To what extent were the civil wars that followed independence in Angola and Mozambique the result of internal divisions or external interventions?
To what extent were the civil wars that followed independence in Angola and Mozambique the result of internal divisions or external interventions?
You should focus your answer on one particular territory but relate this to developments in the other.
The wars that followed the independence of both Angola and Mozambique were resultant of internal divisions, but more importantly, they were greatly catalysed by the financial, political, and physical intervention of other nations. It is also generally agreed that the intervention of these countries exacerbated the already volatile situations in Angola and Mozambique, to the extent that had they not intervened as they did, then the resulting economic collapse and massive social unrest that is still prevalent today would not have been so considerable. In this essay, I intend to focus primarily on the situation in Angola, and the range of factors that were instrumental in bringing about such a lengthy and destructive period of violence. The actual 'civil war' in Angola took place in 1975 and 1976, yet the violence still continues to this day.
Angola is a country with a vast ethnic wealth. At the latest count there are some 36 or so individual ethnic groups, to which an individual language is assigned, including, of course, the Portuguese language which has been accepted across the nation as the official language. Each of the native languages belongs to a certain area of the country, and it is the distribution of these languages and their cultures that has led to some social tension. With such a varied and extensive selection, it is inevitable that the phenomenon of tribalism will play a decisive role in the internal shaping of the country. Tribalism can be defined as "...loyalty to a tribe..."1 It is with this concept in mind that one can begin to explore the idea of internal divisions being instrumental in the civil wars that tore Angola apart after she gained her independence in November 1975.
There are three predominant ethno-linguistic groups, and they account for approximately three quarters of Angola's population. The largest of the three is the Ovimbundu tribe. The language used by this group is Umbundu. They inhabited the lands to the south, and historically were wealthier than other groups due to access to fertile land for agriculture, and there was also a noticeable degree of industrial development taking place in the major cities in the region. The perceived notion of Ovimbundu wealth, as well as the fact that some of the Ovimbundu joined the Portuguese armed forces, may have been a source of consternation in other tribes, who would have been jealous of material success, and angry at the Ovimbundu's consorting with "the enemy". An example of such tension surfacing to violent conflict can be seen with the uprisings in the north, where the white coffee plantation owners and their Ovimbundu workers were attacked by UPA rebels in 1961.
Twenty five percent of the country was made up of Mbundu. The language used in this group was Kimbundu, but Portuguese was also widely spoken. The Mbundu was located in Luanda and its environs. Being situated in the capital city was highly advantageous to the Mbundu, as they were situated in the largest industrial base, with excellent communications as well as proximity to natural resources, such as the coastal oil fields.
Finally there is the Bakongo, whose language is Kikongo. The Bakongo are situated in the north western provinces of Zaire, Uíge, and Cabinda, and also in the neighbouring Congo and Democratic Republic of Congo. Many of the Bakongo have stronger links with their neighbours than with fellow Angolans and this has been the source of some antagonism. Also invoking the green-eyed monster in the Bakongo's fellow countrymen is the fact that they are situated in oil-rich Cabinda, which has provided them with improved levels of prosperity.
The fact that each tribe had its own religions was also a source of unease amongst the regions. The Ovimbundu had Congregationalist tendencies, the Mbundu had American Methodist missions set around their central areas, and the Baptists had infiltrated into the northern Bakongo region. It must be stressed that these religions were usually embraced by the wealthy and educated, and therefore envy and disdain at exclusion from these elitist bodies would have been a cause for conflict.
Coupled with the universal polemic of ethno-regional disparities that are caused by physical location and ethnic of ethnic groups, we ...
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The fact that each tribe had its own religions was also a source of unease amongst the regions. The Ovimbundu had Congregationalist tendencies, the Mbundu had American Methodist missions set around their central areas, and the Baptists had infiltrated into the northern Bakongo region. It must be stressed that these religions were usually embraced by the wealthy and educated, and therefore envy and disdain at exclusion from these elitist bodies would have been a cause for conflict.
Coupled with the universal polemic of ethno-regional disparities that are caused by physical location and ethnic of ethnic groups, we have recently seen the rise of another phenomenon that has played a key role in influencing changes in ethnicity. This is the concept of accelerated urbanisation that has brought about an increase in ethnic interaction, resulting in the fusion of various cultures and customs. There is unfortunately also a negative side to this interesting ethnic amalgamation, what with an increase in competition for jobs, as well as massive congestion of amenities and facilities.
