The New Germany Under Hitler
With the rise of Hitler and the Nazi party came a dramatic change that ushered in a new era of International Relations. No longer was Germany the passive recipient of the articles of the Treaty of Versailles, no longer was the German government a weak entity that could be easily pushed around like a feather in the wind, and no longer were the German people going to live in poverty and fear of where their next meal would come from, all thanks to the Fuhrer Adolph Hitler and his policies of German re-empowerment. Hitler's domestic policies proved to be fruitful in terms of morale and re-militarizing, yet they still underwent great scrutiny by current and past analysts. A subject few touch on, however, is Hitler's foreign policy, a seemingly ruthless and goal-oriented set of rules by which Hitler executed his conquest of Europe. One historian, Andreas Hillgruber, used the term "Stufenplan" (first referred to in Hitler's Mein Kampf) to describe Hitler's foreign policy. According to Hillgruber, Hitler's "Stufenplan" involved the creation of a Germany that would encompass continental Europe. This would be followed by an overseas colonial expansion, which Hitler added would end in a final hegemonic war between the European (which would by then be German) continent and the American continents, thus resulting in German world domination (Schweller 94). Those who merely look at the outcome of the war will be quick to point out that Hitler could not have followed such a plan, as his actions indicate so. However, if one were to closely examine the events leading up to and the outbreak of World War II, one would discover that up until British intervention, the US's rise to military might and a failed territorial conquest of the Soviet Union, Hitler's foreign policy clearly reflected his desire to follow the "Stufenplan." It was only after the aforementioned events occurred that he abandoned "Stufenplan" for a a more spontaneous foreign policy of reacting to events as they occurred.
Hitler had power politics model of the world that surrounded him that he would base his "Stufenplan" upon. In this model, the world had two superpowers: the US and the Soviet Union. Also in this bipolar world existed the "lesser great powers" (or LGPs) of Great Britain, Italy, France, Japan, and Germany (Schweller 113). Of the LGPs. Germany, in Hitler's eyes, was destined to transcend the LGP label and become a superpower, creating a tripolar world. When, through domestic policies that would increase efficacy and morale and through territorial acquisitions in continental Europe Germany achieved its desired power ...
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Hitler had power politics model of the world that surrounded him that he would base his "Stufenplan" upon. In this model, the world had two superpowers: the US and the Soviet Union. Also in this bipolar world existed the "lesser great powers" (or LGPs) of Great Britain, Italy, France, Japan, and Germany (Schweller 113). Of the LGPs. Germany, in Hitler's eyes, was destined to transcend the LGP label and become a superpower, creating a tripolar world. When, through domestic policies that would increase efficacy and morale and through territorial acquisitions in continental Europe Germany achieved its desired power status, it would embark on a conquest of Russian, thus earning the German people the Lebenschraum (or living space) that was necessary for the master race. By wiping out a rival pole, Germany would be left with but one to conquer: the US. Hitler believed that due to sheer population and resource ratios, the newly formed German state would have no trouble whatsoever in defeating the US, thus effectively conquering the world (Schweller 101).
Hitler's plan, however, was not planned to be achieved in his lifetime. According to the Fuhrer, the strategy would consist of "a series of isolated wars of escalated magnitude. First, Germany would win easily obtainable objectives in short and decisive campaigns in the east. Next, Germany would defeat France and coerce the British into an alliance against Russia and America. Finally, Germany would be ready to unleash successive polar wars against the Soviet Union and America" (Schweller 101). If one were to examine Hitler's policies, they would accurately reflect such a plan. He devised the Blitzkreig in order to effectively obtain the short objectives, namely the annexation of Germany's neighbors. Although this was done under the umbrella of uniting the German-speaking peoples, one can clearly see the coincidental advantage of the campaigns, as they were also the first step in Germany's territorial acquisitions.
