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Given these complex economic, political and social problems the post-war period in each of the three countries could be expected to be one of revolution or instability. However, although the post-war period of transition to peace, international trade and internal stability was not a smooth journey for either Britain, Germany or France it did come about during the 1920s.Charles S. Maier’s study of this period Recasting Bourgeoisie Europe (1975) concentrates on the factors involved in Western Europe’s return to social stability, in his view it is “continuity and stability that need explanation”. (Unit 14 page 3). In Maier’s book he puts forward his theory that by the outbreak of World War I the conventional middle-class, or bourgeoisie, had replaced the aristocratic power base in Europe. He also studies the post-war return of Europe to 1914 levels of stability, achieved in a different climate and with a different geopolitical map. Maier’s work is held in high esteem by many scholars, including those involved with the textbooks of this course. His work on this period centres on France, Germany and Italy, chosen, as their resultant internal post-war stability was not based in previous ideology but in the resultant conditions of post-war Europe. Although this important piece of work does not use Britain is one of the countries of its main focus there are references and comparisons made with her and as a study of Western Europe including two of the three countries in discussion in this essay it is relevant here.
The net result of the common problems faced by Britain, France and Germany at the end of the war was a threat to their internal stability through revolution. In Book Two units 11 to 13 page 197 there is a list of seven specimen conditions,
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that may be considered as the general causes of revolution. These seven points are precede below:
- Conflict between classes
- Conspiracy and subversion
- A revolutionary ideology
- Economic disruption/upheaval
- A repressive regime
- Serious divisions and the crisis of confidence within the old regime rendering it powerless to suppress initial disorders
- The collapse of the regime in the face of serious external threat, e.g. war, creating a power struggle
Certainly differing combinations of one or more of these causes was present in all of the three countries considered in this essay, however by virtue of her defeat Germany faced the greatest threat. With her defeat came the abdication of the Kaiser forcing a provisional government to be formed. The position of this fledgling government was an insecure one as the country teetered on the edge of violent revolution, caused by military insurrection, industrial discontent and a rundown economy. The threat of revolution during the first few months of the new government was considered sufficient enough for the allies to consider invasion of Germany should the revolutionary forces look as though they may gain the upper hand. Some had seen the fall of the Kaiser as a point from which great social changes may come about, using the Bolshevik revolution in Russia as an example.
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German supporters of this ideal formed the German Communist Party (K. P. D.) and challenged the provisional government over its preoccupation in stabilising the country rather than the implementation of radical reforms. Instead of taking part in the elections of December 1918, the KPD was involved in an ‘uprising’ in Berlin before the elections could take place. Descriptions of this ‘uprising’ range from “a minor civil war” (Roberts), to “an ill-considered and chaotic demonstration” (Martin Kitchen Between The Wars, 1988, page 162). Whatever its extent, the ‘uprising’ was put down brutally by the newly formed Freikorps and the army.
Those to the left of the political spectrum were not the only one’s to challenge the provisional government, as those on the right of German politics posed a greater threat of revolution to the provisional government than their opposite numbers on the left. At the core of the right’s beliefs was a desire to return to the Conservative German nationalism last seen under Bismarck, they feared that the Communists would gain power and oppose the peace terms. They also hated the Treaty of Versailles, believing that Germany had not lost the war, but been stabbed in the back the politicians in power at the time. Their quest’s for power included the attempt to set up their own government in Berlin in 1920 and the attempted putsch in Bavaria in 1923.
It would seem that the odds were very much against Germany’s emergence from this era intact, but the provisional government managed to keep control and organised elections for a National Assembly in December 1918. A democratic parliamentary system was established, rather than one based on the Soviet model,
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and used in the new Weimer Republic (1918 to 1933). The reasons behind the survival of the provisional government in the face of such opposition are many, but the fragmentation of various opposition groups at both ends of the political spectrum and the high priority given to the enforcement of law and order may have been the two biggest factors in its survival. Other factors included the government’s differentiation between political unrest and industrial unrest; the first was treated in a brutal manner whilst the second was usually ceded to. The list of common problems facing the three countries cited earlier in this essay noted that the power of the trade unions had expanded greatly during the war. In Germany this power was recognised and respected by the government so that during the revolutionary period most demands made by the workers were conceded to, keeping both the wheels of industry turning and a large amount of the population relatively happy.
