Similarly, the Triple Entente developed as a defensive Franco-Russian partnership to counter the Triple Alliance developing amidst Germany’s expanding Armed Forces. France’s geographical position meant that it could provide useful protection for the Balkans that both Russia and the combination of Germany and Austria-Hungary wanted control over. Additionally, Russia needed to obtain loans to substitute those previously funded by Germany. France agreed to fund the Russian military programme and subsequently, France and Russia joined together in mutual fear of Germany. This reinforces the claim that Alliances escalated small conflicts into world-wide competition.
Historians suggest that alliances made violence almost inevitable and comment that without them, international squabbles would never have led to such a catastrophic war. For instance Germany’s aggression in Morocco was an attempt to display Germany as a more necessary and influential ally than Britain. It was however, unsuccessful as Germany’s increasing threat to the European distribution of power, and the Kaisers menace to relations that encouraged France and Britain to launch the Entente trio of WW1. It can be argued that Germany more frequently exploited the alliances than the members of the Entente, as emphasised by Fischer, who demonstrates how whilst the alliances were formed for defence, they were in most cases not implemented with the same aim considered, becoming offensive. As Schmitt believes, the alliances ‘when put to the final test, almost mechanically operated to convert a local quarrel into war.’ However, Joll suggests, the alliances alone were insufficient for causing the war. He suggests that they influenced the readiness of military plans, but didn’t increase the opportunities for them being implemented. The European powers didn’t consider alliances to be concrete and were therefore reluctant to apply military plans amidst expectations that they could disintegrate. This implies that Alliances were a contributory factor, but they couldn’t unaided have caused war. One example is Italy who was committed to defend Germany and Austria-Hungary in a 'defensive' war; arguing that Germany’s actions were 'offensive' they instead declared a policy of neutrality. In 1915, Italy joined against her two former allies.
Germany is depicted as the main instigator of WW1, due to aggressive tactics and desire for power and domination. In 1890’s, the Kaiser embarked on Weltpolitik whereby he rejected relations Bismarck had established and introduced plans for the expansion of Germany’s empire. It was the violence and brutality that Germany inflicted that would fuel her reputation as the cruel inciter of WW1. When the Berlin-Baghdad railway scheme was proposed there was mounting suspicion that the Kaiser would exploit it to establish trading lines and dominate the East. Germany also displayed considerable aggression in relation to Army expansion. The Kaiser believed that a successful navy and colonies would make him a hero for his country, and spread anxiety through Europe. He intended to construct a powerful battle fleet to threaten any other in Europe with the Second Navy Law 1900 which laid way to doubling the size of the German fleet to threaten the British supremacy. The Kaiser hoped that it would force Britain into an alliance with Germany if they could no longer rely on their ability to protect their colonies via the navy. The result of this massive expansion to the German naval shield was that it forced a race between the two powers. As Howard points out, each time an expansion was announced, fear of an attack was heightened in the opponent causing ‘mutual suspicion’ which paved the way for war. This can be seen in the Tirpitz memorandum where the Admiral says, ‘[Britain] is an enemy against which we must urgently require a certain measure of naval force.’
Historians have expressed suspicions over whether Germany’s claim of a fear of encirclement was legitimate, or simply propaganda to persuade the public that an aggressive war was necessary for protection. If the later is the case then it implies that the Germany government was culpable for the war, as they were actively looking for excuses to ignite a conflict with the other powers. Geiss believed that Germany was using the encirclement as an excuse to launch an attack. He reported that the Kaiser wanted a ‘Napoleonic Empire’ and showed that Weltpolitik was offensive as opposed to defensive as the public were told. Geiss refers to encirclement as the ‘propaganda idea’ and concludes that Germany didn’t fear attack, but used this as an excuse to launch an un-justified confrontation. Von Schlieffen claimed that France was desperate to seek revenge, whereas, Von Kinderlen-Wachter claims that had Germany not started a war, ‘no-one would have.’ Differences have been highlighted over what the ruling elite believed and what was portrayed to the public.
It is argued that German reaction to Austria-Hungary’s interests in the Balkans was deliberately provocative. Austria-Hungary could not risk a move against Serbia, supported by Russia, but felt that a German alliance would secure sufficient support to undertake the Balkan challenge. Germany saw this as a unique advantage and used it to launch themselves into European politics, issuing a blank cheque of unconditional support to Austria-Hungary. The War Council states, ‘Both Emperor Wilhelm and Bethmann-Hollweg had most emphatically assured [Austria-Hungary] of Germany’s unconditional support in the case of hostilities with Serbia’. German intentions were clear from the outset, as the only officials consulted were those of military stature. When the Serbian ultimatum was due to be delivered, Germany pressed Vienna to make the terms so unreasonable that Serbia couldn’t accept and war would be inevitable. German actions were consistently militant, giving validity to claims that Germany can be held responsible for the war. Germany’s actions convey the impression that they were bloodthirsty and desperate to be at the forefront of a great war regardless of the cost. Similarly to Germany, Austria-Hungary had an aggressive foreign policy, especially with regard to Serbia. Austria-Hungary could have adopted a democratic approach, suggesting their motive was to annex the region and gain revenge for the assassination. It can be considered, had the ultimatum not been impossible to uphold, the initial clash would not have been instigated and there would have been no opportunity for war. This paired with the detrimental effect on relations Austria-Hungary had, for example the Bosnian Crisis, culminated in WW1 giving validity to Austro-Hungarian responsibility. Remak believes neither Austria-Hungary nor Serbia were concerned with bringing Europe into the quarrel as each stood to secure profit from full-scale war. Conversely, Leslie believes the Austro-Serb conflict was proposed as a counter to Balkan nationalism, but never intended as a full war. He proposed that war would involve Austro-Hungarian troops withdrawing from Serbia and being deployed to Russia, hence making Austria-Hungary less likely to achieve their aim. This implies Austria-Hungary would not have intended the Serbian crisis to implode to war, hence suggesting it cannot be held directly responsible.
Fischer believes that Germany was solely accountable for prompting the war. Because they had plans for military confrontation by which the assassination triggered pre-determined events leading to German victory. Fischer used Bethman-Hollweg’s September memorandum, ‘The general aim of the war is security of the German Reich,’ to provide evidence that Germany needed an all-out war to secure stability of the Reich. Fischer believed that the Council was evidence of Germany’s need for war showing their desire to establish aggressive alliances, as Joll hinted: ‘[Germany] could hope to have Bulgaria, Rumania and even Albania and perhaps Turkey on our side.’ Similarly, the Kaisers conversation with Von Moltke, remarking, ‘I believe war is unavoidable and the sooner the better, [Germany] ought to do more to prepare the popularity of a war,’ shows a considerable amount of planning involved in war preparation, and every aspect being carefully orchestrated to ensure success. War was postponed after the Council because the public were unprepared and the government had to ensure they had sufficiently blackened the Russian reputation and convinced the public that war was essential. In terms of this document, it seems that the German government were most to blame for launching the war, and determined to hide the reasons that it was the case.
Fischer believes this shows Germany planning war long before it is introduced, and war was therefore avoidable if not for Germany causing unnecessary tension. The desire for war was shown amongst those in the higher echelons for example Bernhardi’s opinion, that they should strike before their opponents could react ensuring victory and Germany’s advancement through survival of the fittest. As he stated ‘War is a biological necessity.’ However, Haldane reported that whilst Germany appeared to be a well-ordered society, the more influential the individual, the more chaotic the decision-making. This suggests it would have been impossible for the Kaiser to plan war because he wasn’t organised enough, so he must therefore have been reacting to situations as they happened. This is in contradiction of Fischer implying the government can’t have been as responsible as suggested.
The view that Germany’s involvement is exaggerated to deflect blame from other factors is common. For instance, the Willy-Nicky telegrams imply that Germany and Russia wanted to avert war, and that mobilisation was the result of misunderstandings when two telegrams crossed. Hence messages were insufficiently conveyed, implying each were promoting a war by mobilising armies, to react to one another.
The Kaiser was similarly clumsy in the Daily Telegraph Affair. The Kaiser claims to have sent a battle plan to Britain to assist in the Boer Wars, ‘[Kaiser] worked out what I considered to be the best plan of campaign under the circumstances,… then dispatched it to England.’ This suggests Germany to be cooperative towards Britain’s colonial affairs, rather than the power-hungry nation they were depicted as. However, it is proposed that Germany were only co-operative in situations that they would not otherwise benefit from, hence their supportive role was merely a disguise hiding ruthlessness and brutality. The Kaisers intentions are unclear in this situation, as his comments are awkward and his opinions ambiguous. For instance, he implied that the British people were, ‘mad as March hares.’ Intending to show compassion for the British nation, he instead appeared foolish and insulting. The Kruger Telegram is similarly misleading as a congratulation to the Transvaal was taken by Britain as an insult. This proposes that blame should be predominantly associated with the Kaiser for his gaucheness.
Ritter claimed it is unfair to solely blame Germany, as there is no evidence of plans for world domination. He believes Germany acted peacefully throughout July 1914 to preserve status quo, and realised too late that the war could not be limited. He believed Germany’s good intentions led them to stumble into an Austro-Hungarian war, that they only understood the scale after offering the blank cheque. Some have suggested that Weltpolitik was to satisfy the requirements of a power-driven upper class who saw political victory as triumphant for themselves. It is argued that the Kaiser used misguiding victories to distract from internal instability. For instance, Kennedy has suggested the Kaiser suspected the threat of a socialist uprising would be significantly reduced should a European war erupt as the public would adopt a patriotic goal of securing the safety of Germany.
Turner has focussed upon the growing European militarism as a significant factor, believing that Austria-Hungary’s fading Balkan influence and ability to apply war plans is critical to their eagerness for war. He believes that had the powers not had these war plans available, war would have been implemented less hastily, hence being less of a threat, meaning tensions would not have been so high. Taylor considered war plans a necessary cause for War, seeing rival plans for mobilisation as the trigger for War. Each of the opposing powers wanted to instigate war whilst they held the upper hand. However, most historians would see this as a reductionist, over-simplified view of European politics, most seeing it as a contributory factor in the decision to embark on War, but not the route cause.
The final point to consider is the extent to which Britain can be held responsible. Britain’s lack of action in the July Crisis, it is argued, lead to war being declared. The reason is that the cabinet themselves failed to reach a decision as to whether to face Germany. Some felt it vital due to her expanding navy and her ability to threaten the safety of the Empire. Others felt it could not be considered a major threat so wanted to avoid conflict. Historians are similarly divided over the effect of the delayed declaration on the other powers’ war aims. Some believe had Britain declared their intentions towards the Entente in advance of the declaration, Germany may have been discouraged from embarking on war. Others believe Germany’s encirclement fears would have been confirmed activating an offensive strategy to break free, or the Entente would have launched an increasingly aggressive attack had they had known British support was unconditional.
To conclude, evidence gives unsubstantiated blame for WW1 and the extent to which the German Government is culpable. It seems to imply that whilst it can be allocated a certain degree of accountability, there are multiple other factors equally at fault, therefore deducing that no one cause is responsible.
