To what extent did Hitlers Policies attract working class support between 1933 and 1939?

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To what extent did Hitler’s Policies attract working class support between 1933 and 1939?

It has been argued that resentment amongst the working classes made this group most resistant to the Nazi regime. Growing resentment seemed apparent in the late thirties, in industrial slowdowns, but it fails to accurately reflect the general sentiment amongst workers. Declining working class support was arguably inevitable when economic promises went unfulfilled, as most historians agree efforts to instill Nazi ideology were least effective amongst workers. Many industrial workers remained influenced by enduring affiliations to the opposing ideology of Communism and its “class struggle”.  These values represented a barrier to support, which Bartov argued  policy could never overcome: making the working class issue, “the most significant case in point as regards the Nazi Regime’s failure” to overcome class boundaries. The lack of ideological commitment amongst workers prompted Hitler’s grandiose economic promises. Support was therefore constantly reliant on economics and the ability to create jobs in the midst of a depression. This made support fragile and temporary:  propaganda emphasis on workers’ importance provided little comfort during economic instability. Leisure opportunities provided by Strength Through Joy (KdF) were received gratefully, and although ideological impact was limited, the scheme convinced some workers conditions were improving under the regime. Just like the initial economic recovery, its effect was superficial support limited, as the regime’s values failed to penetrate working class psyche. Ultimately, this failure to instill ideology placed too great a burden on economic policy, which could not be maintained given the priority of preparing for war.

The fulcrum of Hitler’s social policies for workers was the creation of jobs and wage increases to reflect recovery of the national economy and pride.  There was recognition of the range of concerns amongst German workers with the propaganda effort stressing the relative merits of different sectors on top of the incessant emphasis on the importance of workers more generally. In particular, “Hitler had built up the peasantry” making them central to the “People’s Community”, but insistence upon job creation schemes and economic stability was arguably more influential. Mason argued that many workers were convinced by the Nazi economic “miracle” and that this was perhaps an inevitable product of the uncertainty of the “recent depths of the Depression”.  We may suspect exaggeration of the economic factor from a Marxist historian, but he is correct to stress the strong position the regime had. The economic uncertainty allowed Hitler to be portrayed as a savior, but this connection arguably made his support fragile as economic progress was not guaranteed. However, a temporary fulfillment of key economic promises increased working class support and ensured “enormous personal gains… mainly perhaps among workers” for Hitler in the early years where security was established. This recognition reveals that the early years enhanced the Fuhrer’s aura as a ‘man of action’ in whom workers could trust.

However “nominal hourly wages in 1933 were 97 per cent of…1932” and in this regard the ‘miracle’ was not realized in tangible economic terms.  Therefore as early as 1935 SOPADE reported economic uncertainty placed “great strain on the mental strength”. The SOPADE reports naturally contained a sentiment opposed to the regime as an extension of their political endeavors. Operating within industrial centres, they witnessed genuinely negative sentiment, which they frequently exaggerated. Kershaw recognized a “playing down of genuine approval”, which must be considered when evaluating workers’ support.  The disenfranchisement of SOPADE was seen in the description of an initially positive working class response to the socio-economic policy as a “mystery. This showed security and stability could overcome reservations over the regime.  While support fluctuated across different industries the enduring trend was insistence upon the centrality of economics. Kershaw argued discontent “rooted in socio-economic experience … [was] remarkable”, highlighting wage increases as priority. Housden assessed factors which ensured workers’ compliance: “propaganda incentives, food … and Gestapo surveillance”. However, relatively little insight is provided without evaluating their relative importance which varied widely by time and location. He shows economic stability was not alone in attracting workers’ support, but initially it was decisive.

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Any possibility of cohesive working class resistance effectively ended with the 1934 abolition of trade unions and centralization of power through the DAF. This policy revealed urgency of decisively minimizing worker’s resistance.  Having promised to, “build up…worker’s rights” this removal of political expression was not immediately contradictory given propaganda which aligned it with Volksgemeinschaft. Portrayed as a key step toward ending class conflict, the restructuring in fact represented a major victory for the employers, whose heightened responsibility reflected Hitler’s insistence on efficiency for rearmament and a willingness to act at the “expense of the employee” in pursuit of grander targets. In this ...

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