Even if you take the view that individual commanders should take responsibilities for their own actions, would Napoleon have commanded the troops any better? The part of the battle he did command personally was in no way decisive. When the Prussians entered the battle on the French right flank napoleon mobilised his old and young guard for the first time in the battle. You would have expected these elite troops of the French to have heavily defeated the tired, demoralised Prussian troops. However they only managed to hold them and the battles fought on the flank were never decisive. They were only ever one side gaining ground, only to lose it again. This shows that if Napoleon had controlled every area of the battlefield, we cannot presume he would have faired any better.
As I detailed above Napoleon had often won battles were he had less men, guns and a lower morale than his enemy. However he lost the battle of waterloo with 5000 more men, 100 extra guns and morale higher than his enemies. Wellington’s men had just lost a battle against Ney at Ligny and had been separated from their close allies the Prussians. Also the British army itself was only 20% British. This is significant because British troops are renown as being difficult to break, so with less of the resilient troops the army will be easier to rout. These factors would have left the British army with poor morale. Napoleon himself said, “In war, moral factors account for three quarters of the whole; relative material strength accounts for only one quarter” by his own reckoning, Napoleon had the strength in his army, and superior morale. If Napoleon had been presented with these factors and asked who would win I am adamant he would have said the superior army would have. This suggests that it was Napoleons poor handling of this battle that lead to the defeat, and that he cannot blame it upon the troops under his command.
Another reason that Napoleons lack of judgement could’ve lead to defeat at the battle of waterloo is his blatant disregarding of his enemy. Having not personally fought the British for twenty-two years he talked to his entire general staff in a meeting on the morning of Sunday 18th June 1815 about the British army. Shoult reportedly said, “Sire, l’infanterie anglaise en duel c’est le diable” (Sire, in a straight fight the English infantry are the very devil). Napoleon didn’t like this type of defeatist talk. He said to the entire of his staff, “Now I tell you Wellington is a bad general, that the English are bad troops…” Many historians have read heavily into these comments and accounted them as one of the reasons Napoleon lost, saying his over-confidence verged on the arrogant. However I tend to agree with the counter argument about his comments. “Seen in the context of a morale-boosting pre-battle harangue to cautious and nervous generals, Napoleons remarks are entirely explicable” Napoleon was merely just trying to avoid the defeatist comments his generals were hearing. Looking at it from this point of view you could imagine how encouraging it may have been to hear Napoleon discounting the enemy in this way.
Napoleon’s orders were often vague and indecisive. For example he sent a written order to Grouchy saying, “Block Blucher and rejoin the French right flank” these orders are contradictory. Grouchy could not have blocked the Prussians and rejoined the French right; he would have had to split his forces. However grouchy could have used his initiative, but as I said earlier Grouchy was renowned as a soldier, not a tactician. The orders napoleon gave during the battle are criticised in most of my sources. A letter written by General Ney himself says, ”My orders were often incorrect when taken in context of the state of the battlefield, the Emperor was reluctant to take advice…” although the reliability of the letter has to be taken into account, as it is written by Ney, however it does suggest that Napoleon had not given the correct orders. This supports my previous claim that you cannot blame his subordinates; his orders have now come into question as well as his choice of staff.
Throughout the duration of the waterloo campaign there were doubts of napoleons staunchness. He was lethargic, slow to react and spent the duration of the battle in his tent. Gregor Dallas comments on Napoleons health saying, “he was very ill on the morning of the battle, this effected his capacity to command, and therefore his actions cannot be reliably examined” I find this view hard to suppose. The general consensus was that napoleon had haemorrhoids from riding, only him, his brother Jerome and the doctor knew of his condition, until Jerome spoke of it in 1860. However, on the morning of the 18th he was dressed and riding about. Andrew Roberts writes, “He did not, after all, decide to detach 33000 men under Grouchy because he was suffering from piles” However other historians suggest that Napoleon was suffering from more than just haemorrhoids, that seriously impeded him from commanding to the best of his ability. However whilst saying that Napoleon was 46, the same age as Wellington who had no such troubles. His army needed strong leadership, which he failed to give, and this could have been a decisive reason for the loss. Wellington said, “he has the affect of 40000 men on the battlefield, he drives men to do extraordinary things” Speaking after waterloo Wellington would’ve obviously played up Napoleons affect on a battle, he was a dramatic person, but to a certain extent his comments do ring true; the sheer presence of Napoleon had a great affect on his troops.
