It was this threat*4 that accommodated the Hamidian massacres, which lead to the eradication of ‘100,000 and 200,000 Armenians’ with ‘brutal force.’ Historians consider this to be of great importance in relation to the 1915 killings of the Armenians, ‘a dress rehearsal’. Here the Ottomans demonstrated the propensity to implement significant damage towards the Armenians in an attempt, according to Sultan Abdul Hamid II to stop the ‘the endless persecutions and hostilities of the Christian world’. However, it could be said this viewpoint is overly simplistic, as it does not fully consider all the contributing factors to the 1915 killings.
Before these are taken into account, the definition of genocide must be discussed. It is ‘The deliberate and systematic destruction of an entire people who belong to one racial, political, cultural or religious group.’ So far the actions of the Empire have matched this definition but there are key reasons, which make it more difficult to classify the 1915 killings in the same way.
To begin with, breakdown of the Ottoman Empire*5 and the creation of the new Republic of Turkey lead by the CUP*6 (Committee of Union and Progress) and the Young Turks*7 should be considered. The effects that these had on Turkey and the minds of the Turkish people are important. Beginning with the initial support of the CUP in the hope of a life better than that under Abdul Hamid II, primarily from the ARF (Armenian Revolution Federation), the Armenians were hopeful that the new constitution that came as a result of the Young Turk revolution*8 would grant them some semblance of autonomy. The CUP’s willingness form an alliance with the Armenians does little to support the potential to implement genocide in 1915.
However, it was after the CUP reneged on the specifics of their agreement, mainly total autonomy, that the relationship between the two parties became fragmented. In addition to this, it became clear that the party was attempting to revive Ottomanism and had a clear interest in the pseudo-scientific racial theories such as Social Darwinism, placing the Turks as superior to Armenians. The previous cultural superiority that existed made it easy to accommodate such theories and by looking at other instances of genocide it can be said that such theories were often a precursor to genocide.
The situation escalated when ethnic and sectarian violence spread throughout the country. This brought about economical pressures that spread a great deal of animosity among the Turks because, as mentioned before, the Armenians were seen as synonymous with wealth prosperity. In fact, the Adana massacre*9 which resulted in ‘fifteen to thirty thousand Armenians,’ being killed demonstrated that decades after the Hamidian massacres the feelings of resentment towards the Armenian people still existed. However, Guenter Lewy claims that the destabilization of the regime was mostly to blame for this, as the Armenians had more openly opposed Abdul Hamid II. Therefore, it was easy for the Turkish citizens to pinpoint the blame upon the Armenians. Lewy claims that the massacre was one of civilian proportions and estimates the death rate to be lower that fifteen thousand. However, the presence of the military must be considered especially when acknowledging the length of the massacre: a mere 10 days. Therefore, it could be said the estimated death rate from both Lewys and Akcams could not have been achieved without military organisation.
It was not long after their journey into power that the attitude and policies towards the Armenians began to radicalize. To quote Taner Akcam, ‘It is widely acknowledged that war creates a favourable climate for genocide’. It is no coincidence that the killings occurred during World War One were the new Republic of Turkey joined the Axis powers*. In a time of increased political and economic instability and after Ismail Enver openly laid the responsibility of the defeat of the Battle of Sarikamis* on the Armenians. It is no stretch of the imagination that this increased the hostility towards the Armenians. Already having been alienated from Turkish society as a result of their religion and their prosperity, they were ‘scapegoats’* for the failing Turkish republic. What were the implications of this is to the question of genocide? According to historian Vahakn Dadrian, the practice of systematically assigning the blame onto a minority group through propaganda was all part of the run up to genocide*. Indeed if we look at other acknowledged examples of genocide such as the Holocaust, we know that the Nazis blamed Jews for the failure of the Germany in WWI, which acted as a catalyst to their subsequent persecution.
However, historian Justin McCartney claims that the blame was to an extent justified, as the Armenian rebels did in fact side against the Turks during the Battle of Sarikamis with the Russians. If this is the case, then we may consider McCartney’s claim that the killings of 1915 were as a result of an Armenian risk to Turkish security. However, at the time, gaining the alliance of Russia would have had a limited effect to due Russia’s own political instability.
It was in fact during the Battle of Sarikamis, on February 25, 1915 that killings began. They began in the Labour Battalions* that had been set up to accommodate Armenian soldiers who were in the Turkish military. They reassigned men from ages 15 to 60 from their military duties and at first were made to work as labourers. However, it was not long before many were killed. Ismail Enver himself claimed this course of action was decided "out of fear that they (the Armenians) would collaborate with the Russians*". Here a clear threat to Turkish security is demonstrated, but historian Vahakn Dadrian states that with the strength of arms was with the Turks as they had at least 20,000 more troops than the Russians*.
Another point of discussion is the fact that the Armenian soldiers in the Labour Battalions were unarmed. The historian Peter Balakian claims that this was an intentional move by the CUP to render them vulnerable. Indeed, the Memoirs of Naim Bey*, also support this theory goes on to state that this course of action was to make way for the Turkish execution squads who would go on to kill the workers. However, the memoirs have come under close scrutiny and historians such as Sinasi Orel* have claimed that they are in fact forgeries. These claims have made it difficult to treat the memoirs with reliance, and historians from both sides of the Armenian debate agree that ‘any use of them in a serious scholarly work unacceptable.’* However, the memoirs of Yasat Pakar, a Turkish Jew who was also sent to the Labour Battalions also confirm that the camps sole aim was to eradicate the non-Muslims of the empire. Again, we can draw parrallels with other cases of genocide where asocials* were isolated in camps and eventually killed such the Cambodian camp called the Comrade Duch that emprisoned anyone who was though to be a social enemy.
The killing would spread and intensify in the month of April when the infamous events of the Van province came to pass. The governor of the area Jevdet Bey is said to have made requests for 4000 Armenian soldiers it is in the opinion of the American ambassador, Henry Morgenthau at the time that he was ‘preparing to wipe out the whole population’ by leaving Van without any reliable defenders. However, according to author Sameul Weems* this course of action came during a time when the pressures of wartime were taking their toll upon the nation and that Bey was ensuring that Armenian soldiers did not rebel or collaborate with the Russians whom they bordered with. Yet, Weems book has been labelled psuedohistorical and anti-Armenian. Indeed, the chances that the Armenians were consideirng a rebellion could be seen as slim as the German Ambassador for Turkey, Hans , claimed that "that the Armenians have given up their ideas of a revolution since the introduction of the Constitution and that there is no organization for such a revolt". When the killings of Van came to pass around 55,000* citizens were killed. In his research Richard Hovannisian points out that only 1,500* Armenian soldiers fought.
The next phase of the killings came in French when Mehmet Talat Pasha appealed for the legalisation of the ‘Temporary Law of Deportation’, referred to in Turkish as the ‘Tehcir’ Law. He asked the Gand Vizier Said Hailm Pasha and Turkish cabinet for the right to deport Armenians in response to ‘the Armenian riots and massacres, which had arisen in a number of places in the country.’ It should be noted that even among the recognized scholars who reject the theory of genocide, such as Bernard Lewis and Guenter Lewy, no evidence has been found of a united Armenian paramilitary resistance that threatened the Republic of Turkey.
The implementation of the deportation was described by Theodore Roosevelt as "the greatest crime of the war." The deportees were marched into the Syrian Desert and were left with no means of survival. It is the act of deportation and its cruelty that has been the deciding point for a great number of historians. The historian Christopher J. Walker describes how many of the Armenians died from starvation. Eitan Belkind, a Jewish spy described how many were killed by ‘mass-burning, poisoning and mass drowning’
