The continued move towards a guerrilla style warfare sparked a change in British policy, and thus the order for farmhouses in the immediate vicinity of attacks on British rail and telegraph connections, to be burned. Once again, the interpretation of this order in the field was flawed as demonstrated by the entire burning of the town of Bothaville; justified at the time only because it was used as a base for the commandos in their attacks on the railway lines and thus seen by many as a totally barbaric and unnecessary action to be taken. However, there is counter-evidence, evident by the British commander-in-chief, that “by those exceptional methods which civilized nations have at all times found obligatory to use under like circumstances”(J.C. Otto) This ties in with the fact that from a historiography of the last 100 years, since the Boer war that this statement is indeed true. We have seen a striking reflection of these actions many times, for example of the American tactics in their fight against Guerrilla warfare in Vietnam, and under similar, unfamiliar circumstances.
It was the fact that the Boer’s Guerrilla warfare and their refusal to “play the game and fight like men” (Pakenham) that so appauled Kitchener. The success of Mao Tse-tung in China and the humbling of the mighty USA in Vietnam are an indication of the power and potential of guerrilla warfare. There is a school of thought which maintains that the success of guerrilla warfare depends largely upon the response of the other side; and that this response is the determining factor rather than the justice of the cause or the tactical ability of the guerrillas. Militarily, the guerrilla must constantly harass the enemy: capturing weapons, executing ambushes, chipping away at the morale and resolve of the government troops and always remaining elusive and impossible to find. Eventually the government will cede ground to the guerrilla, falling back on strong points which then become the new target. As the regular troops fall back the guerrilla will expand his operations to seek economic, political and psychological victories. Thus, to beat their opponents, Britain needed to enforce some harsh tactics. However, surely there must be other ways of achieving the British objectives without the deaths of near to 30 000 women and children.
Other tactics and options were explored. Milner, for example proposed a creation of protected areas; the Rand, and other industrial areas and in so doing, the war should just “fade away” (Milner) However, this policy, reverse to Kitchener’s scorched earth, would take a long time – Kitchener’s overwhelming objective was to win the war quickly and thus this policy was not appropriate. Moreover, it was not cheap- scorched earth however (what always endeared Kitchener to Whitehall) was. It was also simple, and thus was a far more appropriate solution, especially when considering the nature of the war: “an enemy that always escapes, a country so vast there is always room to escape, supplies such as they want abundant almost everywhere” (Kitchener in his letter to Brodrick) It would seem that this was the only solution.
However, there was now the question of what to do with the women and children who had become homeless as a result of the policy. Thus camps were set up; it was this clearance of civilians into the ‘concentration camps’ that would now dominate the last phase of the war. To the world England pretended to act very humanely by caring for the fighting Boers' women and children in "refugee camps". An English school textbook published in 1914 in Johannesburg, but printed in England, Historical Geography: South Africa, by JR Fisher, makes the following claim:
“During the later stages of the war, the relations, women and children, of those Boers still in the field, were fed and cared for at the expense of Great Britain, a method of procedure which, though humane, postponed the end of the war, at the expense of many valuable lives and much money.”
This statement is contradicted by various sources. The Cape Argus of 21 June 1900 clearly states that the destitution of these women and children was the result of the English's plundering of farms: “Within 10 miles we (the English) burned not less than six farm homesteads. Between 30 and 40 homesteads were burned and totally destroyed between Bloemfontein and Boshoff”. Many others were also burned down. With their houses destroyed, the women and children were left in the bitter South African winter in the open. The British history textbook says nothing about this. Thus we have two different sources, one primary, and thus extremely valuable, especially considering that it is written by and English soldier, and void of any British bias, and one secondary, which is extremely unreliable, both due to the fact that we know that it is inaccurate and because it hold an extreme British Bias.
Despite the English claims that the concentration camps were voluntary refugee camps the following questions must be asked: From whom did the refugees flee? How can the fact that the voluntary women and children had to be dragged to the concentration camps by force be explained? Kimberley camp had a five meter high barbed wire fence and some camps even had two or three fences.
Perhaps the words of the Welsh William Redmond are closer to the truth: “The way in which these wretched, unfortunate and poor women and children are treated in South Africa is barbarous, outrageous, scandalous and disgraceful.”
However, once again we can turn to a historiography of the last 100 years, and in Britain’s defense, learn from it in regard that here we see policy coming from decision-makers not in the field itself. This very much mirrors Hague in the First World War, where his sometimes ambitious ideas became very unpopular, as did he, while he made the decisions from London without seeing, first hand, the damage that has been caused.