The reasons heavily documented above show lots of reasons on the battlefield for why napoleon lost due to a lack in his judgement. However, to what extent was the failure before the battle even took place? Perhaps the failure came in the form of Napoleon having to fight in the first place; was the defeat caused by Napoleons lack of diplomacy? On coming back to France and seizing power Napoleon had upset many of the large nations in Europe, including the Prussians and the British. They had all been instrumental in getting Napoleon to abdicate in the first place. Therefore, his returning made war inevitable; whatever Napoleon did the allied nations of the seventh coalition was determined to remove him from power. Because of this it is hard to see, other than him abdicating for a second time, how France could’ve avoided going to war. This leads me to believe that Napoleon had not failed politically, and the failure was located on the battlefield.
There is a very good case to suggest that napoleon had been to blame for the defeat at waterloo. However there is an equally good one to suggest the loss had been no fault of his. This based around what napoleon did right during the battle, the fact that he could have been beaten by a better enemy, and other reasons accounting for the loss being no fault of Napoleons.
When the seventh coalition re-formed to remove Napoleon from power once and for all, each of the four major powers offered 150000 men (Russia, Britain, Prussia and Austria) and all they other countries offered a total of 100000 men. This made a total of 700000. The French, in comparison had only 224000 men, including those in action in the southern and eastern borders. Only 50000 were ready for service. The odds were not in favour of napoleon. The war machines of four major powers and many other small countries were mobilizing against him. So when you consider that napoleon managed to gain a numerical advantage over an enemy, it is easier to appreciate what an amazing feat the battle of waterloo truly was. Napoleon showed his genius in his tactical manoeuvre, which made both the British and Prussians retreat toward their supply lines. The tactic gave him the power to take on the army’s one by one, making limited odds work in his favour. So when we consider whether the defeat at waterloo was down to napoleons lack of judgement, we should consider the enemy far more numerous than just those he face on that certain day at waterloo.
One of the most important turning points in the battle itself was during the final stages when Napoleon finally committed his old guard divisions. These were the most feared troops the French army possessed. They were war-hardened veterans that had never fled a battle. However thanks to superb deployment of troop by Wellington they fled for the first time. Napoleon cannot be blamed for relying on the most perfectly reliable troops that existed. Although I want to avoid luck when it comes to things under direct control, you have to admit that Napoleon could be said to have been a bit unlucky. However the fact that the troops did fall back in the first place can be accredited to Wellington, as I will cover later.
A point mentioned earlier used his subordinate’s incompetence as a reason to blame Napoleon, as it was him who chose to use them. However David Chandler uses the actions of Grouchy, Shoult and Ney as a reason not to blame Napoleon. For example, he draws upon Ney believing Wellington was retreating ordered a mass unsupported cavalry charge, which was devastating not only to the cavalry regiments themselves but also the entire army’s morale. He suggests that the commanders under Napoleon made poor choices but also, he was making tactically correct choices on the information he was given by his aides-du-comp (which were fed by Grouchy, Shoult, Ney or other commanders). With this in mind it is difficult to fault Napoleon. However I did find in David Chandler’s book “Waterloo, The One Hundred Days” he often failed to criticize Napoleon when it would seem he needed to do so. Therefore I do not trust the reliability of this book totally, in some ways there is bias. The point remains that, in Napoleons defence there is questions as to whether he had all the relevant information to fight the battle.
The final point defending Napoleon focuses on health. Although Andrew Roberts dismisses Napoleons health as “irrelevant” many other historians see it as very important. The Emperor was ill, but to what extent is unknown, if he had stomach cancer as some suggest. However I feel Andrew Roberts’s explanation far more satisfying than the other historian’s views. He had better sources and explained what condition the Emperor was in with more depth and clarity. It still remains that however ill Napoleon was, other factors still controlled the events at Waterloo. It is questionable how significant his health was, as even he admitted he was not the master of his own destiny.
