir) was replaced by an appointed chairman, who was a communist party member.
- The farm must deliver a certain amount of produce to the State. Quotas were high: up to 40% of crops.
- Any profit left over was shared among the collective members according to their work contribution.
- Machine Tractor Stations (MTS) were set up to hire tractors to collective farms. However mechanisation never became widespread. By 1940, there was 1 MTS for every 40 collectives.
- Some collectives had schools and clinics, but at the expense of peasants losing individual freedom.
The impact of collectivisation on the USSR up to 1941
Various impacts of collectivisation:
Economic impact:
- Agricultural production fell dramatically (sometimes even to pre-1913 levels) and did not recover until the late 1930s.
- There was widespread famine in 1932-3, especially in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Caucasus. Millions of peasants died.
- Agriculture remained the poor relation of the soviet economy; farming remained inefficient, often unproductive and with poor levels of mechanisation. Peasants lacked incentives to work hard.
- State secured the grain it wanted. It was able to supply the towns with food, and also export grain to pay for imports of technology. Collectivisation supported Stalin’s industrialisation plans.
- From 1932, collectives were allowed to sell grain left over from State procurements in a collective farm market – the only free markets allowed in the USSR. From 1935, peasants could also sell produce from their private plots on these markets. Eventually, the private plots produced about 1/3 of all marketed food in the USSR, although they made up only about 4% of land.
Political impact:
- For the first time, the regime was able to extend its control over those peasants in the countryside, mainly through party management of the collectives.
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It reinforced Stalin’s control within the USSR & over the party → Stalin’s rivals like Rykov and Bukharin lost power and influence.
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Moved the USSR further along the road to Socialism → class differences in the countryside were abolished.
Social impact:
- Millions of peasants died or had their lives disrupted.
- Although internal passports (1932) restricted movement, millions left the countryside for towns, leaving a serious population imbalance.
- Many peasants felt betrayed and hostile towards the regime. As a result, some welcomed the German invasion in 1941, hoping for liberation from the collectives.
- Agriculture sacrifices to satisfy the needs of industry and socialist ideology.
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More and more peasants became literate → some collective farms included schools, to better the education system in the USSR.
Interpretations of collectivisation:
One argument is that Stalin had clear economic and political motives and so planned and carried out the process once he was in power. Stalin was prepared to use force to make the peasants switch from the NEP to collectivisation.
Stalin also had political aims. He wanted to increase his power over the party, having recently defeated both left and right in the power struggle.
Another interpretation is that Stalin did not plan an agricultural revolution, but got caught up in the process that was not controlled by any one person. Differences in the development rates of industry and agriculture showed that the NEP was only a partial success. Also, there was a grain shortage, leading to the Procurement Crisis. Therefore, the party had to do something and requisitioning grain led to collectivisation, but this was not planned in advance.
Historians such as Arch Getty believe that the idea of Stalin initiating all policies and controlling everything was exaggerate. For example, there is evidence to suggest widespread support in the USSR for the campaign against kulaks, with many industrial and urban workers joining demonstrations and implementations of policy.
The Great Terror and the purges
The Kirov murder and its effects (1934):
The Great Terror is usually said to have started after the Kirov assassination in 1934 and said to have lasted until 1939. Purges were by no means a new thing – Lenin had used them after the civil war to crush internal and external enemies of Bolshevik rule.
Even before the Kirov assassination, there were signs of an increasingly hard line approach by the regime:
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The Shakty trial (1928): One of a series of trials of industrial specialists from middle-class or foreign backgrounds. They were accused of sabotage, spying or anti-Socialism. Some of the victims were shot.
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Ryutin (1932): The former Central Committee member Mikhail Ryutin published a pamphlet highly critical of Stalin’s leadership and methods. It described Stalin as the ‘evil genius of the Russian Revolution’. Stalin could only get him imprisoned at first, but he was eventually executed in 1937.
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British engineers (1933): Six were tried for industrial spying.
The Kirov assassination:
- Sergei Kirov is portrayed as one of the most popular Communist leaders.
- Kirov fought for the Red Army in the Civil War and soon joined the Central Committee.
- He was made head of the Leningrad Party organisation in 1926.
- Kirov later became a member of the Politburo and a close friend of Stalin.
- Regarded by many as Stalin’s eventual successor (this was a dangerous reputation to have).
- Regarded as a more liberal Communist.
