The roles and leadership of Charles Stuart and John Pym in the English Civil War from August 1642 to December 1643
The roles and leadership of Charles Stuart and John Pym in the English Civil War from August 1642 to December 1643.
On August the 2nd 1642 King Charles the 1st raised his standard at Nottingham. The English Civil War had begun and it lasted from 1642 until the King's execution at the beginning of 1649. One could argue that it was actually two separate Civil wars, fought between the Parliamentarians and the Royalists. The first war beginning in 1642 and ending in 1646 when the King was captured, and then the second from 1647 after the Kings escape, to 1648 when he was again defeated and captured. However this esssay will simply be looking at the years from 1642 to the end of 1643 when Pym died, as a comparison between their roles as leaders can go no further than ones death. What plan to do is compare and contrast the roles of these two men as leaders and decide to what extent John Pym was the reason for Parliament's success and to what extent was the King the reason for Royalist failures.
By 1640, John Pym had become the head of a political group who later became known at the Parliamentarians. According to Angela Anderson1, the victory of Parliament was owed much to the "tactical genius of Pym". He was a skilled political tactician who first entered parliament in 1614. He had participated in the Commons' Protestation against James in 1621 for which he was placed under house arrest for five days as a result. He also took part in the attack on the Duke of Buckingham due to his belief that the man was incompetent in the way of foreign policy.
The Parliamentarians (although not named that) originated back in the 1620's with a group of Lords and MP's -Lord Saye and Sele, the Earl of Warwick and Sir John Eliot. They organised the Petition of Right in 1628 and a year later John Pym had joined them during the crisis that produced the Three Resolutions of 1629. So the 1620's saw a number of events that brought together a group of men who had the same political views and the belief that the law of the land was binding on the king and his subjects.
Others that took up support of the Parliamentarians were yeomen and craftsmen and later on once the war had begun, many of the common people turned to the Parliamentarians also.
Pym played a major role leading up until his death in 1643. His role as leader of the Moderate group amongst the parliamentarians was important in keeping the war and peace groups together. His idea of introducing weekly taxes in London created a strong financial system for the parliamentarians which set them up for a long term war against the Royalists. He set up the Midland and Eastern Association that created good relationships between local county communities and the parliamentarians. His alliance with the Scots, proved crucial in the end although it caused a stir amongst the peace and war groups, but Pym's powers of persuasion and the firing of Henry Marten, a powerful war group leader, helped to reassure the peace group.
The Royalists were of course led by King Charles the 1st, who was the second son of the former King, James the 1st. Therefore Charles must have been brought up always believing that his brother would become the King after his father's reign. According to Angela Anderson2, who wrote a book on Charles the 1st in the Longman History in depth series, Charles was rather shy and not very good at speaking in public. This would surely be a problem for any ruler of a nation, as oratory skills are important in attracting support. His weakness at speaking in public would surely have been a problem in 1642-1643. She also states that Charles was overshadowed by the presence and then death of his brother, Prince Henry. So how did Charles act, believing he was not to become King? According to Charles Carlton3 Charles tried to protect himself by being submissive, something which is very rare in an heir, he became withdrawn and always seeking affection. So this was the attitude that Charles felt was appropriate, as it is the attitude he displayed to the King and his brother no doubt above all others. So when it was Charles that eventually became King, he expected his subjects to adopt that same attitude he had demonstrated to his brother and father. Charles was a strong believer in the Devine Right of Kings, like his father before him, and this was a reason for his inability to make concessions with parliament. His mixture of outward self-certainty and inner self-doubt made a lethal combination that created many difficulties with a many number of groups of people.
