To what extent was Germany guilty of causing the First World War?

By Phillip Preston 12.8

The topic of German guilt in relation to World War One is one of the most fiercely debated ones in history. Although it is far easier to blame just one country, we must consider others that had a hand in the causing of the conflict, and to take a critical look at those countries that won the war, since they also are partly to blame. This blame however has been diminished in the classic ‘victor code’ (i.e. those who win have done no wrong and can write the story to suit their own glorification). What cannot be refuted is the aggression of Germany, and their desires for conflict to aid their international situation. It is therefore necessary to decide how far this contributed to war. This essay will demonstrate other factors and views that shed light on the fact that Germany was not completely to blame for the war, as so many think it is. Incidents such as the Alliance systems, the Imperial situation and of course, the Balkans, where the whole war started and was not, ironically, the direct result of a German action.

The Imperial situation of the world during the 19th and early 20th Centuries was one of the long-term causes of WWI. It reduced the number of countries left independent in the world, meaning that there were almost no countries to fight other than those in Europe. This is mostly the fault of Britain whose Empire covered a quarter of the globe. Although Germany had an Empire, it was tiny in comparison and the amount of strategic territory they had was minimal. This was of course, one of their motives for war, to gain a larger Empire, but that motive would not be there if it were not because of the Imperial ‘land grabbing’ actions of countries such as Britain and France would it not? The blame of imperialistic values causing the war cannot therefore be allowed to settle entirely upon the shoulders of Germany. The Empires were often the cause of discontent and disagreement; Britain and France were almost always disputing over territory in Africa, as with the Sudan and Fashoda incidences. This can be interpreted two ways, one it allowed countries to let off steam without direct conflict, whilst keeping relations happy. The other is that it further aggravated relations making war more likely. The former view is not entirely stable though as when Germany and France disagreed over Morocco, it meant actual war between the two came very close. Similarly, the latter view is also flawed since Britain and France almost went to war over the Sudan, yet 6 years later Britain joined the Triple Entente. This contradictory behaviour can be tied to Germany however, since it was Germany’s aggression that caused France to get worried over the Moroccan incident and again their aggression that made Britain ally with France and Russia. This can therefore be seen as German guilt.

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The issue of Alliances between countries within Europe into various power blocs is another contentious point on the subject of German guilt. It is clear that Germany formed the first of these alliances in 1879 with Austria-Hungary, and again with Italy in 1882, before any of the Entente powers began discussions along such lines. Germany must carry blame on this accusation therefore, however what must be remembered is that these alliances were formed for defensive purposes. What cannot be looked over is the fact that it was the various military plans and mobilisation plans drawn up by each individual country – such as the French ‘Plan XVII’ - that led to the precarious and volatile situation, and not the alliances. When this is taken into account it is clearly evident that it is not solely Germany’s fault, but rather the blame must be shared among all those major countries within Europe. To further prove this point, Italy was in the Triple Alliance with Germany and Russia, yet it managed to find loopholes in the alliance meaning that they did not have to declare war straight away. If one country can do that, then all could have done, thusly Germany cannot be held to blame on this point since the countries would evidently have had to have wanted war. What the alliances did lead to however, was the situation in the Balkans.

The situation in the Balkans, with the two crises, was made ever more dangerous thanks to the alliances, as the two largest countries with interests in the region were Russia and Austria-Hungary whom were on opposite sides. This immediate situation can be attributed to Germany, since they started the alliance systems, and so they must take blame for this. Yet the two crises themselves cannot be the fault of Germany since they played no part in them. The Bosnian Crisis especially, since that was entirely owing to dealings between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Germany, and indeed the rest of the world, had no idea that these deals were going on! When the crisis came to fruition, Germany initially took the side of the Turks, leaving their ally in the lurch, and completely avoiding the possibility of conflict with Russia. This absolves Germany of blame entirely. The second crisis as well did not concern Germany. In fact the only hand that Germany had in these two crises was being the ‘silent’ power behind Austria-Hungary and took no direct action against or for any side, she is almost entirely absolved of any guilt on this charge. Coupled with this crisis is that of the Moroccan one. Germany was guilty in this instance. Their actions heightened British suspicion of them, and led them to join France in the Entente Cordiale. This was, in essence, a colonial dispute, one like the hundreds that had foreshadowed it, yet this time it fired up tensions like never before. We must question why, and the answer lies in the fact that Germany had been becoming more aggressive, this made other countries wary – even scared - of their intentions. So when they sent a warship to Morocco, it pushed Britain into forming an agreement with France. This fear, and therefore cementing of another alliance, can be traced back to Germany and for this they must take blame.

The events of 1914 must also be considered when the issue of German guilt is raised. The actual war was the direct result of Austro-Hungarian actions, and their declaration of war against Serbia, and that of Russia against them. The direct flashpoint cannot therefore be directly linked to Germany, however the prevention of war can be seen as their fault. Britain tried to organise a conference with the major powers yet Germany rejected the proposal, meaning that any chance of talking things out peacefully was dashed. This can be classed as war guilt on the part of Germany; it can also be seen from this that Germany wanted war, which is a damaging blow. A contradictory way to look at it would be to sympathise with Germany in that the leaders knew war was inevitable, and prolonging it would result in a bigger, worse war later. It was after all the common belief that the war would be over in 6 months, and so the idea of guilt on Germany’s part did not enter into the heads of the leaders since they thought they were doing the world a favour in not delaying the inevitable.

In conclusion Germany was not entirely to blame for the war, in fact a number of events point in completely the opposite direction. Events such as ‘Plan XVII’, the Imperial grievances of the various Empires and the Balkan crises all suggest that the fault of the war lie with someone else, or at least, that blame should be shared out accordingly. Within these the Alliance system was the most important, yet as has already been established, the reason why this led to war cannot be entirely attributed to Germany. Controversies have risen since the end of the war that suggest German guilt, such as that of Fritz Fisher saying that the German Chancellor had drawn up plans for an invasion and restructuring of Europe after Germany had won the war. However, this was disproved after the discovery of diaries from the Chancellor’s assistant in which were large parts from the so called ‘September Program’ were contained. This again cleared Germany of any damning guilt associated with the war until the discovery of the 1912 ‘War Council’ controversy in which German military leaders planned a war two years into the future. This again is not proof that they were guilty for the war, as Britain also wanted to wait for war so they could prepare their navy and so on. Indeed the Schlieffen plan was drawn up 20 years earlier and this cannot be taken as war guilt for its sheer ludicrousness. A military tactical plan drawn up by one German general 20 years earlier cannot be classed as proof they started the war since the French were doing exactly the same. As I said earlier, it was the presence of many such documents from all the different countries that led to war rather than the alliances. It is clear to see therefore, that whilst the evident aggressor of the period and driving force towards war was Germany, the many factors that caused the war can only be partially attributed to Germany, or in some cases, not at all. In light of the Treaty of Versailles, it is evident that the ‘victor code’ has indeed been enforced upon Germany who was made to take the blame for everyone. Surely denying your involvement in such a perpetration of destruction on an unimaginable scale is far worse than admitting your own small part in it.