To What Extent Was a War Between Nazism and Bolshevism Inevitable?

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Richard Sampson        /        2052

To What Extent Was a War Between Nazism and Bolshevism Inevitable?

Introduction:

From his entry into politics Hitler was committed to a war in the East. He subscribed to the pan-German philosophy and was a staunch believer in the idea of eastern expansion emulating the great German Reich of the Wilhelmine era. Hitler’s personal preoccupation with Lebensraum echoes back to the pre-war thinking of the anti-Semitic right wings, and the general need for expansion felt after the vast confiscations of the Treaty of Versailles. As early as 1924/5, when he was serving a prison sentence at Landsberg Am Lech, Hitler was thinking of the time when the NSDAP would carry Germany to victory in the east. However as Hitler said himself at the time “the result would be inevitable defeat”; but this was taking into account the shrunken economy and military of the unstable Weimar government.

Thereafter Hitler's discussions on the matter of realising ideology, in Mein Kampf and when in power, came down to the necessity of an invasion of Russia; “Destiny itself seems to wish to point the way for us here” he wrote in 1925 at Landsberg.

Thus it seems that ideologically Hitler was confirmed in the fact that war with Russia was unavoidable, and indeed he did not wish to avoid it. Yet the Führer also knew of the benefits to Germany, materially and politically, these were probably the most important reasons for an attack on Russia but by no means the only ones.

The German war effort would require huge amounts of raw materials and food, Russia could provide this; since the British and French appeased his policy of annexation and absorption in the east Hitler was encouraged to go further, by attacking Poland he forced the allies’ hand and realised the unease between them and Russia. Despite their common enemy the enmity between the Russians and the western allies was obvious and Hitler capitalised on it in the end. By attacking and defeating France in relatively short order Hitler flexed his military muscles for the world to see, whilst also giving his troops some experience and confidence. After the loss of the Battle of Britain the attacking momentum needed to be maintained, high expectations from the generals convinced Hitler the plan to invade Russia would work and so as the only contender left in Europe Russia became the obvious and inevitable target for Germany.

It seems that before the order for Operation Barbarossa of 1941 Hitler had been constructing a framework from which it could be launched, the logistics he had tested in France along with the heavy ground troops, the air power and blitzkrieg tactics had been practised in Poland and the paratroops and navy were prepared since their tasks in Scandinavia. However Hitler’s time scale of completion before the winter of 1941 seems over ambitious, especially given the sheer size of the territory to be occupied and more importantly consolidated after capture.

Through speeches to the public and Reichstag, and private talks to official representatives of home and foreign concerns Hitler bred confusion over the relationship of Germany with Russia. Hitler rejected delegations from Russia in 1934 and had already decided to do nothing about the new basis of natural antagonism from the summer of 1933, all this in the aftermath of the breakdown of the Russo-German treaties of Rapallo (1922) and Berlin (1926). The Führer was also adamant that “a restoration of the German-Russian relationship would be impossible” this outburst was in response to the Foreign Ministry’s suggestion of rapprochement with Russia. The German ambassador to the Soviet Union was so dismayed by the conduct of the Führer that he resigned; it is at this point that foreign relations took a downward turn. As Kershaw points out, “German foreign policy had no single, clear direction…it was characterised by Hitler’s own dilettante opportunism”. However in the years between the taking and consolidating of power Hitler also took and consolidated his thinking on foreign policy following the dearth of interest from Britain after the Naval Pact of 1935, “Hitler had fixed ideas in the sphere of foreign policy…above all conquest of the soviet union”.

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Hitler’s personal war was against the Jew, Rosenburg had convinced him of the Jew’s complete responsibility for Marxism, a “Jewish concoction”, when the NSDAP was in its infancy at the start of the 1920s. Since Hitler was violently opposed to the influence of the Jew in Germany he was also opposed to what he saw as the Jewish pollution of rightfully German Lebensraum, namely the USSR. As early as 27th July 1920 Hitler had openly asserted, “an alliance between Russia and Germany can only come about if the Jews are overthrown” . Eleven years later on 22nd July in talks with the Japanese ...

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