Parliament also used taxes to fund their war effort; however, as the King would not give assent to anything passed in parliament they were forced to pass ordinances in place of acts.
As Parliament controlled the ports this prevented King Charles from generating income and war funds through customs duties or trade. Without this crucial income Charles was always at a monetary disadvantage to Parliament. As a result of this lack of money Charles was unable to pay many of his troops and this led to a trickle of deserters that would become a flood if the troops were asked to leave their local area.
Another way that Parliament’s control of trading centres worked to the detriment of Charles’ war effort was that he was unable to call upon European royal families for support as the European troops were unable to get ashore in Britain. It could also be argued, though, that many European Royals would be neither willing nor able to send troops as a direct consequence of the thirty years war.
As the controllers of trade and commerce Parliament also had great access to printing workshops and presses. At the time London was the main centre of printing and so Parliament was able to sustain the production of a huge volume of propaganda in the form of letters, posters, pamphlets and leaflets.
The King also had a prodigious output of propaganda, however, this was tempered by the fact that he didn’t have access to such a large amount of the population as parliament did, as in 1640’s Britain a quarter of the population lived in London.
King Charles was also a far more obvious and easy target for propagandists than a whole parliament was. The fact that Charles had struck a deal with the Irish Catholics also made it easier for parliament to vilify him as a Catholic and worshipper of the Pope. The pacts Charles made with the Irish rebels served no real purpose other than to make him an easier target for the parliamentary propagandists. The Irish did not really help Charles greatly in his war effort and the cessation of hostilities in Ireland didn’t really free up Charles’ professional soldiers as was hoped, they remained in Ireland in case there was another rebellion by the Irish.
At the outset of the war one distinct advantage That King Charles held was that he had a clear target to aim for. If Charles could capture or surround London then he would surely be able to force parliament into surrendering. Parliament, however, didn’t have the luxury of a clear target upon which to focus. Charles, although he did set up his winter quarters in Oxford, didn’t have a set base and as such was a far harder target than Parliament’s chambers in Westminster.
Another factor backing up the point made earlier that Charles was unable to call in help from European aristocracy and Royals and that he was unable to trade as freely as he may have wished is this; The vast majority of the Navy had sided with Parliament as the crown was in arrears in paying the seamen’s wages. Unwilling to fight for free the vast majority of the navy had decided to join Parliament. This factor is not greatly significant, however, as the civil war was largely fought on land and not at sea. The fighting that did take place at sea was largely ineffective. The Navy only stopped roughly one in seven of the King’s ships from making port.
One great weakness of the Royalists was their poorly structured command system. Prince Rupert and the Marquis of Newcastle, King Charles’ main commanders, were often a law unto themselves, Prince Rupert especially. At Marston Moor Prince Rupert and Newcastle had been sent to raise the siege of York. When Rupert arrived and met with Newcastle he insisted that he had also had orders from the King not only to save York but to draw the Parliamentary forces in the area into battle.
When the Royalists did engage in battle with Parliamentary forces again their poor command structure cost them, as did their indiscipline. The Parliamentarian forces, however, were well disciplined and extraordinarily well commanded, especially after the formation of the New Model Army.
After the battle of Naseby in June 1645 Richard Clarendon, a Royalist historian of the time, observed that, “though the King’s troops prevailed in the charge, and routed all they charged, yet they never rallied themselves again in order, nor could be brought to make a second charge again the same day….whereas Cromwell’s troops, if they prevailed, or even if routed, presently rallied again and stood in good order ‘til they received new orders”.
Many people chose to be ‘neutralists’ and tried to avoid being drawn into the war. A large number of the troops involved were coerced or press ganged into fighting in the wars and as such were unwilling participants. Therefore whenever an opportunity to desert arose many soldiers would take it. The number of desertions would increase sharply in a unit of troops if it were asked or ordered to leave its own county or area.
Localism played a large part in the civil wars and was a factor not only in side taking but also in the eventual outcome of the war. The badly disciplined Royalist troops, when garrisoned or billeted in an area, would often pillage the village, town or city in which they were stationed, and in addition to this taxes would also be collected by force when necessary. As the war drew to a close locals again saw the opportunity to be neutralists and teamed up with Parliament to remove Royalist forces from their area as neutrals saw the New Model Army as far less of a threat to them than the forces of King Charles. Therefore it could be said that the Royalists contributed to their own downfall.
In many towns the strength of neutralism was unrivalled by Parliamentarianism or loyalty to the Crown. (Though some might argue that it was exactly loyalty to the Crown that made neutralism so popular).
At South Molton in North Devon strength of opinion was so strong that commissioners arriving there hoping to recruit troops were met at the town gates by a baying mob which even included women with rocks threatening to “bash out [the commissioners] brains” (they beat a hasty retreat!). In other counties such as Cheshire and Yorkshire the Royalist commissioners of array and the Parliamentary Militia commissioners reached a mutual agreement not to proceed with their work in those areas. In Lincolnshire the gentry declared that they wouldn’t fight “for or against the King” whilst other towns and boroughs simply shut their gates to both sides and all other “foreigners”.
The fact that most of these neutralist hotspots were in Royalist areas could be taken to reflect the behaviour of Royalist forces in the area and could also be listed as a weakness of the crown.
The Royalists suffered greatly from conflict within their command structure. The constant disputes between Prince Rupert and Digby meant that many crucially important military decisions were often coloured by personal considerations. Ultimately this caused indecisiveness and infighting, which coupled with King Charles’ indecisiveness and hesitancy explains away the Royalists failure to capitalise on the advantages they held in the early stages of the war.
Parliament’s victory was the result of a multitude of different factors and all need to be taken carefully into consideration before a conclusion as to why the war was won by Parliament can be drawn. Clearly Parliament had the great advantage of controlling the south east and London. This gave them great resources which, if not immediately, would eventually be telling. This is obviously a Parliamentary strength and is compounded by a Royalist weakness. Charles’ failure to attempt to end the war in its early stages, when he had the upper hand and Parliament was only beginning to put into action any plans they had was t6he result of poor communication between his generals and would eventually cause him to lose his head.
Although these Royalist weaknesses and errors were fatal they did not ensure or guarantee a Parliamentary victory. Parliaments strength of resources grew as the war went on as did Parliaments military strength with the Scottish Alliance. At this stage of the war the result was still in question; however, with the formation of the New Model army a Royalist victory began to look less and less likely.
Even at this stage, when Parliamentary victory looked inevitable it was not certain that it would come quickly. It was only Charles’ error in being drawn to battle at Naseby and the re-emergence of the neutralists that brought about the collapse of Royalist forces within the year.
Ultimately it was not Royalist weaknesses or parliamentary strengths which caused the first civil war to end as it did but a balance of the two. Parliament would not have been able to capitalise on their resources if the king had had similar resources and the same goes for their strong command structure, being at odds with the poor discipline of the King’s troops. The Civil war ended as it did because of Parliamentary strength and Royalist weaknesses.
