Malenkov then seized the initiative with his “New Course”. Malenkov believed that war between capitalism and communism was no longer inevitable and that resources could be redirected away from arms and heavy industry towards consumer goods and rising living standards. The new course was criticized by Khrushchev during his struggle for power. A year later Malenkov removed his position of PM, Khrushchev was to adopt and develop the New Course into a policy of Peaceful Coexistence and De-Stalinization.
Stalin’s death provided the opportunity for a rethink of US foreign policy. This was now the responsibility of Eisenhower and his secretary of State Dulles. At first it appeared that the new administration would pursue a more hard-line approach towards the USSR: Eisenhower had been openly critical of Truman as having been soft on communism during the 1952 presidential campaign. Dulles had talked of “rolling back” communism and of the “lubrication” of Eastern Europe form evils of communism. Eisenhower’s foreign policy approach was known as the “New Look”. Eik was acutely aware of the dangers of nuclear war. Like the Soviet leadership he was keen to avoid nuclear annihilation. BY 1958 data from U2 spy planes showed that the US had nuclear superiority over the USSR. Eik was more inclined to negotiate. Eik had the confidence to pursue his own policies and was a firm believer in face-to-face diplomacy making. The public rhetoric of hard line anti-communist did not always translate into practical policy making. In part the New Look policy was designed to save money on conventional arms by relying on fewer but more powerful nuclear weapons (more bang for the buck). By 1954 12% of US GNP was spent on armaments. Ideally Eik would have liked to reduce this and that entailed seeking some kind of agreement with the USSR. Hence the US government was facing many of the same pressures as the USSR form the early 1950s and was prepared to reach limited forms of accommodation with its opposite number.
The first crisis in the “thaw” period came in Hungary, which showed the vulnerability of the Soviet sphere of influence. Calls of liberalization within Hungary were encouraged by Khrushchev’s policy of De-Stalinization and demonstrated that changes within the USSR could have an impact on its satellite states. De-Stalinization encouraged reform by criticizing Stalin’s system of terror and by Nikita’s suggestion that there could be more than one road towards socialism. De-Stalinization led to calls by the general public in Eastern Europe for a liberalization bi its regimes. Nikita’s “secret speech” caused shock thought E. Europe, in Poland the Communist party leader had a heart attack and died after reading it. In the summer of 1956 workers’ protests in Poland forced the Polish Communist Party to elect a new leader, Gormulka, and introduce a series of moderate reforms.
Encouraged by the Polish example Hungarian reformers began demonstrating to put pressure on their government. The Stalinist Rakosi was replaced by Gero and then the moderate Nagy. IN order to keep a hold on events. Nagy gave in to demands to introduce a multi-party democracy and leave the Warsaw Pact. The soviet government responded by sending forces and establishing a new government under Kadar. Order was restored but 35,000 lives were lost and Nagy was executed. These actions revealed a Soviet determination to maintain a tight hold over its sphere of influence in E. Europe.
The Warsaw pact had helped Soviet dominance in establishing some of the rules of the Cold War. Statements of condemnation were issued but little attempt was made to intervene in a crisis that was seen as within the Soviet sphere of influence. The episode also revealed the hollowness of the US policy of “rollback” and “liberalization”
West Germany underwent an economic miracle in the 1950s gut East Germany struggled to present itself as a meaningful independent state. The failure of the East German government to win over its own people was shown by the growing exodus across the Iron Curtain into the increasingly prosperous and capitalist West Berlin. By 1958 Khrushchev had decided that firmer action was needed to shore up the Eastern Bloc and he issued an ultimatum to the west calling for the removal of all occupying forces form Berlin. Khrushchev wanted Berlin to become a free city within the existence of East Germany recognized by the West. The West was unwilling to give up West Berlin hence the ultimatum resulted into another crisis. The ultimatum was only dropped following Eik’s invitation to Khrushchev to visit the USA. This is an example of the way personal diplomacy could be used to diffuse a crisis.
By 1961 Nikita realized that the tactic of offering to relinquish the Soviet hold over the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in return for a neutral Germany was unlikely to produce results. Khrushchev was now willing to agree to the solution proposed by the East German government. To stem the exodus of its own people the East German government closed the main frontier between East Germany and West Germany in 1958 but it was still possible to move from East Germany into West Berlin. The continued loss of population threatened the survival of East Germany. Ulbricht had wanted a Berlin Wall for some time nut had been overruled by Nikita. He had now changed his mind. The Wall was referred to in the west as the “Wall of Shame”, The East German government called it the “anti-fascist protective barrier”. It became a symbol of a divided continent. East Germany was stabilized but at the price of advertising to the world that communist citizens had to be penned in to stop them escaping.
In conclusion, superpower relations during the 1953-62 periods reflected the stability of the spheres of influence established in Europe. Both sides felt secure enough to pursue different approaches to those followed since 1945. Military and economic concerns pushed both sides towards an accommodation with each other. A change in leader in both USA and USSR promoted different approaches as each new leader tried to impose their own particular stamp on the policy. The lurch form crisis to crisis was in some ways a consequence of the wrong policy pursued by Nikita. The large degree of power vested in the Soviet leader was a product of the political system set up by Stalin. Hence changes in Soviet Foreign Policy were strongly influenced by the personal preferences of individual leaders. Khrushchev’s initiatives, (De-Stalinization, Peaceful Coexistence and Berlin) effectively set the agenda with the US adopting a reactive position in defense of the predefined status.