One further aspect of Hitler’s foreign policy, which seems to indicate lack of continuity with previous foreign policy aims, is his desire for healthy relations with Britain, for an alliance. ‘For a long time to come there will be…two powers in Europe with which it may be possible for Germany to conclude an alliance. These powers are Great Britain and Italy’. In the early years of his rule there was a distinct effort by Hitler to improve Anglo-German relations. It could be argued that Hitler, planning his future domination of Europe, could not envisage a favourable outcome from a situation arising whereby Germany faced a combination of France, Russia and Britain. As a result, he looked for any opportunity to improve relations with Britain in order to assure him an ally in his ’struggle’. ‘I want nothing from the West…….but I must have a free hand in the East……..I want to live at peace with England.’ However, to counter this view Hitler could have been improving relations with Britain simply because she sympathised with Germany over the Treaty of Versailles. An understanding from Britain would have perhaps been a way of getting Germany’s grievances heard and considered by the rest of the European powers who were not so willing to listen. As relations with Britain improved over the years this may have spurred Hitler on somewhat, becoming more ambitious with his foreign policy. The latter of the two suggestions may seem a little far-fetched when coupled with the issue of the Soviet Union, however, it is not to be discarded when assessing whether infact German foreign policy was planned and consistent.
Having withdrawn in October 1933 from the League of Nations and the World Disarmament Conference to allow rearmament and Germany to act as a free agent, Hitler made a surprising move in signing a non-aggressive pact with Poland in the following year. Again Hitler ignored advice from his ministers and Nazi activists who claimed he was abandoning Germany’s territorial claims over the Polish Corridor and Danzig. This act of apparent tolerance towards Poland was completely inconsistent with many of Hitler’s speeches before he had come to power, which had struck a decidedly anti-polish tone. On the other hand, although the signing of the non-aggressive pact seems to have been capricious, it was not necessarily unplanned. Indeed it may have simply been camouflage to mislead his critics into thinking that he too desired peace in Europe as tension to the east of the continent was significantly reduced. Hitler was successfully reinventing himself as peacemaker. However policy toward Austria would again see his authenticity questioned when in 1934 the Austrian Chancellor was assassinated. Hitler claimed no part in the incident, which weakened Germany’s diplomatic position through encouraging closer relations between Italy and France. ‘Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude Anschluss (Union).’ In January 1935 a Franco-Italian agreement was signed.
March 1935 saw Hitler take his first major gamble in European relations. He announced that he had defied the Treaty of Versailles, which limited the German army to 100,000, as it currently stood at 240,000 and with the introduction of conscription perhaps 550,000 in less than three years. In response to this British, French and Italian governments met at Stresa where they pledged to act together to ensure there were no further breaches of international treaties by the Nazi regime. In addition to the meeting at Stresa, French government signed a treaty of mutual assistance on 2nd May 1935 with the Soviet Union outside of the League of Nations. This displeased the British government who in turn adopted a resigned attitude to the German desire to rearm. Anglo-German relations were becoming stronger particularly with the signing in 1935 of the Anglo-German naval agreement. This agreement recognised Germany’s right to rearm, undermining the Treaty of Versailles and further drawing a divide between the allies. It is plausible that on announcing his replenished and ever growing force that Hitler was indeed intending to cause the allied bonds to break. ‘I shall do everything in my power to prevent co-operation between Britain and France’. Perhaps it was a strategic act to drive this wedge but alternatively it may have been a case of a sequence of events that happened to work in Hitler’s favour. For instance, it seems highly unlikely that Hitler would have foreseen France signing a Treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union after having attended the Stresa front talks. Without this crucial move from France, the allied forces would arguably have remained a more united force. To hypothesise further, Anglo-German relations may not have developed so hastily, resulting in the lack of British support for the French during the Rhineland crisis. The rearming of the German forces was planned and consistent in as far as it confirms Hitler’s initial foreign policy aims from 1933 when he came to power.