- Prepared to argue with Stalin over some policies – opposed Stalin’s attempt to have Ryutin executed.
- Some thought he was corrupt and vicious and always supported Stalin’s direction for the party.
Stalin obviously felt threatened by him, as in 1933 he appointed Kirov as a party secretary in Moscow, in order to remove him from his powerbase in Leningrad. However, Kirov requested to stay in Leningrad and stood against Stalin for the post of General Secretary when it came up for election at the 1934 17th Party Congress. Kirov was the only significant figure to ever challenge Stalin.
On the last day of the Congress, a secret ballot was held to elect the General Secretary and Stalin was told that almost a quarter of delegates had voted against him.
Soon afterwards, Kirov was assassinated outside his Leningrad headquarters. Kirov’s bodyguard who saw the incident was killed on the following day in a road accident. The assassin insisted he had acted alone, but he was executed with several other alleged accomplices.
Consequences of the Kirov assassination:
- Stalin used the event as an excuse to implement a reign of terror, first against leading party or ex-party members.
- A law in December 1934 speeded up the process of trying suspects and removed any right of appeal. Soon after, Kamenev, Zinoviev and Yagoda, the secret police chief, were arrested.
- The assassination showed that nobody was safe, no matter how important they were.
- Became a signal for the regime to tighten its hold over the country and begin a reign of widespread purges, a period that became known as the Great Terror.
The motives for the purges and the Great Terror:
A particular feature of the Terror was the Show Trials of prominent Communists. Defendants often coaxed into making confessions or persuaded that confession to ‘crimes’ was in the interests of the party and the revolution. The reasons for these...
- They were a way of justifying Stalin’s policies to theworld and his own people.
- To intensify the population’s vigilance and loyalty.
- Old Bolsheviks were picked out in particular. Although they were not a significant threat to Stalin by 1936, Stalin was vengeful, and he had not forgotten the opposition to himself in the 1920s of men like Zinoviev and Kamenev.
- Stalin’s desire to cement his power and eliminate possible rivals.
Interpretations of motives for the terror:
- Due to Stalin’s personality, this made him suspicious, vindictive, and even paranoid. He was obsessed with reinforcing his own position, eliminating rivals and getting revenge on fellow Old Bolsheviks.
- Terror was an integral part of the communist system. The 1917 Revolution and the Civil War were both born and maintained in terror. Stalin simply applied terror more ruthlessly and on a larger scale.
- Terror was necessary in order to complete the economic change taking place from the late-1929s. This change was often forced on unwilling groups such as kulaks. People were purged because scapegoats were needed to explain away mistakes and failure to meet targets.
- Hitler had come to power in Germany in 1933 and Stalin feared that the USSR was not yet ready to compete with such a foreign power.
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Enthusiastic party officials in the provinces sometimes acted ruthlessly and followed their own agenda → the drive to terror did not come exclusively from Stalin.
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Stalin wanted total control of the armed forces → he seemed to have believed there was a military plot against him, involving the Germans.
Stalin’s role in the terror:
It is thought that the suicide of Stalin’s wife was a key factor in the lead up to the terror. Stalin was upset, and many of his more extreme personality traits came to light at this time.
Stalin used the Kirov assassination to implement the first large-scale purge of the 1930s. His personal role was crucial, although revisionist historians tend to downplay this aspect and have focussed on other driving factors.
Interpretations of the terror:
- State violence was an integral part of the Soviet system. The Bolsheviks had seized power by force and used force to consolidate and maintain their position. Essentially, Stalin’s terror was a continuation of Lenin’s terror, but on a larger scale.
- Stalin’s terror was unique in its motives and intensity, and Stalin was at the centre of events. He was personally responsible for promoting and ending the purges.
- Other leading party members played an important part in promoting the error, confident that this is what their leader wanted, or else they had their own motives and were confident that there would be no check from the centre.
- Although some individuals, including Stalin, played an important role in the progress of the terror, it also accelerated in scope and extent because of unplanned factors. It almost took on a life of its own. If you were in fear of being denounced, it might be better to prove your loyalty by denouncing someone else first.
Stalin did not try to escape responsibility for the purges, but justified them, calling them ‘cleansing’.
Key personnel and the instruments of terror:
Trotsky: the absent bogeyman.
During the terror, Trotsky was in exile abroad, as he had been since he lost influence in the USSR in the late-1930s. Despite his physical absence, Trotsky played an important part in the terror.