Preceding the success of the short territorial campaigns in Eastern Europe, however, Hitler pursued his "Stufenplan" and attempted to create an alliance system that would guarantee him freedom of entry into France and Russia. He went on to attempt to strike a deal with Great Britain, whom he viewed as a lesser power, in which he would guarantee the British safety in its colonial endeavors in return for German supremacy in continental Europe. Great Britain, he assumed, would jump at such an opportunity, as Hitler would guarantee it safe expansion overseas. Also, Hitler believed that Great Britain's opposition to France on the question of Upper Silesia and the Ruhr crisis almost guaranteed him British cooperation (Schweller 108). He also sought alliances with Italy, whom he believed was destined to ally with Germany due to its desire to undo the doings of the Treaty of Versailles as well as to topple France (Schweller 109). Outside of Europe, Hitler looked to Japan as an ally because it also opposed Communism in the Soviet Union and because its desire for territorial acquisition was in the Pacific and would not interfere with his Lebenschraum (Schweller 111).
This grandiose plan of alliances was shattered when Britain rejected Hitler's terms, which involved limiting France, Poland and Czechoslovakia's armaments but not that of Germany or Britain (Schweller 112). The British foreign secretary Austen Chamberlain did not want to lose any form of alliance with France, whom he saw as the as Britain's chief ally. Furthermore, he was quoted as saying that if Britain did not offer France reassurance in the form of an axis, Britain "shall lose all influence over French foreign policy... [Britain] shall be dragged along, unwillingly, impotent, protesting, in the war of France towards the new Armageddon. For [Britain] cannot afford to see France crushed" (Schweller 118).
Britain's rejection of Germany's alliance terms meant that one part of the "Stufenplan" had to be skipped. However, in the Fuhrer's eyes, this did not mean that the rest of the plan would not succeed. He decided to continue following the plan, remilitarizing Germany and acquiring the territories on Germany's Eastern front. His last acquisition on the East, however, resulted in Britain and France's declaration of war against Germany. Undaunted by the Britain and France's war against him, Hitler then decided to undergo his plan to conquer Western Europe. After easily invading Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland, Hitler called upon his Italian allies to help him attack France, eventually coercing it into signing an armistice with Germany. Now that the issue of controlling continental Europe was taken care of and Hitler felt confident that Germany had become a superpower, he once again turned to the east, this time to take on the Soviet Union.
In his second eastwards campaign, Hitler faced no problems in annexing Romania, Yugoslavia, and Greece, as well as other states due to the efficacy of the Blitzkreig. In fact, even upon invading the Soviet Union Hitler was convinced that he had made the right decision at the right time:
The more we see of conditions in Russia, the more thankful we must be that we struck in time. In another ten years there would have sprung up in Russia a mass of industrial centers, inaccessible to attack, which would have produced armaments on an inexhaustible scale, while the rest of Europe would have degenerated into a defenseless plaything of Soviet policy (Schweller 100).
What Hitler did not expect, however, was that his Blitzkreig offense would render itself ineffective in the Soviet Union due to the sheer amount of landmass involved. The more land he continued to annex in the Soviet Union, the longer his supply lines grew. This, added to the US entering the war on the side of allies, proved to be too much for the German troops. Hitler's "Stufenplan" had counted on US isolationism until the Soviet Union was defeated. The entry of the other superpower on the side of the enemy coupled with the harsh Russian winters eventually led to the failure to conquer the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of the German troops. The "Stufenplan" was then abandoned for a more situation-practical policy of reacting to the events as they occurred.
The German troops continued to retreat in the direction of Berlin and, coupled with an Allied victory on the Western front, accepted unconditional surrender in May of 1945. Hitler's policy of reacting to the events as they occurred had failed him, as did his prized "Stufenplan." One, however, must wonder what it would be like had Hitler been victorious in his "Stufenplan." Would Germany be the leading superpower in today's world? Hitler was quoted as saying that:
...with the defeat of the Reich...there will remain in the world only two Great Powers capable of confronting each other - the United States and Soviet Russia. The laws of both history and geography will compel these two powers to a trial of strength, either military or in the field of economics and ideology. These same laws will make it inevitable that both powers shall become enemies of Europe. And it is equally certain that both these powers will sooner or later find it desirable to seek the support of the sole surviving nation in Europe, the German people. I say with all emphasis at my command that the Germans must at all costs avoid playing the role of the pawn in either camp (Schweller 182).
One must admit that some of Hitler's above prophecies eerily came to be. If so, then who is to say that the rest of them could not have? One can only wonder.