The nature of Angolan nationalism stems back hundred of years, to when the Portuguese arrived in the fifteenth century. There had always been a certain degree of social unrest, spurred by the Portuguese exploitation of the country's resources and its people. Nonetheless, the Portuguese did provide a certain degree of civilisation to Angola, introducing a variety of religions, as well as a pool of well-educated and highly-qualified personnel. There was a rapid growth of population of white Portuguese settlers who, before the civil war constituted five percent of the total population. Unfortunately, hatred for the colonisers outgrew admiration for them, and this can be seen in examples such as in 1961, when dramatic Portuguese reprisals to the FNLA uprisings in the north resulted in the massacre of some 50, 000 people.
Nonetheless, in the control of the Portuguese, the colony had been experiencing a period of steady economic growth. However, with the outbreak of the civil war there came a heavy period of exodus of the settlers due to fear of repercussions from their five hundred year reign. This was to be catastrophic for the nation, as the Portuguese had failed to prepare her for a secure passage to independence, negating to stop the visible and daunting development of the rival liberation movements that would needless to say be competing for power in the new government. Furthermore, despite the massive financial gains accrued by the white landowners, they had sadly neglected to repay the country, by reinforcing basic infrastructure and health and education programmes.
Subsequently, with the massive outflow of settlers went the vast majority of the educated classes, leaving behind thousands of commercial farms and small businesses, but with a scarcity of personnel qualified to run them successfully, and a steadily decaying infrastructure. The civil war that ensued plunged the country into an economic predicament so dire that it has still not been overcome.
The three main ethnic groups mentioned previously were represented by three predominant liberation movements. The MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertaçao de Angola) was the most successful of the three. Being based in Luanda it had immediate control of the capital from the outset of independence, and this was to its advantage as its power base there grew quickly and steadily, simultaneously providing easy access to immense wealth from the oil fields, and close links to the sea, from where aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union arrived. The movements' leadership consisted of a group of mestiços, and this was representative of its desires for a free, multi-racial Angola.
The second movement, UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) took perhaps the most interesting course in the events following Angola's independence. Founded in 1966, it was to spearhead the incredible political career of Jonas Savimbi. Despite UNITA's low level of military might, Savimbi's role was vital in securing an underground following of Ovimbundu that was to become a small yet very sharp thorn in the side of the MPLA. He was a very charismatic and ambitious leader and played an essential role in the events that followed. It is suffice to say that Savimbi's very existence was a cause for internal division in the country, from which the subsequent civil war was resultant. It was his hegemony over UNITA, and reluctance to accept a secondary role in the Angolan political history that obstructed the passage to peace.
"... The...factional fighting that ensued in 1975 was so chaotic and opportunistic that its exact sequence may remain forever arguable..."2
Savimbi's desire for absolute power led to the 'disappearance' of his internal rivals, an atmosphere of repression amongst his constituency and most importantly, the fuelling of the continuation of the civil war that ravaged the country.
The third principal movement, the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertaçao de Angola) was led by Holden Roberto. The FNLA's ideology was firmly in the Western camp and subsequently it gained support from the United States. It had also forged strong links with Zaire, and from there it gained valued support from former dictator Mobutu.
From the above, it is clear to see that the internal divisions in Angola did play an important role in the development of disharmony in the country. However, it was the external intervention of some of the world's most powerful nations that was to be the ultimate catalyst to the devastating Angolan civil war of 1975. On seeing a country with such natural resource-based wealth potential, the Cold War super-powers were quick to intervene, stepping into the international limelight. The USA, as ever, was pointedly showing its objection to the Marxist-Leninist ideology that the MPLA embraced, while the Soviet Union was simultaneously intent on supporting its political allies.
The events that took place after independence took the form of a political chain reaction. As a result of one military action, another would come into being as a measure of counterattack. One act would exacerbate another from the opposite camp, and this 'ping pong' warfare was to eventually culminate in full-scale hostilities. Unfortunately this ostentatious flexing of military muscles by the big players in the political game was to be wholly detrimental to Angola's future, and furthermore, little external effort was put into the helping to repair the country once the damage had been done.
Support for the MPLA came from the Soviet bloc, in the form of vast financial and military aid from both the USSR and Cuba. The threat to the MPLA from the FNLA, UNITA, South Africa, and indirectly the United States, led to large, heavily-subsidised arms transfers into Luanda from the Soviet Union. An influx of armaments like this was logically a key cause to the war that ensued.
The Clark Amendment had forbidden the United States to support any of the Angolan parties, and as a result, the assistance that they supplied was of a covert (yet significant) nature to both the FNLA and UNITA. The United States had deemed it necessary to step in in order to compensate for Soviet military assistance to the MPLA.