Accused of being a ‘Trotskyite’ was a convenient label to stick on anyone whom Stalin wanted to denounce→ Trotsky’s influence was exaggerated by party officials.
Kamenev, Zinoviev and Bukharin: victims of old rivalries.
These three had been prominent communists in the 1920s but after their defeat, all of them pretty much drifted into insignificance. However, not as far as Stalin was concerned; did he fear their influence, or was he set on revenge?
Kamenev and Zinoviev were arrested after the Kirov affair. After their Show Trials, confessions and sentences, they were killed. Bukharin pleaded in vain to Stalin for an alternative to execution.
Yagoda.
He became a Stalin supporter in 1929 and created the slave labour complex that was an important part of industrialisation. Yagoda organised the 1936 Show Trials but fell out of favour with Stalin and ended up on trial himself in 193. Yagoda’s removal ensured that Stalin had full control of the NKVD.
Yezhov.
In charge of the NKVD from September 1936 to December 1938. He admitted that the terror was completely random in its operation.
In 1939, when Stalin wanted to end the terror, Yezhov was quietly removed from office and shot, being made a scapegoat for the excesses of the purges.
Soviet internal security forces:
1917-22 Cheka: (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-revolution and Sabotage). Set up to ensure Bolshevik survival during the Civil War from 1918.
1922-34 GPU & then OGPU: (Department of Political Police).
1934-43 NKVD: (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs), led in turn by Yagoda, Yezhov and Beria. Given extraordinary powers to carry out the purges.The whole system of policing united under this one body.
The impact of the terror to 1941
The impact on the party, the armed services and the Soviet population:
The scope of the terror:
Although the Show Trials of 1936-8 received considerable publicity, the number of victims involved in them was relatively small compared to the millions of other Soviets who suffered much less publicly in these years.
The pace of arrests increased considerably in 1937 when the government issued a decree condemning ‘anti-Soviet elements’ in the USSR.
The one requirement in the terror was that the quotas of deaths were fulfilled – regardless of whether any charges against suspects were credible or not → quotas include numbers to be shot or sent to labour camps.
Confessions were often extracted from victims by threats or physical and mental torture. There was some evidence of opposition to Stalin:
- In June 1937, a prominent member of the Central Committee, Pyatnitsky, spoke out against the physical elimination of Bukharin and his colleagues, and against giving Yezhov extraordinary powers.
- On the following morning, Yezhov ‘found’ evidence saying Pyatnitsky had been an agent of the tsarist secret police.
- During 1937-8, up to 74 military officials were sot for refusing to approve the execution of people whom they believed innocent.
The impact of the terror on the Communist Party:
January 1928: Approximately 1.25 million members of the Communist Party in the USSR.
January 1933: Amount of members had risen to 3.5 million, mainly because the implementation of the Five Year Plans required more trusty administrators.
1933: 800,000 members were expelled from the party.
1933-36: Recruitment to the party suspended.
1934: 340,000 members were expelled from the party.
1935: Membership had fallen to 2,350,000 (most of these were newer recruits).
What was significant about the purges?
- 1933-36: action against party membership was organised by the party organisation, and aimed specifically at those members deemed to have fallen short of the standard expected.
- 1936-38: action was unofficial (not authorised by the Central Committee). Privately dictated by Stalin and the NKVD under Yezhov. The intention was to make the party a complaint tool of Stalin’s.
- 1939: Less than 10% of the party membership had joined before 1920. Less than ¼ of recruits since 1920 had survived the purges.
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Late 1930s: whereas before recruits had all been from the working-class, now there were many more being recruited → large numbers of technical specialists and people from an intellectual background.
- 1941: Only 14.9% of members were female.
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1939: In the Politburo, there were only three men → Khrushchev, Zhdanov and Beria who had all been promoted by Stalin.
Although many party members were expelled, this did not mean arrest, imprisonment or death, some just ‘sacked’ from their job as a party member.
Not many party members were prepared to stand up to the regime, even when they had doubt.
The impact of the terror on the armed forces:
1936: Just under 1 million soldiers in the Red Army.
1941: 5 million soldiers in the Red Army.
There was not just an increase in numbers, but also a reorganisation of structure and an adaptation to new weapons such as tanks and rockets. Up to 23,000 officers were shot or dismissed. The majority of those purged from the army were not killed.
