To what extent were the Stalinist purges simply a way of eliminating his rivals?

So why exile Trotsky? His and his supporter’s celebrations on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution was not particularly dangerous, despite being controversial. Yet from the beginning, when Lenin hoped to see himself succeeded by a man more similar to Trotsky than Stalin, Stalin had viewed Trotsky as hazardous, not necessarily to the Party, or the wellbeing of the Soviet, but to himself. It could be argued that the rage incurred by Trotsky’s Bolshevik commemorations was little more than an act, and was used to bring about the banishment of the quieter man.

Yet Robert Conquest expresses the belief that Trotsky was in fact an “outsider”, who was “lacking the experience of intrigue which [the Bolsheviks] had picked up in the long and obscure inner Party struggles in which he had tried to operate as a conciliator.” If this is indeed true, then Trotsky would not appear to be the conspirator that Stalin preferred to describe him as. He is also depicted as “arrogant”, and “the respect he won by his gifts and intellect was wrung from [the Bolsheviks] reluctantly.” This clearly shows Trotsky as a man with undeniable talent and acumen, yet without the charisma and likeability that were imperative if he wanted to apply these abilities. Although this is just an example of one of Stalin’s rivalries, it is a perfect illustration of Stalin’s intense paranoia. It could be argued that this is not the same as attempting to get rid of his rivals, for if it were paranoia then it is not a fully conscious decision by planning and cunning, merely a panicked and unnerved reaction to an overestimated opponent. However this interpretation of Trotsky’s personality is based simply on the writings of Robert Conquest, who, although a well known historian on Stalin’s career wrote his assessment in 1968, 18 years after the death of Trotsky. Therefore this source is based completely on the writings of others not mentioned in Conquests work, so it is impossible to derive how reliable the source is.

Like Trotsky, Kirov was a man whose personal attributes were hugely different to that of Stalin. However, unlike Trotsky, Kirov was notably handsome, charming and “an outstanding example of the type of individual around whom dissatisfied Party members might rally.” ¹ Unfortunately for Kirov, his ascension to success within the Party, chiefly his election as a secretary at the XVIIth Party congress in 1934, came at a time when it could be argued Stalin began to feel his power slipping. Particularly unfortunate for Kirov was that that was the very same congress where Stalin lost his post of Secretary General. After this, Kirov was invited by Stalin to work for him in Moscow, a show of goodwill, but then repeatedly postponed Kirov’s transfer, with the excuse that Kirov was needed in Leningrad to finish key party business. Yet Kirov was not invited to certain Politburo meetings and was kept in Leningrad for more than 9 months. However despite this, his influence continued to strengthen. Stalin would have seen Kirov as a possible threat to his position, for not only was Kirov of an entirely different caliber of politician, he had openly opposed Stalin already on a number of issues. Kirov was unhappy with the existing industrialization drive, siding with those who felt the sheer pace of Stalin’s programme was a cause for worry, as well as being opposed to extreme measures being used as a means of disciplining Party members. In 1933 Kirov successfully opposed Stalin’s demand for the imposition of the death penalty against a Party leader, Martemyan Ryutin who had been caught spreading a 200-page document calling for the removal of Stalin. Although it may have simply been the principal that Kirov was fighting for, to Stalin it could have been interpreted as support for Ryutin, and therefore put Kirov in a position where he would have been a figure of suspicion.  Stalin’s handling of Trotsky had already proved he was capable of removing threats from the Party, and when Kirov was assassinated, there were a number of reservations concerning Stalin’s involvement. This gives weight to the argument that Stalin was indeed eliminating his rivals from the Party, as Kirov was arguably a strong competitor against Stalin, and the effectiveness with which it was covered up and made to look as if Stalin had no implication was impressive, suggesting a well thought out plan.

It could be argued that Stalin began what later became the purges as simply a demonstration of his power, the initial purge of party members unfortunately gathered momentum, and within a few years people denounced others in order to shift blame from themselves. This provides a solid piece of evidence for the argument against Stalin’s reasons for the purge. The intolerance which gripped society in the time of this great change resulted in distrust on all fronts, enemies were seen everywhere; traitors to the revolution, who wanted to ruin the hard work and accomplishments of the New Russia. The denunciation of such key figures as Trotsky as enemies of the state resulted in people drawing the conclusion that if such important dignitaries could betray the nation, then what about the lesser people? This snowballed and quickly hundreds of people were suspected of traitorous acts. Common people were left to draw the distinction between incompetence and intentional sabotage, which consequently led to any mishap that might arise in the workplace to be blamed on sabotage.

Denunciations therefore became commonplace, and no one was safe. They became a means of harming your enemies, as well as proving your patriotism, for by identifying a peer as a traitor, it could perhaps protect you from being named as one. For when ‘conspirators’ were uncovered, it was not uncommon for their wives and relatives to also be punished and apprehended. It seemed as if the only way to protect yourself was to denounce someone else, fuelling the situation within Russia to one of fear and suspicion. The idea has been put forward that keeping people in constant fear of being arrested was a technique for making them do as Stalin wanted, and at its most basic, this is true. Stalin’s wish was to improve Russia economically, yet this could not be achieved without the full support of his people. In a speech in 1931, he is recorded to have said "We are 50 or 100 years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this lag in 10 years. Either we do it, or they crush us." At this time, the people of Russia were largely uneducated, and the majority of the population had little or no understanding of the complexities of communism, and therefore had little reason to support it. As a result of this, Stalin lacked the commitment from them that he so desperately needed, and had to think up another method of drumming up support. The terror and purges were a result of this, as survival was the biggest incentive to work hard and support the country. This ‘blame culture’ led to the emergence of arrest quotas, whereby the secret police were required by Stalin to arrest a certain number of ‘saboteurs’ in order for propaganda to illustrate how the failure to meet targets was wholly because of sabotage.

