In the February of 1934, Mussolini encouraged Dollfuss to set up a right wing regime taking the form of Italian fascism. This would be strongly anti-Nazi. Dollfuss attempted this and was then killed by Nazi part sympathisers in July 1934. Mussolini was appalled by this event and dispatched Italian troops to the Austrian border immediately. He hoped this would deter and prevent Germany from attempting an armed attack. The relationship between the two fascist regimes had started on unstable ground. Mussolini was growing less fond of Hitler as time progressed.
When Mussolini heard about the assassination of Dollfuss, he called Hitler a “horrible sexual degenerate” and the relationship between the two reached a low in March 1935 when Germany revealed the existence of an air force which was in breach of the Versailles treaty. The Nazi’s announced that the introduction of military conscription to which would create an army five times the size of that permitted by the peace treaty. Mussolini, angered at this, agreed to meet British and French delegates in the town of Stresa to organise a joint response to this act. The result of the meeting was a declaration that the three powers (to be called the “Stresa front”) would collaborate in order to prevent further breaches of treaties that might threaten peace.
Although Mussolini feared and had little trust for Nazi Germany, he began to realise that Britain and France had just as much, if not more reason to fear Hitler. The rearmed and hostile Nazi Germany bore a resemblance of the World War One. Mussolini, ever pragmatic realised this and was able to use it to his own advantage. The “Stresa Front” gave him added protection and it also indicated to him that the western powers were eager to avoid Germany allying with other states to seek revenge against the revision of the peace settlement (especially due to specific clauses such as the payment of reparations and limited military and arms).
Mussolini was convinced that a German-Italian alliance would horrify alarm Britain and France. To avoid this prospect, he hoped that they might show sympathy towards Italian ambitions and thus, be more tolerant towards Italian ‘adventures’ overseas. Mussolini realised that this was an ideal opportunity to attempt expansion of his colonial empire with minimal risk. His chosen target was Ethiopia. Britain and France, although not certain of Mussolini’s attack, stayed faithful to the “Stresa Front” and did not speak up against his invasion of Ethiopia. Both countries were too scared to risk having Italy as an enemy.
Mussolini suddenly began to look upon German fascism with more favour. He saw it as another vibrant fascist regime, one which also had grievances with Britain and France. Mussolini realised that Italian friendship, alongside the prospect of military alliance with Nazi Germany, would terrify both Britain and France. He was aware it might grant him the power to manipulate Britain and France, although he was unsure of how he would go about this exactly. He saw a vision of his dream becoming reality, a Mediterranean domination.
The reconciliation between Italy and Germany began in January 1936. Hitler agreed to hold back an attack and in return, Mussolini stated that Austria would be reduced to the status of a German satellite. Britain and France were constantly becoming aware of the growing relationship between Germany and Italy. This was apparent when Ciano, Italy’s foreign minister visited Berlin. This confirmed the existence of a Rome-Berlin axis and that Italy would concentrate on gaining power of the Mediterranean area whilst Germany would concentrate on Eastern Europe, the Baltic and thus ensuring they were not competing for the same countries. Hitler went so far as to suggest that preparations for a war were taking place.
Hitler’s talk of war did not scare Mussolini. The opposite was true; he was revelling in the idea of a “supreme test” both of himself and his nation. Italy was beginning to rearm and although he was not committing to going to war, he was prepared to risk conflict to pursue his foreign policy goals.
From 1936, the alliance with Germany was central to Mussolini’s foreign policy. German and Italian forces fought alongside each other in the Spanish civil war, supporting the attempts of Spanish conservatives and fascists to overthrow the elected republican government. Mussolini had been rather reluctant to involve himself in this and at first only lent transport to the rebels, but when the expected fascist victory was not taking place, he donated Italian troops to the cause to avoid damaging losses and prestige. Eventually around 40,000 troops were fighting in Spain and were withdrawn only when the collapse of the republican government in 1939.
The Rome-Berlin axis was going from strength to strength. Italy had joined Germany and Japan in the Anti-Comintern pact. This declared that the three countries would work together against Soviet Russia. However the relationship between the two states did not remain constant. In March 1938, Hitler carried out an attack without consulting Mussolini. Mussolini signed an agreement with Britain which guaranteed stability in the Mediterranean in retaliation, although Hitler and Mussolini were soon reconciled. His admiration for Germany increased and in September 1938, Hitler’s demands over Sudetenland seemed likely to lead to a large scale war. The British Prime-Minister, Neville Chamberlain, asked Mussolini to act as a mediator at a conference which had been called to suggest a diplomatic solution to the crisis. The Sudetenland was soon handed over to the third Reich.
Mussolini was seen as an “architect of the peace”, but this view had only confirmed the weakness of both Britain and France. In the November of 1938, the Italian parliament was recalled and Mussolini instructed it to demand the annexation of Nice, Corsica and Tunis from France. At last, Mussolini was beginning to clarify the vague expansionist ideas he had held for well over a decade.
By 1938, France was rearming and the French were outraged by the Italian demands. The Duce was aware that to realise his ambitions, war was inevitable. He believed (and hoped) that he could win a war against France. He believed Britain would keep out of any conflict and in February 1939, the duce presented a candid analysis of his foreign policy aims and made it clear he was prepared for confrontation, even with Britain if need be.
While preparations were going ahead for the invasion of Albania, Mussolini received a shock from his German friends. German troops had invaded Czechoslovakia in March 1939. He was furious and once again, contemplated changing sides. Once again, his thoughts of this lasted for a short period. Real fear of Germany was now added to the admiration of her success. Mussolini felt it was better to be friends with a dynamic regime rather than pick up the losses of Germany’s victory.