The purge of the military was regarded as very significant. Marshall Tukhachevsky had been an innovative general who thought carefully about improving military tactics → he and other leading generals were dismissed, convicted of treason and shot in 1937. Thought that the generals were tortured into confessions as in 1957, a Soviet military court found no evidence of treason.
- Since 1922, Red Army officers had been working with German officers on tactics and ideology, giving Stalin a reason to be suspicious. This meant that more and more officers were arrested by Stalin.
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The numerous arrests and executions meant that the leaders of the army had little experience → about ¾ of officers had been in place for less than a year. This was made worse by the inability to push back the Germans in the first months of their invasion.
The impact of the terror on the Soviet population:
September 1936 – December 1938: During the Yezhov years, it’s expected that over 7 million people were arrested, and 1 million executed.
1936-39: 10 to 15 million may have died, from torture, execution or in camps. These figures do not include all those who died during the collectivisation famine. Thought that of those sent to camps 1936-8, less than 10% survived.
(Figures in this table not exact, in 100s to make it easier to remember)
Torture:
- Used widely by the lower ranks of the NKVD to extract confessions.
- Most police were poorly educated and poorly trained, and willing to obey orders.
- Leading figures, like Beria, sometimes took part in torturing suspects personally.
Use of informers:
- Used to back up the police.
- In cities such as Moscow, may have been several in one building.
Crimes:
- NKVD keen to root out those considered dangerous to society, such as those belonging to suspect groups (former members of other political parties etc).
- Many arrests due to personal feuds.
- People arrested sometimes because one of their friends or family members had already been arrested.
Labour camps:
- Forced labour used as punishment since 1918. Labour camps built early 1920s.
- 1937 was a turning year: “Soviet camps transformed from indifferently managed prisons in which people died by accident, into genuinely deadly camps, where prisoners were deliberately worked to death”.
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‘Enemies of the people’ sent to camps → not just someone who commits sabotage, but also someone who doubts the party line.
- Political prisoners often treated worse than other criminals.
Ordinary people:
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Until 1937, it was mostly the USSR’s elite that were in most danger of being arrested → many people avoided promotion in the party to stay out of the line of fire.
Working conditions:
Rationing ended in 1935, and then food prices remained stable while wages rose. Many workers still found it possible to change jobs. The Stakhanovite movement gave workers more opportunity to demand better conditions and criticise poor management.
Social impact of Stalin’s policies
The role and impact of Stalinist propaganda:
Propaganda in NEP Russia:
Ever since the 1917 revolution, the state relied on propaganda to put across important messages → propaganda depicting the White opponents of the Bolsheviks and their foreign allies as evil agents of Capitalism had been an important factor in the Bolsheviks’ success in winning the 1917-21 Civil War.
Even during the peaceful 1920s, the party had used propaganda to justify its policies. Propaganda also had an ideological function:
- Communist enthusiasts did not just want to win support for policy, but also wanted to coax the population into thinking in Marxist terms.
- Art, literature, the cinema, music, architecture etc could all be used to mould the new Soviet people.
The Communists had a monopoly of control over public information, and could therefore stop any bad information to be shown.
- There were many people who were not convinced by propaganda, particularly when propaganda proclaimed things that things were much better than they actually were.
- Many peasants were illiterate in the 20s and so could not succumb to propaganda.
The Stalinist approach → It’s likely that the propaganda in Stalin’s USSR was more effective than the propaganda of the NEP period because:
- In the 1920s, communist organisations were relatively new and not well established in the countryside. Collectivisation meant that the party now had an official at each collective and all the peasants were in one place, ready to be influenced.
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In NEP Russia, much more art was free of communist ideology → Lenin believed in ‘Art for Art’s sake’. Western films were more popular than Soviet films. In the 1930s, the State took more control of all aspects of media and culture.
However, when Stalin came to power, the population of the USSR had started to show the benefits of many years dominated by Lenin:
- Regime already on its way to making more people literate.
- The concept of censorship was already established: before the end of 1918, all non-Bolshevik newspapers were eliminated.
- The regime had increased the number of schools and made the content of education more political.
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Organisations like the Komsomol were growing in importance → many young people became keen Communists.
Therefore, Stalin’s successful propaganda could be said to have not been down to anything in particular that he had done; instead things that Lenin had put in place before his death.