His followers, the Royalists, were made up of many of the gentry as Thomas Stephens, the sheriff of Gloucestershire in 1445 conceded that "almost all the gentry were ever for the King"4. Charles also had the support of foreign rulers that he was related to who lent their aid by supplying his army with cavalry. Among the King's followers there were moderates and extremists. The Moderates sought a compromise that would prevent the king from anymore unconstitutional acts, guarantee the rule of law and the rights of parliament, and leave intact the valid powers of the king in both Church and State. Edward Hyde (Lord Clarendon) and Lucius Carey (Lord Falkland) were the leaders of this group. The Extremists were a group who felt that the king needed to settle the dispute by force. Lord Digby was one extremist, and the King himself seemed to favour this option as well as the Queen, Henrietta Maria.
Others who joined the Royalists were simply those too afraid to commit the sin of rebellion. This in fact deterred many supporters of the Long Parliament who began to feel that their demands had already been met and that the Long Parliament was beginning to push the limits. So Charles' position as King acted as a way of gaining support in the early stages of 1642.
The king's role in the English Civil war was of course possibly the most important individual role of all. His decision to move north to establish his court in York meant ...
This is a preview of the whole essay
Others who joined the Royalists were simply those too afraid to commit the sin of rebellion. This in fact deterred many supporters of the Long Parliament who began to feel that their demands had already been met and that the Long Parliament was beginning to push the limits. So Charles' position as King acted as a way of gaining support in the early stages of 1642.
The king's role in the English Civil war was of course possibly the most important individual role of all. His decision to move north to establish his court in York meant that he had left Parliament with a free hand at Westminster. His inability to make concessions made any chance of peace unlikely. His lack of restraint on his commanders and his failure to create good relations with the local county villagers and farmers meant that many of them turned away from him.
So the first, most vital roles that both Charles and Pym played was their leadership among their parties. It is important to note though that their leadership was different from the others and played a key role in parliaments victory for almost opposite reasons.
The King had many advantages in the beginning of the Civil War, such as his position as monarch. According to Angela Anderson's5 The Civil Wars 1640-9 he had far more loyal subjects at his disposal who helped fund the war and lend men and cavalry. For example, the Earl of Worcester donated three hundred thousand pounds before the war was over. No other sources I found backed up that the king had more followers, but according to one of the chapters written in The English Civil War and After by Brian Manning6, the King had the majority of the house of Lords on his side while the majority of house of Commons supported Parliament. Which leads me to believe that both sources hold truth in them and that simply, the Lords were far more able to provide arms and cavalry for the King as they were rich land owners who owned small armies of their own, than the men in the House of Commons were able to for Parliament. So the Lords and their own followers outnumbered the men of the House of Commons. Angela Anderson7 pointed out in her other book Charles I that "It is difficult to draw clear conclusions regarding the distribution of support and the motives behind it". Another advantage identified by Angela Anderson8 was that, as King, he had sole command and everyone followed him alone, whereas with parliament they were not as unified and certainly didn't have as clear a strategy as the Royalists. Yet in her book The Civil Wars 1640-99 she states that there were divisions among the royalists as well, with Edward Hyde trying to negotiate with Parliament while Prince Rupert and Lord Digby fought over war strategy. Yet in the beginning of the Civil War, nothing suggests that the King was unable to control his subjects. So with all these advantages, the king was able to mobilise an army far quicker than the parliamentarians. Proof of his earlier success is shown in his victory at Edgehill in 1643.
Parliament's political divisions were far, far more complicated than those of the Royalists. There were over two hundred Mps and many of them had little appreciation of what war was like. Yet of the men that did step forward and contribute, three groups formed out of them. There was the 'Peace group' which had limited and defensive war aims. Then there was the 'War group', led by Sir Henry Vane, Sir Arthur Haselrig and the republican Henry Marten. This group openly sought a total victory against the Royalists and wanted to severely reduce the kings powers. Then, the middle group between these two extremes was led by John Pym who was helped by many other Mps, one of whom was Oliver Cromwell. This middle group wanted to negotiate a settlement which would give them control over the armed forces of the king and his advisors. However, this middle group's biggest problem was trying to hold the two extreme sides, War and Peace, together while they developed the measures needed to fight a war. This of course was one of Pym's roles as leader of the Moderate group. His success at this, although it didn't unify Parliament (there were still war and peace groups), helped hold Parliament together and lead them in the direction to victory.
