This leads on to the next major problem which was the War. Although not necessarily at the worst point for Russia; they were containing the retreat, the supplies to front were steadily, if not rapidly, improving and the communications network was recovering from its atrocious beginnings to the War. However the War was still going badly for Russia, and dominated politics of the day. It was not as simple as to sue for peace; Russia would have lost a huge amount of land, industry and people in the resulting settlements (which they did under Bolshevik agreements). Furthermore Kerensky was under a lot of pressure from foreign allies to stay in the war, and had the incentive of reparation payments when finally the allies were victorious.
Further problems occurred in the fact that the Government was consistently undermined by the Soviets. The socialists, although obviously restrained by Marxist doctrine, were limiting Kerensky’s powers, allowing only law/decisions that would not be to the detriment of socialist revolutionaries and would not contradict the Marxist doctrine. Thus the self-liberating popular movement continued. Strikes and demonstrations continued to occur, and without any of the Tsarist bureaucracy such as the police force to control the demonstrations. The most radical of the movements was naturally in St. Petersburg, with the rest of the major cities following closely. The strikes gave rise to higher wages and in some instances when the factory owners refused to talk and shut down the businesses, the workers stayed inside continuing to work.
Thus Kerensky inherited a job where he had limited, if any control over food supplies, transport, army organisation and law and order. The job of balancing the desire by the radicals for sweeping reforms, and also placating the more conservative of the Provisional Government members was the daunting task facing Kerensky. It could be suggested that these under-lying, fundamental problems made it inevitable that Kerensky would lose his power, and that revolution would occur. However there was one major factor that crippled the already ‘derelict state’, making the revolution seemingly inevitable.
This was the so called ‘Kornilov affair’, once General Kornilov had begun to march his division towards St. Petersburg, Kerensky was left with out ‘ a leg to stand on’ , and his only viable alternative to stop a military coup was to turn to the Bolsheviks for there support. In doing so he destroyed the only pillar supporting the derelict Provisional Government, the army. By choosing the Bolsheviks over the national force he almost gave the Bolsheviks carte-blanche to come to power whenever they wished, and although no conflict actually took place it certainly enhanced the cause of Bolsheviks, and put them in prime position to take control over the country.
This is obviously a simplification of the facts, many other factors were involved in the downfall of the Provisional Government (such as the Summer Offensive), but to answer my first question, was the Revolution inevitable? This would suggest that it the downfall of the Provisional Government, unless Kerensky had acted remarkably astutely, and had extraordinary luck, was inevitable. What is does not suggest is that the acquisition of power by the Bolsheviks was inevitable, they were certainly were in the ‘running’ to take power, and the Kornilov affair put them into a good position. Yet there was not the overwhelming support from the people that has been attributed to them since by communist historians. Rather they were the only viable alternative willing to take on the task of government at this particular time.
The next section of this essay invites a comparison between the two protagonists, Lenin and Kerensky. History will always view the former as the hero, as history is invariably written by (or for) the victors. However in their style of politics, if not there beliefs, they were both revolutionary. It is ironic, and one of the many anomalies that this situation presents us with that they both went to the same high school (were Kerensky’s Dad was headmaster). Both were highly ambitious, and devoted to their cause. Kerensky was a very young premier, and it was a huge responsibility for someone so young to take on a situation this large, yet it showed his ambitiousness and his enthusiasm. Lenin was renowned for his inexhaustible determination and devotion to the cause of Social revolution. There use of propaganda, and use of the media were well advanced of their rivals and both at the for-front of modern politics as we know it. Each knew the importance of appearance and propaganda. Lenin could be credited for the first use of the ‘sound bite’. His slogans “Peace, Land and Bread and “All Power to the Soviets” were instantly recognisable and were on the tongues and billboards of most of the revolutionaries. Kerensky on the other hand was very conscious of projecting his image around Russia, billboards with his picture were erected throughout Russia, and he soon set about, through propaganda, convincing the Russian public of the Provisional Government’s and also his ability to run the country affectively. Finally both produced copious amounts of literature, both in the forms of pamphlets and in Newspapers, writing articulately about the future of Russia as they saw it.
It seems as if Kerensky naturally was the better orator, Figes says “There was a cult of Kerensky indeed…young girls fell in love with him…. His rhetoric was sickly sweet, which in the euphoria in the spring 1917, was just what was needed”.
Lenin seems to have been less confident in public speaking initially, however as with all his weaknesses Lenin worked on his speaking ability, eventually becoming renowned as one of the twentieth centuries greatest orators.
The major differences therefore between the two were policies, not their ability as politicians. Kerensky likened himself to Napoleon, the Russian saviour. He saw himself as a man destined to lead Russia out of chaos to freedom. Whereas Lenin with the workers cap and the speeches on boxes projected an air of working class, even though he was born into (lesser) nobility.
Interestingly, if looking broadly at the time between Kerensky’s appointment and the October revolution, both characters made one major mistake. The difference between them is that whereas Lenin successfully recovers from his, Kerensky cannot. Lenin major mistakes was the support of the July days, it was too early for a Bolshevik uprising, yet his enthusiasm and confidence led to a premature attempted revolution. This could have, if Kerensky had more power, been fatal for the Bolsheviks and Lenin. Kerensky’s major mistake (though it is debatable whether it affected the outcome in the long run) was to launch a summer offensive, the Galician offensive, which badly backfired and lead to the Kornilov affair.
In conclusion therefore, on first viewing it would seem that the Bolshevik revolution led by Lenin was inevitable, yet I believe this is a misconception. The Provisional Government was in all essence doomed, yet it was not inevitable that the Bolsheviks would come to power, rather it was the drive and genius (as well as luck) of Lenin that pushed his peers in the Bolshevik party to rebel successfully. Historians will always debate the exact significance of Lenin in the Russian revolution, whether he was the catalyst for revolution or simply took advantage of the situation. For what it is worth I believe that Lenin saw his chance for power, for radical change, and his great conquest was to successful take his chance and secure it for the future, leading Russia from the turmoil it had been in since the beginning of the turn of the century to stability. It was something Kerensky failed to do, and is why Lenin was in power in 1917, and not Kerensky.
