The decision to go forward with the testing and possible deployment of a NMD is one rife with controversy and laden with many technical obstacles. The defense system proposed by President Clinton is a vastly scaled down version of the Reagan era “Star Wars” plan. His plan was a “3+3” concept, with 3 years for development and testing and 3 years for deployment. It called for a ring of high and low orbiting infrared imaging satellites; a ground based super sensitive radar system in Massachusetts and Northern California, a command and control center in NORAD and high-speed interceptor rockets in Grand Forks, ND or Fairbanks, AL. (Galloway, 18) The concept is called “hitting a bullet with a bullet” and as you can imagine the technological challenges are immense. The interceptor rockets must travel at speeds of 12,000 mph and reach altitudes of 100 miles; with these speeds and altitudes the minutest change in direction translates to a miss downrange. Though the technological challenges are daunting, they are not the only obstacles to deployment.
The balance of power between the US and Russia has been a delicate thing over the past 50 years. Over this time Washington and Moscow have signed many arms control treaties, one of them being the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, which specifically bans the development of a National Missile Defense system. Russia has made no attempt to hide its distaste of the US fielding a NMD system. Russia’s Foreign Minister recently stated: “The prevailing system of arms control agreements is a complex and quite fragile structure. The collapse of the ABM treaty, would, therefore, undermine the entirety of disarmament agreements concluded over the last thirty years.” (The Progressive, 8) Not only would the fielding of an NMD by the United States upset the balance of power, it may also raise feelings of strategic inferiority in the Russians. It would do nothing to encourage them to adhere to the START II treaty that drastically reduces the nuclear arsenal of both the U.S. and Russia, which they recently ratified. Blatantly thumbing our nose at the Russians and deploying a NMD under these circumstances would be devastating to Washington – Moscow relations, and would in fact make us less safe from nuclear attack. Russia has 5,000 aging nuclear missiles (The Progressive,8) that are on a hair trigger. By provoking them into keeping their scattered, decrepit arsenal active, we run the risk of accidental launch or thievery by rogue states. It could also threaten the Nunn-Lugar program, in which the US aids Russia in securing its alarmingly scattered arsenal. (O’Hanlon, 68) Though a launch would be devastating to the US we would know exactly where it came from, and could promptly deal with the offending nation. The real threat in many experts’ eyes is more covert than missiles.
A National Missile Defense system cannot stop a boat loaded with a nuclear device from anchoring off New York and detonating, nor can it stop a terrorist from pouring a vial of Anthrax virus into a cities’ water supply. These threats are considered by some defense experts to be more realistic than a rogue state lobbing a nuclear missile at the US only to be clobbered in return. The deployment of a NMD is a 55 billion dollar bad idea that has no chance of defending the U.S. from an attack of this sort.
An alternative to a National Missile Defense is a more localized shield known as a Theatre Missile Defense, or TMD. These have remained in development throughout the 90’s and are considerably more effective than a NMD since they do not face the same insurmountable technological obstacles. These systems gained in popularity during the Gulf War when the US Patriot system was deployed against Iraqi SCUDS. These defenses are considerably less expensive, mobile and offer protection to troops abroad, which are more likely to be target by a less capable missile carrying a biological weapon. The US Patriot has seen many upgrades since the Gulf and is due for another that will improve its accuracy and expand its coverage radius to over 45km. (O’Hanlon, 70) These TMDs do not fall under the 1972 treaty, as their specifications do not bring them into the national defensive role. We need to address the real threat, and not waste our money on massively expensive projects that put us into contention with other nations.
The arms race is as old as the human race. We have always been after the ultimate defense that will render our aggressors attacks futile. The Great Wall of China, Hadrian’s Wall, and the Maginot Line, all were expected to keep out the invaders and protect the citizens within. All failed. It would seem that the US National Missile Defense policy is charged with the political agendas of powerful corporations and politicians who wish to be re-elected. The big three of missile defense: Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Rayethon, have already been given billions of taxpayer dollars to develop this system, they have delivered failure after failure. Continuing down this exorbitantly expensive route can destabilize the delicate power balance that we maintain with Russia, China, France and other nuclear capable countries. It is time we identify the more likely threat to the US and concentrate our efforts in that area. The Patriot Missile system and others like it should continue to receive funding, to protect our men and women in uniform, and we should be more alert to subversive attacks on our own soil.
References:
Allen Nguyen
October 23, 2001
Mr. Woodbury
Honors Political Science
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