The English claim of decent actions towards the Boer women and children are further contradicted by the location of the concentration camps. The military authorities, who often had to plan and erect camps for their soldiers, would certainly have been well aware of the essential requirements for such camps. Yet the concentration camps were established in the most unsuitable locations possible.
At Standerton the camp was erected on both banks of the Vaal River. It was on the Highveld, which ensured that it was extremely cold in winter and infested with mosquitoes in summer. The fact that Standerton had turf soil and a high rainfall, ensured that the camp was one big mud bath in summer, even inside the tents.
The same circumstances were experienced in camps such as Brandfort, Springfontein and Orange River. At Pretoria, the Irene Camp was located at the chilly southern side of the town, while the northern side had a much more favourable climate. Balmoral, Middelburg and other camps were also located on the south-eastern hangs of the hills to ensure that the inhabitants were exposed to the icy south easterly winds.
However, again we come back to the notion that decision making came directly from London. Much of these decisions were made in haste. This can be seen by the fact that administrative problems of this kind, and especially involving citizens, bored Kitchener, and so, especially when his main aim was to win the war, and quickly these decisions were not important to the decision makers in London. Whilst one makes an attempt to defend the decision making here, there is little in this counter argument that would legitimise and justify Kitchener’s actions and decisions with the argument that this simply had the hallmarks of one of Kitchener’s ‘short-cuts’ and a result of Kitchener’s “far ranging but narrow-angled mind” (Pakenham) It was not only the location that dismisses the fact that Kitchener’s actions are justifiable. The actions inside the camps are equally horrific:
Ill and healthy people were crammed together into unventilated areas conducive to the spreading of disease and epidemics. At first there were no medical amenities whatsoever in the camps. Later doctors were appointed, but too few. In Johannesburg there was one doctor for every 4000 afflicted patients. There was a chronic shortage of both medical supplies and medical staff. Eventually 26 370 women and children (81% were children) died in the concentration camps.
The visit of the British humanitarian, Miss Emily Hobhouse, a delegate of the South African Women and Children's Distress Fund to the camps in the southern Orange Free State led to an improvement in the conditions. On her return to Britain the story she told of the conditions under which the women and children had to live shocked everyone not committed to believe in the inevitability of the war and the harsh measures that was to end it. Her report to the Committee of the Distress Fund was first circulated to MP's and published in late June. From August to December 1901 the Fawcett Commssion visited the different camps and presented their report in December confirming in all essentials the accuracy of Emily Hobhouse's account.
They berated the camp authorities for the red tape which complicated the running of the camps, the spread of diseases that should have been foreseen, elementary rules of sanitation that had been forgotten, the vegetables that should have been provided; and the fact that medical staff should have been rushed to the scene as soon as the epidemics broke out.
Their recommendations led to improvements within the camp system. By February the annual death-rate in the camps were to drop to 6.9 percent and soon to 2 percent. This must surely show that contrary to common belief, or the “policy of punishment” (Milner) there was an attempt by London to treat the Boers with some element of humanity.
Thus, can accounts such as:
“Next to me there was a tent which housed a woman who had six children; four had already died of the measles and during the night of the storm, the other two also died.” (E.J. van Rensburg. Kroonstad concentration camp.)
be justified by changing moralities. Yet, it was less than 50 years after this that after World War 2, England mercilessly insisted on a frantic retribution campaign against the whole German nation for the purported Jewish holocaust. To this day, Germany is being forced to pay annual compensation to the Jews, which means that Germans who were not even born at the time of World War 2, still have to suffer today for alleged atrocities committed by the Germans. Should England subject herself to the same principles applied to Germany, then should England do everything within her power to reinstitute the Boer republics and to pay annual compensation to the Boers for the atrocities committed against the Boers? This may seem like a bizarre notion, yet on this occasion, the historiography from the last 100 years would work in the favour of the Boers and in theory should do so. The fact that "Their only crime was that they stood between England and the gold of Transvaal." (Pretorius) should justify the actions of the British, despite the fact that there are many reasons for the British actions during the war is fantastical. Essentially, the war was due to the greed of British colonialists, and in retrospect, it would appear that this is a far more bizarre notion than that which would suggest that like the Germans to the Jews, Britain should also pay compensation.
Essentially therefore, there is little doubt that the argument that Britain’s actions were justified is limited. Few would argue that the Americans had a valuable reason for invading Vietnam with regard to the amount of innocent deaths and suffering that was caused as a result of this; similarly, Britain had a relatively invaluable reason for it’s actions, and indeed for the war in the first place.