The role of Stalinist propaganda:
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Reached into more corners of the USSR than Soviet propaganda had in the 1920s → collectivisation was the key.
- Once peasants had been organised into state farms, it was easier to bombard them with propaganda.
- Peasants more likely to be literate.
- Party likely to have had more success in influencing those in towns and cities, where an increasing number of party members were trained as organisers of meetings in factories.
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Censorship became much more rigorous. The possibilities of artistic freedom available in the 1920s disappeared → Socialist Realism depicted workers and peasants happily creating a socialist future. Propaganda was also focussed against ‘the enemy’ (anything that stood in the way of progress).
Impact of Stalinism on ideology, culture and society:
The existence of the Soviet regime relied on a variety of factors:
- The monopoly of power enjoyed by the Communist Party.
- The impossibility of ever replacing the Communist Party or challenging it, despite guarantees of civil rights in the Soviet Constitution.
- The threat of force against dissenters or doubters, who were portrayed as a serious threat to the State and the Soviet people.
- The use of propaganda to get support for policies.
- A natural patriotism or reluctance of people to oppose the government.
- Support that the regime won for its acclaimed successes, eg in the industrialisation drive.
Culture and society in Stalin’s USSR:
Lenin had been cautious and had not let his regime radically change the Russian culture → he believed that culture exceeded class. In 1920s NEP Russia, the old and the new sat side by side. Some of the ‘new’ experimental art forms were not created by committed Communists, but by artists and intellectuals who simply welcomed the initial burst of cultural freedom after 1917. This changed under Stalin, when all culture must be linked to the party line.
The arts in NEP Russia:
Some artists in 1920s Russia accepted the communist message and produced art forms designed to appeal to the masses, but not all did this. The ones that did tried to influence people with new ideas:
- There was a movement for popular theatre, often called Agitprop theatre, involving street performances and more.
- Radical change in design and architecture.
- Literature encouraged working-class themes.
- Cinema was taken up enthusiastically by the Communists, who realised its propaganda potential. Proletkino made political films.
Culture in Stalin’s USSR - Cultural Revolution 1928-31:
1928 (the year of the First Five Year Plan): Cultural revolution started and lasted around three years. Combination of two themes:
- A class war that attacked old values associated with the NEP.
- A projection of the new society that was to emerge out of the great economic revolution taking place in the towns and countryside.
There was a strong sense of ‘Utopianism’ (a belief in a future idealised society), planning for the ideal proletarian future.
Socialist Realism:
- Films must emphasis the important role of ordinary workers and peasants in Soviet society.
- Films, books and theatre had to have a straightforward, optimistic and easily-understandable message that made a hero out of an ordinary person.
- Everything had to show the building of a new and better society.
- Plots had to have a happy ending.
- Paintings of villages showed an abundance of corn and content peasants, when in reality there was class warfare and famine.
- Music had to be optimistic and jolly.
- Only those who promoted Socialist Realism could practice their craft.
- Writers had to write about themes relating to party concerns like industrialisation.
- Cheap books produced in bulk to ensure the population became increasingly more literate.
In 1931, Stalin declared the Cultural Revolution had come to an end. Provided people followed the party line, they were treated well and became successful and wealthy. Many writers and artists disappeared during the Great Terror for not promoting Stalin’s policies. In 1932, all existing proletarian artistic organisations were merged into one single union and Stalin’s hold over cultural life was complete.
Education:
After the revolution, there had been a great experiment with education. More active learning styles were promoted and children were often encouraged to do more socially useful work. During the Cultural Revolution, Stalin changed this. There were problems → teachers were untrained and not communists therefore did not like nor approve of the new syllabus. Stalin replaced teachers with communists and encouraged children to pursue subjects like science, maths and technology. There was a need for a skilled workforce in the USSR.
The social impact of Stalinism:
Women in NEP Russia:
Policy towards the role and status of women had always been inconsistent. Bolsheviks had maintained a belief in gender equality and soon after the revolution; women were awarded equal rights → provided they belonged to the right social class.
- The reality was that leading party members took little interest in the reality of women’s lives.
- When women’s sections of the party were set up, it was not for them to be involved in policy making, it was simply for them to explain policy to other women. (Zhenotdel was the women’s section of the central committee was not popular and closed in 1930).
- Seen as inappropriate for women to take an active part in politics, even if they were married to party members.