Many realized that some innocent people were being victimized, and the saying went around that "when you chop wood the chips fly." As with Lenin, it was “believed by the majority that some who were innocent would have to be victimized if all of the guilty were to be apprehended”. Not only this, but the introduction of “denunciation quotas” set under the authority of Nikolai Yezhov only contributed to the huge volume of people being arrested. This shows how the number of people arrested and detained rose not only from Stalin attempting to eliminate all adversaries, but much from the fervour with which the Russian people leapt to betray their contemporaries. Again, the source of this point is Robert Conquest, but unlike some of his other points, this quote can be relied on to be correct, for at the time of writing this (1968) the full extent of what had been happening in Russia was just beginning to come out, so deducing the state of society at the time would have not been difficult, due to the fact that Conquest would have been able to speak to Russian citizens.

The version of communism in Russia was not particularly traditional, it was perceived to be more of a hybrid of ideas. As a result of this, the ruler, namely Stalin, can then impress their own adaptation upon it. If the purges were to be judged from this perspective, then Stalin was in fact trying to build a stronger governing body for Russia, and the way he went about it was to expel anyone he considered a threat to this.

The Communist Party wanted to eliminate what it saw as “socially dangerous elements”, for instance ex-kulaks, former members of opposing political parties (such as Social Revolutionaries), and former Tsarist officials, which although led by Stalin,  does not automatically mean that it embodied the sole purpose of one man. It was the combined wish of the communists as a whole who did not eliminate these enemies in fear of competition, but as a point that these groups would not be tolerated, for the good of the state.

The idea that the assassinations of those who Stalin had worked side-by-side with was allowed because of his irrationality may seem farfetched, yet it is argued that the reason why terror was used under Stalin is the same reason as why the Bolsheviks used it. The reason is he felt he “still had to prove he was really in charge, and the people he had to fight were, he believed, all around him.” Yet it has become clear that by 1936, there was little evidence to suggest that there was much opposition to Stalin’s position. In reality, by this point Stalin had managed to consolidate his power to the extent that the Soviet Union was by then an authoritarian one man state, and this has been said to be a direct result of the terror.

Yet the Bolsheviks had to use terror to keep control, an example being the ‘red terror’ under the revolution of 1917-1920, whilst the purges that took place in the years 1937-39 now appear to historians that “the killing was so random and idiosyncratic that journalists and social scientists have no concept for it” This surely adds weight to the argument that Stalin’s purges were a result of his paranoia, again not because of a premeditated scheme to kill off all opponents.  Stalin’s paranoia merely added to his thoughts of plots against him, yet what differentiates the two explanations is the basic fact of whether these ‘traitors’ were in fact a threat to Stalin. Tomsky, for example, was a staunch ally of Stalin for years, had opposed Trotsky in the early years, and yet was accused of being implicated in assassination plots against Stalin. After hearing the NVKD were coming for him, “Tomsky committed suicide in his dacha at Bolshevo. (He left a letter to Stalin denying the charges.)” This is just one of many examples where Stalin turned on his previous supporters, adding weight to the argument that Stalin was indeed paranoid.

There is much reason to believe that Stalin’s purges were ideologically driven,  for instance when purging the party he was keen to get rid of Mensheviks who turned Bolshevik. Not only this, but Stalins dissolution of the Church is an area that supports the argument that he did not simply eliminate rivals. For the Chuch held neither enough strength or power to overthrow him, unlike the army. Getting rid of the church seems to be an ideological commitment in the sense that the state replaces religion before the state “withers away”.

Stalin’s five-year plans could be said to be overambitious, and certainly he had numerous hindrances when his near-impossible targets were not met. It would be expected that blame would fall on Stalin for these shortcomings, however Stalin’s power was established on a ‘cult of personality’, placing Stalin as a kind of human god. To deal with this predicament, scapegoats had to be found. Again sabotage was a central theme throughout the following arrests, as reasons for the targets not being met. The Kulaks in particular were targeted, the rich peasant class created by Stolypin in the land reforms. However the actual number of Kulaks is nowhere near the amount of people accused of being Kulaks and shot. One example of Stalin’s preference to using scapegoats is his response to the grain shortage. When informed of the shortage, Stalin refused to accept it, and instead accused the Kulaks of hoarding grain. The requisitioning squad were sent out to claim the grain and deal with the ‘traitors’, and although it is unclear from records whether it was actually being hoarded, the amount that was recorded was nowhere near the amount that was actually seized. The result of this episode was that the grain kept by farmers as seed for next year’s harvest were seized and ultimately caused mass famine the following year. In this way Stalin was able to avoid blame by painting the Kulaks as the enemies, and his failures were covered up by tales of sabotage. This shows how the purges were not attempts to rid society of opposition, but in fact simply a way of Stalin retaining his position of power by putting the blame elsewhere.

There is no doubt that the purges between 1928 and 1939 were simply to eliminate his rivals. Stalin’s paranoia exaggerated the idea that people were plotting against him an as a result his purges intensified. The suicide of Tomsky confirms this. The attack on the Kulaks shows that Stalin did indeed try to rid Russia of particular groups or threats. The purges began with Stalin’s desire for unopposed power, as seen in the exile of Trotsky and from then on it simply escalated to massive proportions.