Wellington has to be credited for some of the events that prevailed at waterloo. For example if you look at the battlefield of waterloo it is the only defendable place for miles, he chose a site with reverse sloping hills the hide his troops on and a particularly narrow battlefield to avoid the numerical advantage having flanking affects. This came into real affect when Napoleon moved in his seemingly un-defeatable imperial old guard into the action. Wellington then, when the old guard were only 20 yards from his hidden troops, stood them all up fully deployed and unleashed devastating volleys into the guard. They routed, and this lead to the victory. The reverse slope tactic was often employed by Wellington and Waterloo was another demonstration of it effectiveness.
Wellington’s mannerisms throughout the battle have also to come into the equation. Even as a general, he found time to care for his men. He often rested them when they could’ve pressed on (After Quatre Bras). They had an immense respect for him, and during the battle he was everything Napoleon wasn’t. He was often caught in the middle of the squares encouraging his men and giving orders himself to the battalion captains. This was his style though. “Wellington had to be in direct control over everything happening in the battle, he rarely thanked commanders under him using their own initiative” whether this can be called a weakness is dependent on the situation; in terms of Waterloo, it was most definitely a strength.
Surprisingly, the weather was a key element in the eventual victory for the allies. Napoleon cannot be blamed for the torrential that lead to him delaying the start of the battle. If the ground were wet the numerical gun advantaged enjoyed by napoleon would’ve amounted to nothing if he had started earlier. Considering he did not think the Prussians were going to make the battlefield in the next week, let alone the next few hours it didn’t appear to him to be a problem holding off an attack for a few hours. This is simply luck, it shielded Wellington’s retreat from Ligny, and it had delayed the start of the battle, which had enabled the Prussians to play the decisive part in it.
Napoleon, probably along with Wellington had presumed Blucher would not make it in time to affect proceedings in the battle. However the both underestimated the 74 year old badly bruised Prussian. He had given his word to Wellington and he intended to stick to it. Gregor Dallas says, “many incredible things happened that day, this was the most incredible. Blucher defied the odds in arriving at waterloo, not only did he arrived he put in a good show when he did.” So rather than saying it was Napoleons fault he suggests it was the resolution and determination of Wellington’s faithful ally. This is another example of the great debate between historians as to the key reason for Napoleons loss at Waterloo.
In conclusion, was the defeat at waterloo the fault of Napoleons? Alternatively was the battle wholly out of his hands and never mind what he had done his cause was lost? All the information accumulated leads me to believe that the loss at Waterloo was not Napoleons fault. Of course he made a few tactical errors, but they were not enough to lose him the battle at Waterloo. I think he was never the master of his own fate. The weather, Wellingtons performance, Blucher resilience and his illness made for a battle where he was not a decisive player. It was other reasons that played the key roles in deciding the outcome at waterloo, not Napoleon. Therefore blame cannot be apportioned to him. If the weather had been fine, and Napoleon well I think the outcome would have been wholly different. The battle would have started earlier, and with Napoleon well, he would have been in a better position to exploit his advantages. So I conclude the weather, and Napoleons ill health to have been the most important reasons for defeat. Therefore Napoleon was not to blame. With over 40 battles won on the battlefield, Napoleon was justifiably one of the greatest generals of all time. However what impresses me most about him is his disregard for that fact, he saw himself as just the person who “found the crown of France in the gutter, and simply picked it up”
The Napoleonic Wars by Gunther Rosenberg
Marked out by www.napoleon.org as being of high class.
Waterloo: the one hundred days by David Chandler
Waterloo: the one hundred days by David Chandler
Napoleon and Wellington by Andrew Roberts
The Napoleonic Wars by Gunther Rosenberg
Napoleon and Wellington by Andrew Roberts and www.napoleon.org support this view
War Walks by Richard Holmes
Napoleon and Wellington by Andrew Roberts
The Napoleonic Wars by Gunther Rosenberg
Letter by Ney to Duke de Oranto
1815 The Road To Waterloo by Gregor Dallas
Napoleon and Wellington by Andrew Roberts
Quoted from Napoleon and Wellington by Andrew Roberts
1815 The Road To Waterloo by Gregor Dallas and Waterloo: the one hundred days by David Chandler focus heavily on Napoleons illness.
Waterloo: the one hundred days by David Chandler suggests cancer as a possibility
War Walks by Richard Holmes
The Napoleonic Wars by Gunther Rosenberg
Napoleon and Wellington by Andrew Roberts
Napoleon in conversation with Count Emmanuel