To what extent was Tsar Nicholas II saved by making concessions in the 1905 revolution?

‘sweep away a thousand years of history’, and so offered the ultimatum of ‘reform or bloodshed’. Witte told Nicholas II that ‘repression could only be a temporary solution’, however the Tsar was extremely reluctant to play the role of a constitutional monarch that his subjects desired. ‘There could have been no deeper humiliation than to be forced by a bureaucrat like Witte to grant his subjects the rights of citizenship’ – Orlando Figes, which suggests how the Tsar, although not against bloodshed, was averse to giving his people what they wanted, because this meant he was giving away his power and failing to be infallible (as Pobedonostsev claimed he had to be).   The Tsar reluctantly gave the people of Russia concessions in the form of the October Manifesto. The Manifesto gave Russians the freedom of speech, conscience, association, and unwarranted arrest, and an elected Duma to represent them. ‘There was a euphoric sense that Russia was now entering a new era of Western constitutionalism’ – Orlando Figes. This shows how the October Manifesto was seen as a step towards a constitutional government and a move away from the stout principal of autocracy – this gave hope to much of the opposition and calmed the resentment stemming from Bloody Sunday. However, in reality, ‘the Manifesto was a tactical manoeuvre, its sole purpose to buy time; there was no sign that it came from the heart’ – Orlando Figes. Witte claimed that the Manifesto was a ‘temporary concession’, and argued that the Tsarist regime had intended to return to its old autocratic ways once the danger had passed. The Manifesto was accepted with readiness by the liberals and peasants, which suggests neither of the groups were serious about a revolution. The Manifesto appeared as though the Tsar had recognised the grievances of the Russians and wanted to help by offering reform and a government who would make decisions with the people in mind.   Following the victory of the October Manifesto, there was a critical split within the revolutionary opposition between the liberals and the democrats. On one hand, the liberals ‘were mainly interested in political reforms’ and they felt like they had got what they wanted out of the October Manifesto, and so urged support for the Tsar. On the other hand, the socialists and their followers ‘wanted to push on to a social revolution’. The October Manifesto ultimately drove ‘a wedge between the liberals and the socialists’ – Orlando Figes. This meant that the peasants ceased in their opposition as they lacked coherence and leadership, and were contented with the promise of an end to redemption payments. This created the opportunity for Tsar Nicholas to claw back his power by appealing to different parts of the party whilst planning to go back on his concessions.   Within the opposition groups there was also a lack of unity. The various opposition groups, such as the peasants, the mutinies in the armed forces, and the nationalist independence movements, ‘all followed their own separate rhythms and failed to combine politically’ – Orlando Figes. This meant that it was easy for the Tsar to attack pockets of opposition which threatened the Tsarist regime. This can be compared to the success of the 1917 revolution, because in the later revolution, the Duma and the Soviet performed the role of coordination. The strikes which were organised by the opposition groups often had little impact because they were like impulsive outbursts of anger with no real direction or planning behind them. ‘The workers’ demands were often not even formulated until after the strike had begun’. This shows that people had no real sense of what they were fighting for and that oppositional ideas were not widespread throughout all the groups. Stolypin also attempted agrarian reform to buy off the working class and make them happier with their land, by creating a rich class of peasants named ‘kulaks’. This meant the Tsar had the support of the middle class, meaning not all of the Russians resented and opposed the Tsar.   The Duma that Nicholas II granted in the October Manifesto intended to give the Russians representation. However, the Duma failed in itself because of the Tsar’s presence and power over it, meaning the Tsar essentially still had all control. The Tsar could not work with the people in the 1st or 2nd Duma because there were too many people who opposed him with hostile demands, with the Duma mostly dominated by the Left who didn’t want to work with the Tsar. This meant he dissolved these Dumas. In the third Duma the Tsar selected half of the membership so that there were more people who supported him, and the Tsar was free to restrict the left presence because of the Fundamental Laws. The last Duma ostensibly worked but it was skewed in the favour of the Tsar because he flooded the Duma with his supporters. This took away the concept and aim of representing the Russian people and listening to what they wanted because his own supporters were in there – this gave him control over the concessions he gave.   The Tsar decided that he had got over crisis point and had given away too much. He had pacified the masses with concessions and so decided to try and claw back the power he gave away with the Fundamental Laws. “Russia had changed irreversibly, the experiences of the revolution had turned ordinary Russians into politically aware person” – John Morison. If the opposition were politically aware this presented dangers to the autocratic regime, and so the Tsar decided to take the concessions away. ‘The masses might become impatient with the gradual process of political reform and look instead to a violent social revolution’ – Orlando Figes. This shows that the Tsar was afraid of the opposition and so took greater measures. He basically stripped the Russians of the autonomy and control he had given them – he could dissolve the Duma’s he had granted and only he could demote those he assigned in the Executive. This meant that essentially, the Russians had no control, power, or concessions any more, and so could not pose a danger to the Tsar, and since the revolution had already failed, there was nothing they could do. ‘Once they had tasted these new freedoms, the mass of people could never again put their trust in the Tsar’ –Orlando Figes. However, ‘fear alone kept them in their place’ – Orlando Figes, meaning that although the bond with the Tsar and his people had been broken, they feared the power Nicholas II had and so couldn’t do anything.   Another contribution to why the Tsar succeeded is the questionable nature of the revolution – whether it really was one or not. It could be argued that it was not a revolution because there were no fundamental changes in the political and social fabric of Russia – the old autocratic order remained and was largely intact. Not everybody wanted rid of the Tsar; for example, the middle class supported the Tsar and were not present at Bloody Sunday. Furthermore, the church and army still supported the Tsar, and there was no alternative person to succeed the Tsar. 1905 opened up many paths and possibilities, for example, a more democratic government through an elected Duma and political parties, and expansion of civil rights – alternatives to autocratic rule. 1905 was a genuine, but an uncompleted revolution.  To conclude, the Tsar was strengthened by the revolution. The ego and power of the Tsarist regime had been dented by the embarrassing loss in the Russo-Japanese War. The revolution, and the Tsarist regime’s success in preventing it, overshadowed the war, and broadcasted their strengths (namely the loyalty of their military despite rash of mutinies), which in turn helped to strengthen the Tsar’s power and stabilize the regime. Despite the concessions the Tsar made in the form of the October Manifesto, it was the fact the revolution actually failed that saved Tsar Nicholas his crown. The revolution was largely uncoordinated and the protests were incoherent meaning they lacked clear purpose and powerful leadership – many of the protests were more short outbreaks of rage only sufficient to force small concessions, rather than the downfall of the Tsarist regime. It could be argued that the Tsar didn’t save himself; he simply delayed his downfall and abdication in unknown anticipation of the 1917 revolution. Sasha Groves