There are perhaps some valid reasons for the disagreement between the two sources and even within the sources themselves. For example, source A was written on 25th September 1956 which was approximately one month before the bombing raids on Egyptian airfields. At this time, there seems to have been no problem between Britain and America, as is reflected at the beginning of source B. However, paragraph two of source B describes the mood after the rash action taken by Britain and so understandably a rift has developed between the two disillusioned countries.
Also, source B, clearly a secondary source, gives an overview of the general situation, whereas source A is a report from Macmillan to Eden written at the time. There must therefore be a more objective view of mood in source B as it will not involve any of the personal feelings or opinions that source A does.
It has therefore been shown that although the two sources of A and B greatly differ on the surface, the circumstances of their origin’s make it clear that they actually agree more when it comes to America’s reaction to British policy in Suez.
- “The Suez Crisis of 1956 destroyed cherished illusions of national unity and pride.” How valid is this assessment of the impact of the 1956 Suez Crisis upon Britain?
To answer this question it is firstly necessary to draw material from the sources in order to prove or disprove the argument that “The Suez Crisis of 1956 destroyed cherished illusions of national unity and pride.” Further expansion on this material will then give a better understanding of how valid the statement actually is with regards to the impact of the 1956 Suez Crisis on Britain.
There are points in all three sources to consider here, although only sources B and C could be used to actually prove the statement to be valid. If we look at source A, United States Secretary Dulles is reported as having stressed that “…our threat of force was vital, whether we used it or not, to keep Nasser worried.” This implies that Britain was such a great power that their threat of force would actually worry Nasser. At the time Britain was not as highly regarded in the world as they thought. Therefore, source A does show that Britain and perhaps America were under some illusions as to Britain’s status in the world.
From source B we can gather that America did not hold Britain in as high esteem as was believed. Indeed, their disbelief and then ‘anger’ at Britain’s taking the initiative to act gives the impression that they wanted someone to cling to their coat tails and pat them on the back rather than an equal ally. President Eisenhower’s explosive outburst on the telephone to Downing Street after the Israeli and British attacks on Egypt can certainly have left no doubt in Prime Minister Eden’s mind as to America’s opinion of his actions. The only explanation Eisenhower could imagine would cause Eden’s “…glaring deception of their closest ally…” was “…that you have gone mad!” If Britain saw the reaction of the United States for what it was, then it would definitely have ‘destroyed’ their valued deceptive ideals of National unity and their pride in being shoulder to shoulder with one of the world’s superpowers.
Source C shows us the situation from a completely different angle, in that it shows the shattering of “…cherished illusions…” from the perspective of the British people themselves. In lines two and three for example, Clarke provides us with an excellent quotation to represent Britain’s complete change of heart towards Eden’s methods. He writes that “It was the moment when middle-class liberal opinion turned anti-Conservative.” The whole of Britain’s opposition condemned Eden for what he had done, this opinion is reflected in Aneurin Bevan’s words spoken in Trafalgar Square when he said that “…it is not possible to create peace in the Middle East by jeopardising the peace of the world,” while all the time stressing that in no way did he support Nasser or condemn Israel’s retaliating to provocation. Eden’s own party later became devided over the matter, partly because he had started the train rolling down the hill and partly because he’d not ridden it all the way to the bottom by continuing the application of military force until Britain again controlled the canal. Even Churchill who had suggested Eden for the premiership and a man of action himself said “I am not sure I should have dared to start, but I am sure I should not have dared to stop.” From this it is reasonable to assume that even Eden’s mentor was losing faith in his abilities, so what chance did he really have of keeping the countries illusory ideals alive? A very slim chance, if any.
In contrast to the above arguments, source A provides a good reason to suggest that the Government, if not the whole British population, were under no illusions as to their status. At first this looks contradictory of the earlier argument involving Britain’s sufficient threat, however, it has more to do with the illusory pride aspect than National unity. In source A, Macmillan describes how if they lost the war, then “…the whole structure of our economy would collapse.” This shows that he knew that Britain hadn’t sufficient funds to throw away on a lost cause. This is perhaps why Eden and Macmillan secretly colluded with Israel along with France, in a desperate attempt to salvage something from the mess they had unnecessarily got themselves into. As it turned out, Macmillan was correct, for even though they didn’t technically lose the battle, approximately £100 million in gold reserves were lost. This put a serious strain on the British economy as he had predicted. This is not to say that the Suez Crisis was the only strain on the economy, Butler’s earlier attempts to expand its over-stretched means had already set rumours spreading about deflation.
There are also some points to consider regarding whether illusions were lost at all. For example, a Gallup poll in the winter of 1955 showed that 70% of those who voted were for Eden, but a few months later in the spring of 1956, this had dropped to 40%. This shows that the disillusionment was gradual and not immediate. This is backed up by the results of the by-elections during Eden’s premiership, all but one showing a swing against the Conservative Party. Eden was expected to stand no nonsense from Nasser, who had been presented as a second Hitler. Perhaps his go down fighting stance was what brought the old unity and pride back from the war, at least in part. This is demonstrated in the opinion polls in which Eden received 48.5% of the popular vote on 30th October 1956, which rose to 60.5% on 21st November.
In conclusion, there were cherished illusions destroyed by the Suez Crisis of 1956. The statement in question is therefore valid. However, it is reasonable to assume that not everyone had the proverbial wool pulled over their eyes and so the statement is not absolutely valid, but valid to a lesser extent. This disillusionment was seen as regrettable, but its possible that it helped prepare the British people for the decolonisation that inevitably happened during the 1960’s. It was probably therefore the most positive product of the Suez Crisis.