Following the Abyssinian affair whereby Italian troops invaded Abyssinia with the aim of territorial expansion in Africa, Mussolini drew Italy into a close diplomatic relationship with Nazi Germany. Not only had Hitler found another potential ally, he had also, in many respects, been given the go ahead from France and Britain for further military aggression. Naturally this had not been a deliberate invitation from Britain and France but regardless, the affair illustrated that the two powers were incapable of acting unilaterally to halt any further aggression from Hitler and his Nazi followers. Undoubtedly the uncertainty created by the Abyssinian affair encouraged Hitler with his next and most rewarding gamble in the inter-war years, the invasion of the Rhineland. With a vastly inferior German Army, Hitler invader the Rhineland on 7th March 1936. Britain still peeved over France’s Treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union, France was left standing alone in protest against the German occupation. The Belgium government decided upon reverting to a policy of neutrality in European affairs. Marching into the demilitarised Rhineland does appear consistent with Hitler’s initial foreign policy aims in as far as his desire for more living space for Germans, though Hitler himself admits he wasn’t prepared. ’I had no army worth mentioning….if the French had taken any action we would have been easily defeated; our resistance would have been over in a few days.’ However, a series of events preceded Hitler’s early 1936 gamble, which seem highly unlikely for him to have predicted. It is here where the idea of a blueprint to German foreign policy seems unreliable. Rather more likely is the proposal that an ultimate goal was on Hitler’s horizon. He would have seen this as achievable by way of manipulating situations, events, and individuals to his advantage, using his opportunist qualities.
Predicting the Spanish Civil War seems farfetched even where an individual such as Hitler was concerned, yet it did seem an extremely well timed diversion of attention from the Rhineland crisis and the increasing build-up of German armaments. Around the same time Hitler outlined the chief aims of the four-year Plan whereby Germany would make herself self-sufficient in raw materials and ready for war by 1940. The year of 1936 saw enormous success for Hitler with the peaceful remilitarization of the Rhineland, the recovery of the economy and the fall in unemployment in Germany. One of Hitler’s greatest ambitions from the early years began to be realised when an Austro-German agreement was signed. It stated that Austrian government would except German control of foreign policy in return of a weak promise to maintain the independence of Austria. This ties in completely with Hitler’s early foreign policy aims indicating again that there are goals to be aimed for, it’s just a case of doing whatever is necessary and manipulating situations to achieve these goals. The extent to which the Austro-German agreement was planned is unlikely in terms of being next on the list of things to do. An opportunity arose and Hitler, once again, took advantage of the situation.
The extent to which Hitler’s foreign policy was consistent seems to decrease as years in power mounted. Initially, to build up relations in the immediate post-war period, foreign policy was designed to appear consistent and was perceived by most European diplomats ‘to represent continuity rather than a radical and aggressive new approach to European affairs.’ As Hitler’s confidence in himself grew and sympathisers such as British aristocrats and the conservative government were recruited, foreign policy became more daring and thus, less consistent. The initial consistency provided cover and opportunities for his more controversial foreign policy aims such as the Austro-German agreement, rearmament and occupation of the Rhineland. The degree to which Hitler’s foreign policy was planned demands a little more consideration. For instance, Hitler’s initial foreign policy aims as stated in Mein Kampf and 1933, such as the desire for lebensraum, seem in keeping with his anti-Russian tone. However, much of Hitler’s most impressive developments, including the Anglo-German Naval agreement, the Rhineland success, the Austro-German alliance and the Rome-Berlin Axis came about through the allies grievances with one an other and lack of unity. The Anglo-German naval agreement was mostly down to France having signed a Treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union and Britain taking issue with this and the Rhineland success seems again due to the lack of unity between France and Germany. Further, the Austro-German agreement took place under the cover of the Spanish Civil war and finally, the Rome-Berlin Axis simply came about through Mussolini having grievance with British and French government for supporting economic sanctions against Italy. Again, it can be argued that the underlying reason for these continuous conflicts of interest between European powers are ultimately due to Hitler and infact the demise of allied relations was planned. ‘I shall do everything in my power to prevent co-operation between Britain and France.’ Hitler as an opportunist is apparent once again over the Rome-Berlin Axis as two years previous he had stated, ‘If I succeed in bringing Italy and Britain to our side, the first part of our struggle for power will be greatly facilitated’. Hitler’s foreign policy was consistent as far as he relied upon consistency for progression with his ‘struggle’. With regards to the extent of which his foreign policy was planned there was a light at the end of the tunnel, which Hitler aimed for, and it was simply a matter of doing whatever necessary, appearing justified where possible, to make his way to that light.