It could be further argued that the simplicity of labeling the opposing sides Protestant and Catholic distorts the political motivations of the Monarchs and Armies involved. Just because a Catholic nation fights a Protestant one does not necessarily mean there are not more important political reasons for doing so rather than just an opposition to a certain faith. It is not the intention of this argument to dismiss the important religious factors involved in the conflict, it’s merely an attempt to provide a balanced response. For example were those European nations that were drawn into the German civil war fighting for religious supremacy or tactical, political advantage? Though the former may be seemingly accurate there is also grounds to argue that the latter became an increasingly prominent factor as the war progressed. Koenigsberger argues that the ‘domino theory’ played an important role in nations’ decision to fight in the war. One after another, the powers decided to enter the war because they feared that a real or potential opponent was winning and becoming to powerful10. The progressive escalation of potential disasters appeared to be a dominant factor in the decision to attack a neighbor for the sake of defense. This occurred in Sweden for example where Gustavus Adolphus persuaded his government that Ferdinand II’s success over the Protestant rebels and their allies presented a major threat to Swedish security. However, after winning important victories this justification for war was further modified as political ambitions took hold of Adolphus. In a sense ‘defense had been transformed into a new imperialism’11. Though Adolphus’ death put a damper on his more radical plans Sweden continued to fight for economic and political control of the great Baltic river estuaries. Furthermore, Koenigsberger argued that although the Protestant-Catholic antagonism remained the basic determinant, it was not the over-riding one12. As fighting progressed armies were recruited almost indifferently from Catholics and Protestants. Their generals often had private ambitions and fell foul of their employers, so much so that regiments and even whole armies would change sides13. What this shows is that as the conflict in Germany continued religious persecution was no longer the main cause of bloodshed. Instead, as time progressed, political factors such as territorial expansion, national security and personal aggrandizement became increasingly apparent.
Conflict during this period was not solely restricted to the German Princes and their allies, this after all the Thirty Years’ war involved every major European nation. Therefore, the remainder of this essay will look at the Dutch Republics conflict with Spain and Frances conflict with Spain in an attempt to determine whether religion was indeed the main motive for fighting. Although Spain had close religious ties with Ferdinand II political prestige was arguably an important cause for Spanish military action. The war in Germany had presented the Spanish government on with a dilemma as the alliance with Ferdinand was proving to be expensive. However if Spain withdrew from the alliance there would be a grievous loss of prestige for herself and her allies14. Yet before Spanish intervention in the Empire could begin the Dutch Republic had to be confronted. Spain feared that the Dutch would be free to support Spain’s enemies in Italy as they had done in earlier years unless war was renewed. Parker supports Bonneys' argument and expands by stating that the monarchy’s strategic position and commercial prosperity made war necessary15. Economic matters played an important role in Spain’s decision to go to war. During the truce period between conflicts the ‘Dutch rebels’ were able to capture much of the carrying trade from Western Europe and the Baltic to Spain. Furthermore, they had never ceased their attacks on the Spanish and Portuguese overseas colonies16. Yet Koenigsberger concludes, ‘Spain was not engaged in a Catholic Crusade’17. Pennington supports this view by arguing that ‘the great aim of the Spaniards was to get German troops to fight against the Dutch. Saving Catholic Germany from Protestant aggression was no concern of theirs’18. However, Spain’s actions may not have been a ‘Catholic Crusade’ but religion was still an important factor in the decision to go to war. After the expiry of the truce between the two nations in 1621 Spain offered a new truce based on certain conditions including and end to Dutch expansionism and that the Dutch should allow free rights of worship to Catholics19.The Dutch refused the conditions thus hostilities commenced. What this information shows is that Spain in much the same way as Sweden was motivated to intervene based on a perceived threat to Spanish political, religious and economic interests. But what of the Dutch Republic? If Spain had made a deliberate choice to restart the war, so had the United Provinces. The opportunities seemed splendid and the risks not too great20. The Dutch had a powerful navy and their borders were defended by modern fortresses a highly skilled military. Both Catholics and Protestants recognized that the peaceful and placid United Provinces were the center of resistance to the growing political power of the Habsburgs. In a sense, they were fighting for their own and for Universal Liberty21. If Spain was prepared to use military force for economic reasons then surely the Netherlands would fight to protect their economy? Koenigsberger argues that due to the far-reaching influence of the many firms that had developed in the provinces Dutch actions did not constitute a conspiracy against the Spanish or indeed Catholicism. While others fought for religion and politics, Calvinist capitalists were out to make money22. As it increasingly seemed that war with Spain was being fought more and more for the benefit of the house of Nassau and the economic position of the Republic. Though many would have been prepared to end the war with a reasonable settlement many were afraid that peace would lead to renewed civil and religious strife23. Thus it could be said that the Dutch maintained war partially for religious reasons, namely to avoid possible religious unrest. France intervened in the conflict in 1635 for more clear-cut reasons. For France war was fought not over the religious divisions of Catholicism and Protestantism but politics. This can be seen in the fact that France, itself a Catholic country, declared war on fellow Catholic country Spain. Instead motivation for intervention stemmed from France’s opposition to the growing power of the Habsburgs in Europe. This is an argument supported by Pennington who states that Frances ‘enemy was Habsburg power…all possible forces must be aligned against it’24. Religious preference was of no consequence as according to Pennington ‘Catholic and Protestant princes alike were possible allies of the French’25. Therefore out of Spain, France and the Dutch Republic it can be argued that France was the only nation to have gone to war mainly on political grounds.