- Even if women were involved in politics, they still had their domestic responsibilities.
- When unemployment rose in NEP Russia, women were forced into lower paid, unskilled work.
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Social inequality → men did not have to give much notice to divorce their wives. Most divorced women ended up unemployed or dependant on their ex-husband.
However, Soviet propaganda painted a very different picture. It depicted the ideal Soviet woman → should be proudly independent and should reject bourgeois concepts like worrying about appearance. Loyalty to the party and the state was promoted above the ideals of romantic love or loyalty to a husband or family.
Women in the party:
By 1928, only about 65,000 out of 1 million party members were women. Female membership of the Komsomol never rose above 20% in towns and 5% in the countryside. Women did not enjoy the same party benefits as men and they could be undermined easily in the party. One of the few prominent party members was Alexandra Kollontai (member of Central Committee and Commissar for Social Welfare) but she had a disagreement with Lenin and was demoted.
Loval party organisations were told to expel people from the party for being inactive and the large majority of those dismissed because of this were women.
Soviet women and the family in the 1930s:
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There was no significant improvement in women’s status or conditions. Rapid urbanisation had caused many problems → housing problems, increasingly more men deserted their wives or girlfriends after the birth of children.
- Women were given low paid and unskilled work.
- Women more likely than men to become unemployed and not get compensation.
- Numbers of prostitutes in cities rose as they couldn’t support themselves any other way.
A law in 1920 meant that Russia was the first country in Europe to legalise abortion on demand, in an attempt to give women freedom of choice. Soon, Russia had the highest divorce rate and the Soviet population was not growing in the way Stalin wanted it to.
In the 1930s, there was the ‘Great Retreat’ → rejection of social experiments of the past. Influenced strongly by the falling birth rates and the disruption caused by family break ups; there were many orphaned children that ended up on the streets performing violent crimes.
Action was taken against this in the Family Code of May 1936:
- Abortion made illegal.
- More difficult to obtain a divorce.
- Mothers with six or more children received cash payments.
- Propaganda focussed on the irresponsibility of husbands and fathers who neglected their family responsibilities.
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Law was tightened (1935) → children who committed violent crimes were treated like adults from the age of 12.
- New laws passed against prostitution and homosexuality.
However, it wasn’t all bad. 60% of undergraduates were women by 1940.
Women struggled with a situation in which there were insufficient kindergartens for the children of working women. The already small proportion of educated women in party or high administrative posts declined even further in the 1930s.
Living standards in the 1930s:
- The Great Famine (1932-3) caused many deaths, along with major problems in towns as they were swamped with refugees from the countryside and the rationing system often broke down.
- There was a housing shortage and many families were crammed into communal apartments.
- 1933 was the worst year for living standards – popular consumption was lower than in 1900 and consumption of meat was only a third of the 1928 figure.
- Conditions improved from 1935, with 1937 being the best year for living standards. Due to major shortages (eg buying shoes), some private trades were made legal again.
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Problems increased again after 1937 → 1936 was a bad harvest and the impact was felt and living standards for many dropped again. Also a continued rise in the urban population.
With the outbreak of war in 1941, conditions for civilians became very tough and rationing was introduced. However, it could be said that the years of terrible living conditions had prepared them for a time like this. Conditions were not as bad as in the Great Famine of 1932. Stalin’s policies had toughened up the population and now they were ready to withstand the German invasion.
Religion:
Religion was rejected by Communists. Lenin had not banned religion altogether, but he had focussed on anti-religious propaganda. However it was stopped after it was realised that it was doing more harm to the Soviet regime than good.
In 1929, the regime resorted to a much more direct attack:
- The teaching of religion was banned.
- Hundreds of churches destroyed of closed down.
- All religious schools closed.
The regime found it impossible to kill off religious belief → in the 1937 census over half a million described themselves as religious believers.
Ideology and opinion in Stalin’s USSR:
Stalin’s regime could rely on a certain amount of good will, generated by several factors →
- Regime associated itself with the idea of modernisation which was popular with many young people.
- Soviet propaganda may have been successful in portraying the regime as the guardian of national security and patriotism.
- Conditions did improve at times in the 1930s and people understood that the state did provide for some basic needs like housing.
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Stalin was usually immune from criticism → people blamed mistakes on local officials and assumed Stalin did not know about them.
- No simple or safe means by which people could state a desire for change.