Physically Britain came out of the war in a far stronger position than France or Germany. Her land had not been fought on, she had not lost as many men and was politically relatively stable in victory, however, the problems involving industrial militancy gave cause for grave governmental concern. The agreements struck between government and industry during wartime were now re-examined and felt unfair now that the war had ceased. Within nationalised industries such as coal and the railways, workers were worried that re-privatisation would lose them the gains in conditions and pay that they had achieved during the war. Perhaps the most worrying of the industrial disputes for the government was the police strikes in
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London and Liverpool in August 1919, the strike was called over the legislation introduced to ban trade union membership for police officers. In all just over 5% of London policeman took part in the action with nearly half the Liverpool force. Here, as in Germany actions threatening law and order were dealt with firmly, the army was called in, in Liverpool the riots were put down and all police officers on strike were sacked. The influence of the revolution in Russia was felt among sections of industrial workers triggering a government report ‘Revolutionary Feeling During the Year 1919.’ In the report the main reasons for workers unrest were listed as, class hatred, bad housing and high prices although the high esteem within which the royal family were held were found to stifle ideas of revolution. The accumulative effect of this unrest and trade union power was that in 1919 thirty-five million working days were lost to strikes in Britain, in order to tackle these problems the British government developed a two-pronged strategy. On the industrial front the Ministry of Reconstruction, set up in 1917, worked on the principle of continued government involvement in industry, maintaining conditions for workers. Councils were introduced to facilitate collective bargaining between employers and the workforce and legislation was introduced to improve social standards, including the Housing Act of 1919 and two National Insurance acts in 1920 and 1921. The second prong of the strategy brought in legislation concerning social order. The Defence of the Realm Act brought in, in 1919 enabled a state of emergency to be declared due to a rail strike, whilst the Emergency Powers Act
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enabled the use of emergency regulations to maintain essential services if threatened by industrial action.
In France the post-war industrial unrest and the manner in which it was dealt with were very similar to the events in Britain, but both the actions and the government’s appeasement policies were of a milder flavour. Fewer trade union members resulted in a weaker and more disorganised force and therefore less days lost to strikes, (also due to the less industrialised economy), however they were just as determined as the British counterparts not to lose the advances made in pay and conditions during wartime. Although badly organised the French trade unions did succeed in obtaining an eight-hour working day in 1919, but they had to wait until 1930 for a National Insurance scheme. Major strike action generally failed without government intervention but when required the government’s reaction to disruptions in law in order were similar in strength to Germany and Britain’s, volunteer militias and strike breakers were government funded and a special police force was formed in order to deal with civil unrest and demonstrations. Again the treatment of protesters in the situations was harsh and brutal.
At the end of the war the main problem facing Britain, Germany and France was that of regaining internal stability, in the face of revolution. This was achieved by a conciliatory attitude towards social and industrial relations and the use of the ‘strong arm’ of the law to maintain civil order. Europe did not returning socially to its place in 1914 but began to evolve into what Maier called a ‘corporatist’ Europe, “consensus, therefore, was achieved not so much through parliaments, which
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depended from time to time on the approval of the electorate, but through continued bargaining between the state and major organised interests.” (Unit 14 page 6). This essay has spent more time considering the position of Germany than that of France or Britain, as in my view, the German provisional government’s achievement of, maintenance and reinforcement of internal stability of the country which socially suffered the most adverse effects of the war, meant that it coped the best in the post-war situation.
BIBLIOGROPHY
Open University, AA312 Total War and Social Change: Europe 1914-1955,
Primary Sources 2: Interwar And World War 2.
Secondary Sources
Book 2 The Impact Of World War 1.
Book 3 Between Two Wars.
Total War And Historical Change: Europe 1914-1955.
Europe 1880-1945 J.M. Roberts