The Conservative Party often exaggerated the threat from communism as a way of weakening support for Labour. A classic example of this is the allegations of communist influence behind the General Strike of 1926. Certainly communists were prominent in many aspects of British life in the 1930s. Several trade unions had leaders who were CPGB members or sympathetic to it. Communists played a lead role in major strikes such as the Birmingham rent strike in 1939. Communists also played a leading role in organisations like the National Unemployed Workers’ Movement (NUWM) which had 50,000 members in the early 1930s. The NUWM not only gave useful advice to the unemployed but organised ‘hunger marches’ and mass demonstrations. Some of the latter resulted in violent confrontations with the police.
The CPGB was also active disrupting meetings and marches held by the British Union of Fascists and resulting in violence. The Communists Party newspaper, The Daily Worker, had a daily circulation of 80,000 copies, whilst the Left Book Club had 50,000 members by 1939. Communists formed a large proportion of the British section of the International Brigade which went to fight in Spain. The CPGB did get a handful of MPs elected – a few Labour MPs were also sympathetic to communist ideas. Party membership doubled in the early 1930s.
Communists also made some headway in the universities, though in most cases these communist loyalties faded away as the students established their careers. One group at Cambridge, called the ‘Apostles’, however, developed into a network of spies who became notorious when it was revealed in 1951 that they had been passing secrets to the USSR during the war and the early Cold War years. However, although the CPGB certainly had influence, it never posed a really serious threat. Party membership peaked at 18,000. There were never more than one of two Communist MPs at any one time. Communist influence in the trade union movement was limited by the opposition of moderate union leaders such as Ernest Bevin. The Labour Party consistently refused to work with the CPGB or allow it to affiliate to the Labour movement. The CPGB never had more than a fraction of the strength of its Italian, German or French counterparts.
The National Government therefore never felt seriously worried about the CPGB. The secret service kept a close eye on its leaders, sympathisers and activists. The police were not discouraged from cracking down hard on communist led or inspired demonstrations. Legislation such as the 1934 Incitement to Disaffection Act could be used to prosecute communists.
In October 1932, following a visit to Fascist Italy, Sir Oswald Mosley formed the British Union of Fascists (BUF). Dressed in a black uniform, with a silver insignia and giving the fascist salute to the leader, the BUF brought a touch of Italian fascism to Britain. In 1936, increasing German influence led the movement to be renamed the British Union of Fascists and National Socialists. The BUF gained support from Lord Rothermere, owner of the Daily Mail, and grew quickly, up to 50,000 members by 1934.
Support for the BUF was strongest in parts of London and in some northern cities like Liverpool and Leeds. Early on there was also some support in the more affluent middle-class towns – but the typical recruits to the BUF were young working-class men. Supporters varied in their reasons. Mosley was a powerful speaker with ideas for reducing mass unemployment at a time when unemployment was high. His book The Greater Britain set out his programme and was thought by some people to be intellectually superior to the writings of Hitler and Mussolini. Mosley played on his ability as an orator. He gave a hundred speeches around the country, published three books and wrote many articles for newspapers and magazines. He was the BUF’s biggest asset but also tended to do too much on his own. There were few other talented people in the party.
Between 1931-4, the time looked right for a new political movement. There was inevitable disillusionment with the traditional political parties and system. The collapse of the second Labour government, the failure of the National Governments to solve mass unemployment, cuts in government spending and the means test, contrasted with the apparent dynamism of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Mosley’s appeal to anti-Semitism won some support in London’s East End for example but it was a two-edged sword. For every supporter Mosley gained by exploiting racist attitudes, at least one potential supporter was lost.
The BUF won some support in the north by arguing for tariffs to protect the declining textile industry. Some traditional Labour supporters flirted with the BUF because they had become disillusioned with Labour in 1931. There was also some support for the BUF from people who were in favour of better relations with Hitler’s Germany because they wanted to avoid a war, or thought Hitler was a valuable defence against the evils of communist.
In the end, Mosley and the BUF never seriously challenged political stability in Britain – but for a brief spell it seemed as if he might do so. Mosley was a credible political figure in the early-1930s. Had the National Government broken up in 1933 or 1934, as Labour had done in 1931, then Mosley might have achieved a hold on power – as certain counterfactual historians believe. After all, both Mussolini and Hitler had come to power by exploiting times of economic and political crisis. Mosley hoped that the same would happen in Britain and that he would be seen as the county’s saviour and a formidable rival to the discredited MacDonald and the cautious Baldwin.
