Within our current system, centred around state sovereignty a fundamental principal is non intervention and non-aggression of one state into the affairs of another states sovereignty. According to the legalist paradigm and its self determination argument, the crime of aggression lies in breach of sovereignty because breaching sovereignty violates individuals human rights.
Suffice to say, not only does principle of non-intervention and non aggression apply to external endeavours by one sovereignty into another defined sovereignty but the principal of non-intervention and aggression also applies to a sovereignties internal endeavours. And so, the most easily accepted justification for the resort to war is a war of self defence against aggression, for “Aggression is the violation of the principle of non-intervention, which is the guard for sovereignty (Shue, 756).”
If for some reason, a state does not act in accord with the principle of non-intervention and non-aggression (that is to say aggression) externally it would be a blatant violation of sovereignty and at the very least justify military action in self defence, if not demand such action. Similarly, if a state is guilty of internal aggression such as acts of genocide, enslavement or massacre, this action also warrants military action in self defence. In both cases of aggression, external and internal, it is clear that “the privileges of sovereignty can be understood to be conditional not only upon non-predatory external behaviour - non-aggression - but also upon non-predatory internal behaviour (Shue, 757).”
The fundamental ideology established within Michael Walzer’s legalist paradigm is that of the right to state sovereignty and that aggression against such sovereignty is criminal. By understanding that state sovereignty speaks not only of territorial boundaries and the rights thereof, but more fundamentally about basic human rights, or self determination, it is easily argued that wars waged in self defence of sovereignty and aggression are always justified. For, human rights are our greatest ideal and should be defended at all costs by the victim state as well as the international community. Although it is clear that once aggression has occurred against sovereignty war waged in self defence is justified, it must be examined whether wars waged preemptively can ever hold moral or legal justification.
Preemption and Prevention
Wars of self defence are fought in the interest of the state under attack, and although this can be argued as special interest rather than general interest wars, I reject the ‘special interest’ argument, for self defence is universally regarded as a moral justification for war. Thus, I intend to argue that preemptive strikes in extreme circumstances by a third party states can be morally sustained as a legitimate form of self defence. In order to achieve this end, I will first establish that preemptive strikes launched by the ‘victim’ state are essentially an act of self defence and therefore justified. I will then argue that once the crime of aggression has been committed, it is morally permissible for a third party state to strike ‘preemptively’. Such action is in self defence of the rights of the victim and the potential threat of an enlarged aggressive state against the international community and therefore morally permissible. Lastly, I will reject wars of prevention (which I will clarify as different from preemptive strikes) for preventive strikes lower the threshold required for permissible justifications of war and aggression.
The primary duty of a state is to protect its sovereignty against aggression. However, aggression often begins without a single shot being fired or any borders crossed and so how is a state to determine what threat is sufficient enough to wage a preemptive strike? Both individuals and states have the right to defend themselves against actual violence and aggression and as the legalist paradigm highlights, “imminent threat of force...constitutes aggression and is a criminal act. (Walzer, 62).” Thus, preemptive strike against aggression is much alike a “reflex action (Walzer,75).” where action is an absolute necessity for the preservation of sovereignty. Therefore, I agree with Walzer, in that preemptive strikes waged against imminent threat are acts of self defence and morally permissible.
Walzer later revises the legalist paradigm to include permissible preemptive strike against threats that are “absent of any immediate intention to launch such an attack or invasion. (Walzer, 85).” I reject this relaxed revision of the legalist paradigm, for such a doctrine lowers the threshold required for permissible justifications of war and aggression. Similarly any preemptive action which is not ‘reflexive’ is not an action in self defence and therefore not morally justified. The ability to act preemptively to ‘distant’ threats falls into the category of preventive, which I intend to disqualify at length later.
Walzer’s legalist paradigm speaks of the inherent right of individual and collective self defence. The legalist paradigm holds that aggression justifies war of self defence by the victim “and a war of law enforcement by the victim and any other member of the international society. (Walzer, 62).” Although I agree with Walzer that sometimes third party intervention is sometimes necessary in order to assure victory over the aggressor, I feel the legalist paradigm is enormously vague and allows for the minimalization of the threshold required for permissible justifications of war and aggression. It is absolutely necessary that third party action in war be labelled preemptive. Such a title will force intense scrutiny by the international community concerning the motives of the third party before preemptive strikes occur. A more strict and focussed doctrine concerning preemption will ensure that preemptive strikes by third parties are only launched in self defence and are therefore morally permissible.
First, one must reject the legalist paradigm when it argues for third party involvement in ‘law enforcement’. ‘Law enforcement’ implies that the goal of military action by third parties is to achieve ‘justice’ rather than disrupt and overthrow states committing aggression. This is fundamentally wrong, for as established, the protection of sovereignty and human rights must be held as the ultimate ideal and defence of such is the only thing capable of justifying military action. More so, wars waged based on ‘law enforcement’ encourage third party intervention based on personal motives. Justifying war waged by third parties with the goal of ‘law enforcement’ encourages aid based on personal motives rather defence of aggression and therefore must be rejected.
Intervention by third parties must be labelled preemption. I encourage such a label, for preemptive strike committed by any state other than those peoples who have been directly threatened and reside under imminent attack is not an act in self defence and therefore not justified. Consider two scenarios. In the first, a state is invaded aggressively by another state with the hopes of overthrowing the established government and exploiting the states resources. War ensues. In this circumstance third party military action would be justified because “justified military action stands in harms way, shielding intended victims from harm. It is justified harm protecting against unjustified harm, justified by the protection it provides. (Shue, 743).” In this case the third party would be acting in self defence of another and therefore justified. However, this third party action must still be labelled preemption. The third party actor is launching military action before they themselves have been attacked, or even threatened. Although justifiable, it still must be classified as preemption.