So parliament had a much tougher start to the war, despite being in London. Although Parliament may have had no less support than the King, the ability to control it and unify it into one strong force was a challenge that they were faced with which the King didn't have.
So, as far as sides go, it would appear that the King had a far more organised, larger and unified force against Pym's various committees that were divided into three main groups that all had very different views. As Pym said himself about the Kings and his forces: "the king and his people are obliged to one another in the nearest relations....he is the head, they are the body." Yet using hindsight, we know that Parliament won, despite Charles' initial advantage. So what went wrong for Charles? Did his role or Pym's have any effect in the turn around?
Although Charles was the unified leader of a loyal force, he did not keep as tight a control on his commanders as Parliament did on theirs. Angela Anderson10 wrote that in 1643 his commanders began to plunder local counties regardless of whether or not they were loyal or neutral and this severely damaged the local's relations with the royalists. Brian Manning11 explained that "farmers refused to follow their landlords into the royalist camp and offered to pay their rents to parliament instead. The Yeomen and clothiers, and the whole 'middle rank' of people in Somerset, as well as the 'poorer sort', turned to parliament to defend them against the royalist nobility and gentry." Angela Anderson12 believes that this was not so much a fault of the King but simply the need to supply the King's armies with food and other necessities due to the high demands of the army. Yet Charles was the only man who could have prevented this, being the sole leader of his forces and his failure to do so led to villages in the west supporting Parliament instead. The divisions of opinion between his generals, as stated in the paragraph above, were the reason that his armies did no meet up at Oxford and move on London, which was perhaps his best chance to win the war early on, which was precisely what he needed.
In contrast Pym realised the importance of the co-operation of local counties under their control. He work to improved relations with the local county committees by establishing the Midland and Eastern Associations in December 1642, which co-ordinated county administration and military efforts. This reduced localist obstruction and so while Charles' commanders ruined relations in the north and west counties, Pym worked to build up strong relations in the south and east counties. This only helped to boost Parliaments situation as due to the lack of discontent amongst the farming majority, and the co-operation from county committees they were able to get the best out of the counties that they ruled over, and got many farmers to join their armies. So Pym had the right idea about getting local support, and this is proof of his tactical genius.
At the same time, while Charles failed to maintain control over his followers, Pym worked to secure the co-operation of the war and peace groups in Parliament. According to Conrad Russell13 in his book The Crisis of Parliaments Pym's greatest achievement was probably the creation of a financial and administrative machine which, in the long run, would enable parliament to win the war. Here, Russell openly states that Pym's role, more specifically his role in creating the financial system, was a factor in winning the war. After reading Anderson's14 view, in which she said Pym persuaded parliament's Mps to establish compulsory weekly taxes in London, that were later extended to other areas. She finishes by saying he laid the basis for a reasonably effective financial structure. From this I can not really detect if she believes it was as important a factor as Russel believed it to be. She points out that the financial system did take quite a while to get up and running, and "were at last beginning to bear fruit" after his death in December 1643.
Russel15 also contrasts Pym's effective financial system with the King's not so effective financial system. From what he writes I believe this is because, the King's financial system was only planned for a short term war, which he might have had if his north and western armies had been able to link up at Oxford to move on London. Russel16 states, "the king relied on contributions from his richer supporters." This is perfectly believable, as there is little other way that Charles could have raised money, as Parliament had control of all major ports, stopping Charles from receiving aid from foreign allies.