Stalinism
The strengths and weaknesses of the USSR on the eve of war in 1941:
Strengths:
- USSR survived the war against Germany that began in June 1941. Germany was very powerful meaning the USSR must have had considerable strengths.
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Stalin’s policy of industrialisation meant the USSR had a strong industrial base, allowing it to compete with other powers → USSR able to significantly out produce Germany in war materials and heavy industry.
- The centralised nature of the Stalinist command economy allowed it to adapt relatively quickly to the needs of war.
- Stalin’s propaganda during the 1930s had already created a ‘siege mentality’ among Soviet people. They were used to hardship and adapted easily to the crisis of war.
- Stalin was respected as a strong leader.
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The Five Year Plans achieved remarkable growth, and gave the USSR a strong base for further development → hydro-electric projects and an increase in steel production by 400%.
- Consumer good availability rose due to the Five Year Plans.
- Education became much more widespread, more and more people were literate.
- Workforce became more skilled.
- Development in basic social services like health.
- Living standards were beginning to rise again after a considerable fall in the early 1930s.
- More schools became available in rural areas, although they were still behind the towns.
- Stalin’s regime inspired some young Communists.
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There was an amount of social mobility → people could ‘rise through the ranks’.
Weaknesses:
- Stalin’s policies caused disruption to many people’s lives.
- Terror was an integral part of Stalin’s policies, and millions of people died or suffered. Many people lived in fear.
- Economic policies had limited success. Agriculture remained a weakness, with low yields and an unenthusiastic workforce.
- Urban workforce had strict labour discipline and harsh conditions.
- Most women remained second-class citizens.
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There was no personal or political freedom → religious believers often persecuted, no free press, all cultural activity controlled, people could not travel freely and there were no free elections.
- Population bombarded with constant propaganda.
Nationalities:
In 1939, almost 100 million out of 170 million Soviet citizens were not Russian. The USSR was made up of many states, Ukraine, Georgia and more. In theory they could leave the federation if they wanted to do so, but in practice it was harder as Stalin’ exercise control from the centre.
Collectivisation had bad effects the states:
- Kazakhstan’s economy was in crisis.
- Uzbekistan’s agriculture was destroyed in order to produce cotton.
Impact of Stalinism on the USSR:
Six key features of ‘Stalinism’:
- Personal dictatorship.
- A ‘command economy’ that was centrally controlled and directed.
- A politicisation of life (all activity was given a political slant. Citizens did not have the freedom to behave as individuals).
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A social structure that in theory allowed for quality of all people. However in practice the Communist Party dominated all aspects of life → those with senior positions in the party had the most privileges.
- Culture determined by the state. Creative energy was not allowed to blossom.
- A conservative ethos. The party hierarchy, in practice became conservative and in many respects was resistant to change.
Stalinism was not a term used by Stalin himself, but by people after his death in 1953 to identify the characteristics of the USSR.
Stalin’s dictatorship:
USSR came close to being a totalitarian society → the State controls every aspect of people’s lives, not just activities but thoughts too. The mixture of propaganda, education and terror was never enough to make the country completely totalitarian, for two reasons:
- It was not efficient enough. Some of the written propaganda did not reach those illiterate peasants.
- People were not brainwashed into accepting the party line. There were individuals who might conform physically, but not mentally.
How much power did Stalin really have?
It’s possible to argue that Stalin could not run everything personally and could not know everything that happened. Local party officials sometimes acted independently of the centre. However, historians accept that Stalin was the directing force and even his closest colleagues were in fear of him. When there was significant change in policy (Great Terror, Non-Aggression Pact with Hitler in 1939) the driving force came from Stalin.
The Communist Party and Soviet government:
The main features of Stalin’s personal dictatorship:
- A cult of personality.
- An emphasis on the all-important role of the leader.
- Control over the population.
- The use of Terror and propaganda to reinforce control.
- The ability to ignore any constitutional guarantee of individual rights.
Stalin’s personal contribution:
Many historians have argued that some of the characteristics of the USSR had already been put in place by Lenin. They argue that Stalin took these characteristics to the next level. However it is possible to identify some features that were distinctly ‘Stalinist’:
- Strong emphasis on Nationalisation and patriotism. This was a new development. The early Bolsheviks had been quite international in outlook. Building Soviet strength was as much about beating the enemy and creating national pride as it was about building Socialism.
Conclusion