Secondly, a government begins to persecute its own citizens and aggressively pursue ethnic cleansing. Although it is plausible that the minority victim could wage war in self defence they are most likely incapable financially, structurally and emotionally. A third party state would be justified in launching a preemptive strike against the aggressors. Such a strike would be justified military action for it would confront those engaged in doing harm and defend those being harmed. This is action should be classified as action is self defence and therefore morally justified. Although just, such action must be classified as preemption.
In both scenarios preemption is justified because it action in defence of incapable peoples. It is essential that third party action be classified as preemption, for preemption is unjustified unless in self defence. I will summarize justifiable preemption as defensive action by a third party only after aggression has taken place and where the victimized people are incapable of liberating themselves. Such a scenario, as in the above circumstances are extreme circumstances and require action which would otherwise be unjustified, that is a war launched by a third party preemptively in the self defence of a victim state. Action taken by a third party outside of this narrow doctrine of extreme circumstances would be considered preemption and therefore aggressive and unjust.
Michael Walzer speaks of scenarios where a state is so desperate and in a state of “supreme emergency (Walzer, 251) that it may violate principals of war. Walzer argues that in cases of supreme emergency, a defensive war may be fought indiscriminately and without concern for the rules of war. Targeting the innocent is an example of accepted action during periods of ‘supreme emergency.’ Walzer’s argument of supreme emergency is fundamentally different from the extreme circumstances which I argue permit preemptive attack. The difference between the two must be clear. The extreme circumstances to which I allude, refer to circumstances where a state has been victim of aggression and is unable to sustain resistance. The preemptive third party strike which this then justifies is a war of defence and is expected to be fought with utmost accordance to general rules to war and moral ethic. Walzer’s argument for supreme emergency allows for unethical conduct, and aggressive military action which I argue is always wrong. Cases of ‘supreme emergency’ are avoidable if my argument for third party preemption in extreme circumstance is accepted. The aim of third party preemption is to destroy those aggressors before they place a peoples within ‘supreme emergency.’
Critiques of my revision to the legalist paradigm and my argument as to how third party military involvement should be internationally viewed may argue that preemptive action taken after aggression has taken place allows for the murder and destruction of innocent peoples and property. These critiques may advocate a policy of prevention. Preventive wars can be said to ‘save lives’, effectively uphold international morale, and be fought in self defence. I reject this claim.
The argument for preventive war is simply that one defends a state of affairs worth defending and that fighting such war now is better than fighting it later. This argument is not justified, not substantiated and simply not very good. Walzer argues that even if the state of affairs were worth fighting for and fighting now is better than later, states should not accept them because doing so would lead to “innumerable and fruitless war (Walzer, 77).” More so, preventive wars lower the threshold of war and are likely to make wars too frequent. Walzer’s greatest criticism of preventive war, is that the calculations required to determine whether a war is more cost effective fought now rather than later are simply impossible. “Think of what one would have to know to perform the calculations, of the experiments one would have to conduct, the wars one would have to fight–and leave unfought! (Walzer, 77).” Walzer’s basic objection to preventive war is not only , he tells us, that preventive war would make war-fighting too frequent, but that it would make it to ordinary. In this, I agree with Walzer.
First, I established that preemptive strikes launched by a ‘victim’ state are justified. The victim must only act in reflexive self defence against imminent threat, and thus in self defence. Such action is morally accepted as justified military action. I then established that third party intervention is sometimes necessary to insure victory over aggression. This third party action must be labelled preemption rather than ‘law enforcement’ as given by Walzer. Preemption is a vital description, for it more accurately describes the action of a third party and permits third party involvement only in extreme circumstances. Extreme circumstances I defined as situations where aggression has taken place and those victimized are unable of liberating themselves. This differs from Walzer’s “supreme emergency” for it does not allow for unjust conduct but instead prevents it. Lastly, I rejected wars of prevention. I defined preventive war as a preemptive war in which the requirement of ‘extreme circumstance’ is relaxed or non-existent. I argue along with Walzer that a doctrine of preventive war simply makes it far too likely that “innumerable and fruitless” wars will be launched.
Conclusion
Human beings are morally immune from physical assaults designed to injure or kill them. This principal is established by the legalist paradigm written by Michael Walzer. This fundamental principle of basic human rights, defined as sovereignty within the legalist paradigm, I accept. It is the violation of sovereignty and the crime of aggression which is war, and that which is fundamentally wrong. What needs to be explained is why there should be any exception to this general rule and, if so, what exactly the terms of this exception are. The explanation I provide consists of two points. First, that those engaged in efforts to harm others without justification may themselves justifiably be harmed to the extent necessary to prevent further unjustified harm. Therefore wars of self defence are justified.
Second, also necessary in protecting sovereignty and crushing aggression is third party intervention. I argue that preemption by third party states is justified in extreme circumstances. First, Walzer’s notion of ‘Law enforcement’ is rejected as being to broad and too lenient on the justifications required by a third party to commence aggression. Second, third party involvement in war must be labelled preemption. Accordingly, a third party may act preemptively, in the extreme circumstance where a victim state’s sovereignty has been violated and they are unable of defending their peoples basic rights and defeating aggression. This preemptive strike I argue is in self defence and is justified. Last, I reject the notion of prevention. Preventive war legitimizes wars under conditions too close to the routinization of aggression. Preventive war simply does not count as a form of collective self defence and therefore is not justified.