In conclusion to argue that the Thirty Years War was a religious war rather than a political one would be inaccurate. From the evidence presented in this essay it is apparent that the conflicts of the period were fought over a multitude of issues which varied depending on the particular nation in question. Yet due to the nature of the conflict between Catholics and Protestants religious factors were ever present in the motivations of Europe’s leaders. It can be said that the period certainly began as a primarily religious conflict as a Catholic monarch attempted to halt Protestant rebels. The argument that this element of the conflict was fought over religion is cemented by the fact that at the post-war settlement the German princes were confirmed in the right to determine the religion of their subjects26. Though as the conflict in Europe widened it can be said that war was pursued for more economic and political reasons including personal aggrandizement and imperial expansion. Yet into these political factors were woven strands of religious fervor and conflict and vice versa. This ultimately highlights the complexity of the situation because as secular governments did not begin to develop until after 1648 religion and politics were always influencing each other. Due to this it is possible to conclude that the nature of the Thirty Years War cannot be attributed to solely Religion or Politics rather a symbiotic combination of the two.
Bibliography
Bonney R, 1991. The European Dynastic States 1494-1660. Oxford University Press. Pages 188-212.
Koenigsberger H.G, 1987. Early Modern Europe 1500-1789. Longman Group. Pages 118-123.
Koenigsberger H.G, ‘The European Civil War’ in H.T Roper (ed.), 1987. The Golden Age of Europe. Thames and Hudson. Pages 119-146.
Maland D, 1966. Europe in the Seventeenth Century. The university Press, Glasgow. Pages 116-139.
Parker G, 1979. Europe in Crisis 1598-1648. Harper Collins, Glasgow. Pages 158-294.
Pennington D.H, 1989. Europe in the Seventeenth Century, Longman Group. Pages 332-360.
References
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Bonney R, 1991. The European Dynastic States 1494-1660. Oxford University Press, p. 188.
- Ibid., p. 187.
- Ibid., p. 187.
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Koenigsberger H.G, 1987. Early Modern Europe 1500-1789. Longman Group, p. 118.
- Ibid., p.118.
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Bonney, Dynastic States, p. 189.
- Ibid., p. 189.
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Pennington D.H, 1989. Europe in the Seventeenth Century, Longman Group, p. 333.
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Maland D, 1966. Europe in the Seventeenth Century. The university Press, Glasgow, p. 117.
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Koenigsberger, Early Modern Europe, p 120.
- Ibid., p. 120.
- Ibid., p. 121.
- Ibid., p. 121.
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Bonney, Dynastic States, p. 203.
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Parker G, 1979. Europe in Crisis 1598-1648. Harper Collins, Glasgow, p. 171.
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Koenigsberger H.G, ‘The European Civil War’ in H.T Roper (ed.), 1987. The Golden Age of Europe. Thames and Hudson, p. 135.
- Ibid., p. 135.
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Pennington, Europe, p. 346.
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Bonney, Dynastic States, p. 204.
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Koenigsberger, Civil War, p. 136.
- Ibid., p. 136.
- Ibid., p. 136.
- Ibid., p. 136.
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Pennington, Europe, p. 333.
- Ibid., p. 347.
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Koenigsberger, Civil War, p. 143.