Yet his movement never really took off. Even at its peak in 1934, the BUF had a membership of 50,000 – enough to make an impact but far short of a mass movement. By 1935, these numbers declined to 5000. In the late 1930 there was a modest revival with membership around 20,000 but no political breakthrough came. Electorally, the BUF was a failure with no MPs or even local councillors elected. Following the violence of a BUF indoor rally in London’s Olympia Hall in 1934, the BUF lost the support of Lord Rothermere. In the later 1930s, the BUF lost support through becoming more closely associated with the ideas and racial policies of Nazi Germany. Right until the outbreak of war in 1939, Mosley could still attract sizeable audiences to his speeches. The majority attending were opponents determined to disrupt his meetings rather than committed supporters.
National Government policies played an important part directly and indirectly in limiting the threat from political extremism. Legislation was passed to curb the activities of both the communists and the fascists. The 1934 Incitement to Disaffection Act could be used to prosecute anyone advocating revolution or violence of any kind. The Public Order Act 1936 forbade the wearing of political uniforms and gave the police greater powers to control and even to ban political meetings and demonstrations. There were to be no Nuremburg-style rallies in Britain.
The National Government itself, with its huge parliamentary majorities in both the 1931 and 1935 generals, ensured stability and prevented extremist parties from exploiting any political vacuum. It also meant that the government had no need to depend on any political alliances with extremists. The National government was in place for nine years, in itself a source of stability. In foreign policy, both Baldwin and Chamberlain (who succeeded Baldwin as PM in 1937) avoided coming into conflict with either communist or fascist countries – their policy of ‘appeasement’ and the avoidance of war ensured public support until March 1939.
The Labour movement also played its part in preventing extremism. In the 1930s, both the party and the trade unions were led by moderates opposed to any link with the communists. Leading trade unionists like Ernest Bevin spent much of their career fighting communist influence in the trade unions. The Labour Party rejected all attempts by the CPGB to bring about a ‘Popular Front’ against fascism – as had happened in France. Also, despite its terrible defeat in the 1931 election, Labour hung on to its core vote. Although the Conservatives dominated parliament, Labour remained the main opposition party.
International events also discredited the political extremes. By the late-1930s, the truth about Stalin’s show trials of political opponents and his mass purges was beginning to be known. There was also hostility to Stalin’s role in the Spanish Civil War. People were even more alienated from Soviet Communism when Stalin made the amazing decision to make a pact with Hitler in August 1939. This took the CPGB completely by surprise and made British communists look both ridiculous and unpatriotic.
Similarly, Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 and his backing for Franco from 1936 turned people away from Fascist Italy. Hitler’s Germany was discredited by internal violence, such as Kristallnacht 1938, and by his aggression in foreign policy. The outbreak of the Second World War further discredited the BUF. In May 1940, fear that the BUF posed a threat to British security justified Churchill’s government in arresting Mosley and over 700 followers.
Perhaps the most significant factor of all in maintaining stability was the patchy but undeniable economic recovery from 1933-4. One of the popular causes played up by extremists was mass unemployment, for example – but this had been much reduced by 1937. In the Midlands and south-east, new industries were growing rapidly and a more comfortable lifestyle was developing. Unlike Germany, the British classes did not suffer economic disaster. There were pockets of deep unemployment in the depressed areas but these did not lead to political extremism. If anything, the long-term unemployed became demoralised and apathetic; or they adjusted to life on the dole. George Orwell noted, simple life ‘averted revolution’ in Britain.
Both the CPGB and the BUF also contributed to their own failure. The communists never found an astounding leader. The BUF had Mosley, but despite his charisma he was impatient, a poor administrator and made political mistakes. Although not all the violence at BUF meetings and marches was due to its members, the BUF got a reputation for thuggery which lost it public support. Finally, there was the continued strength of Britain’s political institutions, especially parliament and the monarchy. Unlike German and Russia, the 1914-18 war had not ended in defeat and revolution in Britain. There was no widespread loss of faith in the parliamentary government nor in constitutional monarchy – not even after the Abdication Crisis of 1936.
Britain in the late-1930s was not free from social and economic problems but was a stable society, relatively confident about the future. The economic crisis of the early-1930s had been blunted if not completely overcome. Political extremism was making a negligible impact within Britain, even if the international situation was threatening. Foreign observers (inc. Hitler) still saw Britain as a great power, with its empire intact. The great smoother-over of difficult situations, Baldwin, resigned in 1937 but his successor, Chamberlain, was a capable administrator and an impressive politician. Many people (inc. Chamberlain) thought he would make a great PM.
In the event, Chamberlain was brought down by his most cherished policy, appeasement. In May 1940, Chamberlain would have to resign in disgrace. There was no hint of this in 1937-8. Appeasement was seen as the logical policy, supported by the bulk of political and public opinion. When Chamberlain made his flying visits to Germany to negotiate with Hitler and then signed the Munich agreement, he gained mass popularity. Only a few voices spoke out against Chamberlain at the time – just as only a few voices gave warnings about Britain’s social division; and only a few voices warned that the British Empire was headed for trouble as colonial independence movements developed.