Throughout 1642-1643, Parliament and the King tried to negotiate a settlement. But the King's stubbornness and inability to make concessions meant that these negotiations were a waste of time. Althought Anderson17 states that he did make concessions as a strategic move, but had no intention of keeping them as a long-term solution. What also made these negotiations seem pointless was that at the same time Charles was still pursuing military tactics. Conrad Russel18 explained that in November 1643 while negotiations were underway due to the fact that Charles' armies were so close to London that the peace party had enough support to go to the negotiating table, Rupert attacked at Brentford and came within eight miles of London before realising an attack would not be possible. This was because the women of London had tied chains across all the streets to prevent the cavalry from charging in. This shows that Charles followed two different policies at the same time, almost acting as a radical and moderate all in one. This would have confused his followers and made future negotiations with the Parliamentarians harder as they would have lost a lot of trust in him after this event.
According to Robert Ashton19 in his book The English Civil War "the final and most important element in Pym's strategy for saving the parliament from the dangers which threatened from all sides in 1643 was the Scottish alliance." Also known as the Solemn League and Covenant. He also stated that this alliance was not welcomed by the Peace Group in Parliament as they "were reluctant to take steps that would further antagonise the King." Yet using hindsight we know that the alliance stayed intact, which means Pym must have managed to convince the Peace group, or made enough concessions, to reassure them that things were still going to plan, or that this alliance would work in their favour. Anderson20 writes that he made concessions for the peace party by removing the most aggressive war group leader, Henry Marten from Parliament. In the end it was this alliance with the Scots that helped Parliament win the Civil War, as the King surrendered to the Scots who handed him over to Parliament for four hundred thousand pounds. They also leant their armies which helped in securing the north.
The people of England were rather worried about the idea of a Scottish alliance as well. There were many religious issues between England and Scotland and the people were afraid of Scotland trying to interfere with the religious system in England. Which of course they did by trying to establish the Presbyterian Church in England in 1643. However, any anger over this was quickly replaced in 1944 by the Kings Alliance with the Irish, and although this was after Pym's death, it is a clear contrast in Pym's successful alliance and the King's not so successful alliance, as Anderson21 says it made the people of England suspect him of Popery and it was his alliance with the Irish that sealed Pym's success with the Scottish alliance.
So the effective financial system, the Eastern and Midland Association, the Scottish Alliance and Pym's ability to keep the Parliamentarian groups together were all important factors and eventually all were important in their survival in the first years of the war. But to what extent was John Pym the reason for Parliamentarian sucess? And in the same way, how much was Charles to blame for the Royalist failures? Was it only Pym's tactical genius and Charles mistakes that saved the parliamentarians?
The geographical positions of the Parliamentarians and the Royalists were also extremely important in the Civil War. Territories started to become drawn out in early 1642 when the King left London. This was a costly mistake. By moving further west he lost his capital as well as his wealthy counties which contained a larger population than the west and the north, so Parliament had the advantage over building up a larger army. This also gave them control over the major ports and navy so they could blockade any ports that Charles did obtain to receive aid from outside England. Yet no historians remarked as this being a fatal mistake. I suppose this is because the King could hardly have stayed in London as Parliament support seemed to grow. I don't believe that at the time when he left, either Parliament or the King planned on a Civil War, or at least not one to last the 1640's. According to Russel22, when the king raised his standard at Nottingham, the general feeling amongst his supporters was in favour of negotiation over war. He then goes on to state that Parliament never had the aim of starting a war, but simply wanted to use the threat of war to force Charles to make concessions and come to a political settlement with them so that they could avoid fighting. Anderson23 claimed that "Both sides gradually took steps to secure their military position, although for the most part these measures were defensive."
So it would seem that the King was somewhat to blame for his decision to leave London and nobody but himself can be blamed for his decision to adopt two policies at once, negotiation and war. The King, however many personality problems he had, was not entirely to blame for his military failure in linking up at Oxford as the conflicting aims of his followers were to blame for this. His commanders can also be blamed for plundering the local towns and losing the king his support but in the end it's the kings responsibility, as the leader of a unified force, to maintain tight control over every aspect of his force. This is what Pym did, and this was one of the main differences I found between them. Pym left little room for error where the king did leave room. Pym's tactics were clever and set Parliament up for the future years but what helped Parliament just as much was their strategic geographical position. His ability to convince all of Parliament that the Solemn League and Convenant that he established with the Scots was necessary was a prime example of his political skill and powers of persuasion. He showed cunning in removing Henry Marten to appease the peace party and throughout all this he kept both peace and war groups together. He realised the necessity in having strong relations with the local counties and his financial system, once up and running, was an important factor in supporting the Parliamentarian cause. After reading the countless books I am led to believe he is a great leader and a fine politician and his title bestowed on him by Anderson "Tactical Genius" does him great justice. Despite dieing at the end of 1643, I believe he was the most important man to have opposed Charles and it was his actions in these early years of the war that set Parliament up in the years to come while I believe that it was Charles' mistakes that saved Parliament in the early years.
Word Count: 3699
Bibliography:
Anderson, A. (1998). Charles I. Longman, Edinburgh.
Anderson, A (1995). The Civil Wars 1640-9. Hodder and Stoughton, London.
Ashton, R. (ed) (1983). The English Civil War, conservatism and revolution 1603-1649. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London.
Manning, B. (ed) (1979). The English Civil War and After. The Macmillan Press Ltd, London.
Russell, C. (ed.) (1985). The Crisis of Parliaments English History 1509 - 1660. Oxford University Press, New York.
Underdown, D. (ed.) (1985). Revel, Riot and Rebellion. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Abstract:
Anderson, A (1995). The Civil Wars 1640-9. Hodder and Stoughton, London. Page 83.
2 Anderson, A. (1998). Charles I. Longman, Edinburgh. Page 42.
3 Anderson, A. (1998). Charles I. Longman, Edinburgh. Page 42.
4 Underdown, D. (1985). Revel, Riot and Rebellion. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Page 169.
5 Anderson, A. (1995). The Civil Wars 1640-9. Hodder and Stoughton, London. Page 84.
6 Manning, B. (ed) (1979). The English Civil War and After. The Macmillan Press Ltd, London. Pages 1, 2 and 3.
7 Anderson, A. (1998) Charles I. Longman, Edinburgh. Page 118.
8 Anderson, A. (1995) The Civil Wars 1640-9. Hodder and Stoughton, London. Page 86.
9 Anderson, A. (1995) The Civil Wars 1640-9. Hodder and Stoughton, London. Page 85.
0 Anderson, A. (1995). The Civil Wars 1640-9. Hodder and Stoughton, London. Page 84.
1 Manning, B. (ed) (1979). The English Civil War and After. The Macmillan Press Ltd, London. Page17.
2 Anderson, A. (1995). The Civil Wars 1640-9. Hodder and Stoughton, London. Page 84.
3 Russell, C. (ed). (1985). The Crisis of Parliaments English History 1509-1660. Oxford University Press Ltd, New York. Page 350.
4 Anderson, A. (1995). The Civil Wars 1640-9. Hodder and Stoughton, London. Page 87.
5 Russell, C. (ed). (1985). The Crisis of Parliaments English History 1509-1660. Oxford University Press Ltd, New York. Page 351-352.
6 Russell, C. (ed). (1985). The Crisis of Parliaments English History 1509-1660. Oxford University Press Ltd, New York. Page 352.
7 Anderson, A. (1998). Charles I. Longman, Edinburgh. Page 119
8 Russell, C. (ed). (1985). The Crisis of Parliaments English History 1509-1660. Oxford University Press Ltd, New York. Page 354.
9 Ashton, R. (ed.) (1983). The English Civil War, Conservatism and Revolution 1603 - 1649. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London. Page 200.
20 Anderson, A. (1995). The Civil Wars 1640-9. Hodder and Stoughton, London. Page 88.
21 Anderson, A. (1995). The Civil Wars 1640-9. Hodder and Stoughton, London. Page 88.
22 Russell, C. (ed.) (1985). The Crisis of Parliaments English History 1509-1660. Oxford University Press Ltd, London. Page 342.
23 Anderson, A. (1998). Charles I. Longman, Edinburgh. Page 116.