The intervention of South Africa was prompted by her desire to weaken Angola's ability to assist rebels in Namibia, which was under South African rule at the time. South Africa played a significant role in the developments of 1975, allying with the FNLA and UNITA, and advancing into southern Angola in August of that year. The Clark Amendment's hold over US interaction however led to South Africa's hasty retreat later on in 1975. South Africa continued to provide training and armaments for UNITA, as well as access to rear bases in northern Namibia. A certain degree of direct intervention also followed, with intermittent attacks on Angolan military bases, and horrifically, on Namibian refugee camps by the South African Defense Force (SADF).
Another Angolan neighbour, Zaire, saw fit to intervene in the struggle. Zaire provided 21, 000 troops to the FNLA in the failed bid to capture Luanda. The FNLA was virtually destroyed after this escapade, and was then to suffer further hindrance when the previously favourable Mobutu regime established an amicable relationship with the FNLA's rival party, the MPLA.
The situation in Mozambique was to bear striking similarities to that of Angola. FRELIMO, the Marxist-Leninist vanguard party had a background that mirrored that of the MPLA, and was simultaneously on the receiving end of decisive support from the Soviet bloc. Just as with the opportunistic MPLA leaders, many of FRELIMO's leaders were involved in order to benefit from substantial Soviet financial aid. Also of great consequence was the desire of RENAMO' s leaders for absolute power. The state had been incapable of furnishing its country with basic amenities and more importantly providing the reassurance of its inhabitant's safety. This can be compared directly to Savimbi's immense ambition and refusal to accept UNITA without his hegemony, as well as the general feeling of dissatisfaction with the state of the country's leadership.
However, unlike in Angola, the leading party was soon to break away from the socialist system, in a bid for economic rehabilitation. By the time that all allusions to Marxism-Leninism had been disbanded in 1989, Mozambique was beginning its journey to relatively new-found prosperity. Angola, lamentably, was still to suffer from social disunity and poverty.
From the above we can clearly see that the civil war in Angola was intensified to a great extent by the internal divisions that were already present in the country, but more importantly by the intervention of external parties after the declaration of independence in 1975. Had there not been any of said interference from foreign factions, then it is safe to say that the destruction seen in the last quarter of a century would not have escalated to the levels that we have now witnessed. The situation in Angola would have doubtlessly led to conflict (albeit minor), due to the concept of tribalism and ethnic divisions, the distribution of mineral-based wealth around the country (and subsequent wealth that it generated for the MPLA and UNITA), and perhaps most importantly, the leadership of Jonas Savimbi, whose ambitious and headstrong character would have made hostilities a certainty. Coupled with the changes that were taking place right up until the war, another influencing internal factor was the legacy left by the Portuguese settlers when they fled in 1975. The country was in a state of political turbulence, with many of the policies leading to disappointment when their many pledges remained unfulfilled.
The influence of external parties in promoting regional conflict was, however, infinitely more consequential. Vast quantities of aid were received by all of the principal fighting forces, and had this not been the case then Angola's history would not have been so volatile.
When comparing the outcomes of post-independence in Angola and Mozambique, we can see that the civil war came to an end in Mozambique and not in Angola essentially due to one major component: money. It was the great wealth that Angola received from its natural resources and from foreign aid that prolonged the conflict there. Mozambique, on the other hand, had limited funding, and a continuation of the costly armed struggle was therefore not a possibility. It is also noteworthy that the internal divisions and personal rivalries in Mozambique were no way as deep-rooted as in Angola.
"...In sum, both the Angolans and the Mozambicans did have their own internal reasons for disagreement...However, it is widely agreed that the wars attained their deadly height as a result of external forces that raised destruction to levels far beyond the capacity of the societies to resist. It was above all, the intertwined pacing of apartheid's death struggle and the end-game of the Cold War that determined their rhythm and intensity..."3
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ali, Taisler M., and Matthews, Robert O. (eds.), 1999, Civil Wars in Africa. Roots and Resolutions, McGill - Queen's University Press, Montreal.
Hodges, Tony, 2001, Angola from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism, James Currey, Oxford.
Kitchen, Helen (ed.), 1987, Angola, Mozambique and the West, Praeger, Washington.
Minter, William, 1994, Apartheid's Contra's: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique, Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg.
Collins Concise Dictionary, Fourth edition, 1999, (HarperCollins Publishing, Glasgow.)
2 J. A. Marcum, United States Options In Angola, taken from Helen Kitchen (ed.), Angola, Mozambique and the West, 1987 (Praeger, Washington.)
3 W. Minter, Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique, 1994, (Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg)