To what extent did the Domino Theory cause continued US support for South Korea in the period 1950-1953?

by skuds2000 (student)

The Domino theory undeniably influenced the USA’s decision to bring continued support for South Korea. Truman, fearing that the Soviet Union intended to "export" communism to other nations, centered his foreign policy on the "containment" of communism. Thus, the Domino Theory, to a considerable extent, had an immediate influence on the USA’s actions in South Korea. However, there were numerous additional factors that led to the continuation of US support in the period 1950-1953. For instance, NCS 68, a report directed to conduct an analysis of Soviet and American military capabilities, recommended heavy increases in military funding to help contain the Soviets. Thus, NSC 68 acted as a practical extension of the Truman Doctrine, and had an unquestionable impact on the US’s continuation of support for South Korea.

To a large degree, it could be argued that the Domino Theory was the key motive for continued US support in South Korea. Truman was fearful of the spread of communism – an ideology rapidly expanding and strengthening across Eastern Europe and parts of Asia. In the Far East, Truman felt threatened by the spread of communism, and its appealing qualities to less economically developed countries. After China turned to communist rule in 1949, Truman was wary of a ‘domino-effect’ sparking, and neighboring countries falling to the ideology. In particular, Truman felt that if Korea were to fall to communism, the next ‘domino’ would be Japan, an incredibly strategically important location for American trade. In fact, Dean Rusk made the point that “a communist Korea would be a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan”. Hence, the Domino Theory was a significant motive for the continued support towards South Korea, with Truman and the USA attempting to contain communist rule.

To a certain extent, it could be suggested that Domestic politics in the USA transformed and altered Truman’s decisions in South Korea. President Truman’s popularity had fallen sharply in domestic polls, and Republicans accused him of losing China to the communists. Being a democrat, Truman was often viewed as taking a soft approach to the problems facing America. Hence, with an upcoming election year in 1952, Truman needed to show the American public that he was going to take a hardline stance against the spread of communism. Therefore his decision to support South Korea may have been skewed by ...

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Alternatively, it could be suggested that the NSC 68 document, was greatly to blame for the continuation of US support towards South Korea. NSC 68 was a vital document involved in Truman’s decision to maintain his support for South Korea. According to the NSC-68 document, the Soviets were engaged in a gradual plan to conquer, and spread communism around the world. Consequently, Truman feared that a defeat for capitalism in Korea, was a defeat for capitalism everywhere, with established countries of Europe susceptible to the threat of communism. Hence, the NSC 68 document provided the justification for the US to question communist influence over political change, particularly in Korea. Furthermore, the document highlighted the fact that the Soviet Union was greatly out-spending the USA in terms of military expenditure. Thus the NSC 68 document was a considerable cause for the continuation of US support for South Korea.

Whilst Truman was being scrutinised by Republican critics in America, it could be suggested that pressure arising from the ‘The Red Scare’ and ‘McCarthyism’ were factors contributing to the continuation of US support. In a period known as ‘The Red Scare’, throughout the early 1950’s America was overwhelmed with concerns about the threat of communism growing in Eastern Europe and Asia. The Red Scare that swept through the US in the early 1950’s was further fuelled by the public accusations of Senator Joseph McCarthy, made in a speech in February 1950. McCarthy claimed that he knew of more than two hundred “card-carrying” communists that had infiltrated the United States government. These claims were followed up in further speeches throughout 1950, and although there was no real evidence supporting such claims, thousands of Americans began to believe him. Consequently Truman was pressurised, and in order to show he was anti-communist, continued US support towards South Korea. Thus, McCarthyism pressurised Truman into supporting South Korea and reiterated his ‘hardline’ stance against communism.

Another factor influencing the USA’s decision to further support for South Korea was the fact the US could not withdraw support for South Korea, without an end to fighting. The NKPA was far superior to any army of the South, with 135,000 troops, compared to the South’s 98,000 – of whom 33,000 were non-combat troops. In addition to ground fighting domination, it was reported that the North Korean air force held around 36 Yak-9 fighter jets. Due to the NKPA’s dominant army, the US and Truman were aware that if they withdrew they’re support for South Korea, the likelihood would be that the state would collapse. Thus, it was evident that if the US wanted to withdraw support for the South, they would have to end the war. This however proved a difficult task for Truman, and despite attempts, negotiations soon broke down. Therefore, it could be suggested that the Domino Theory’s significance was limited when reflecting on the precarious situation that the US were in.

In conclusion, whilst the Domino Theory was undeniably a significant cause for the continuation of US support, there were other factors that were arguably of greater importance. The Domino Theory seemed to act as the catalyst for Truman’s actions in South Korea, however the impact of Domestic politics and increased pressure resulting from McCarthyism and The Red Scare, were perhaps more of a motive for Truman to further US support. Arguably, it was the weakness of the South Korean forces that prevented the US from withdrawing support, which furthermore strengthens the claim that the Domino Theory was not the key factor affecting the continuation of US support.

Alex Skudder