The objective of this German offensive was to capture the French capital, Paris, within six weeks. Then Germany would turn against Russia. The plan was to advance troops in a massive ‘hammer-swing’ through neutral Belgium (this would require an exceptionally strong right wing, to sweep around). There would also be a small number of troops used as a hinge in case of counter-attacks. The integral part of this plan was to be sure the ‘hammer-swing’ would move west of Paris and circle the city from the south. When Paris was trapped, the capital would fall and its rich mining and industrial areas would be under German control. France would be out of the war. During these plans Britain was always a power never considered to participate. Speed (esp. through Belgium), surprise (using railways) and strength (using numbers and ‘hammer-swing’) were elements essential to the success of the plan.
The plan failed due to a number of related reasons, with the major one being the modifications made to the original plan, flaws in its design (strategy) and implementation of the plan and the loss of momentum. General von Moltke made some critical revisions to the original plan, which reduced its strength and speed and altered the balance of the attack (Germans fought an unplanned offensive attack in Liege, with a large number of soldier, which caused a bottleneck and slowed the advance). Many errors such as these showed Moltke’s lack of faith in the Schlieffen Plan. The hammer was seriously weakened as troops were removed to act as a hinge or sent to eastern front (to fight surprising rapid Russian advances). This slowed down thrust through Belgium. The success of the plan required rapid movement through Belgium. This did not occur due to the unexpected strength of the Belgium and British Expeditionary Forces (BEF) resistance and the result of three battles en route through Belgium (Mons, Le Cateau and Guise). As modifications were made, it was obvious that the plan was not unfolding as expected. The abandonment of the timetable upon which the plan was dependent was a critical factor. The reliance of the movement of soldiers by foot rather than with the speed of railways was a crucial mistake. The exhausted and injured soldiers welcomed the opportunity to ‘dig in’ which further reinforced the prospect of stalemate. Momentum was also lost as ammunition reserves were dropped, guns showed wear, men were tired, casualties not replaced and the destruction of railways and bridges by the British (essential to quick movement). The Battle of Marne saw more critical changes being made to the plan by Moltke. Not only did this battle halt the German advance, it also saved Paris from attack. Moltke made the fatal mistake of ordering his troops to swing east of Paris, which proved not only devastating but also was not effective to the plan. This resulted in confusion and creation of gaps in the German army where the BEF could attack. The German troops retreated back to the River Aisne, and this effectively ended the Schlieffen Plan.
For Germany the hope for quick victory was over and the prospect of a ‘two-front’ war was still lingering. The allies now took the offensive role, and attacked the German’s up the river Aisne. With no apparent gains appearing, both sides began to ‘dig in’ and establish their trenches on 14th September. The Battle of River Aisne marked the beginning of stabilised trench warfare. Commanders on both sides had underestimated the ability of machine guns and defensive artillery, which caused the abandonment of movement tactics and the implementation of stalemate during trench warfare.
General von Falkenhayn replaced General Von Moltke. The French general, Joffre and von Falkenhayn attempted to outflank each other many times. Each force was now involved in a ‘race to the sea’ from 17th November, continuing to outflank each other and ultimately gain control of the channel ports. These actions forced both sides to ‘dig in’ further and consolidate their position. The battleline (trench line) stretched from the channel to Switzerland (750km). These trenches also helped soldiers during the bitter winter.
The Schlieffen plan and the ‘war of movement’ was over. Stalemate was established and would not be broken until 1918. The consolidated trench system secured and gave confidence to both armies defensively. Both had strong backing and resting places (esp. German elaborate trenches) and the improvements of new weapons (machine guns), frontal attacks were not often ordered due to strong defence. Neither side was able to break through the defences of the other. A stalemate developed.
The Schlieffen plan’s aim of rapid defeat of France proved to be unsuccessful and failures due to reasons such as modification to planned attacks, unexpected enemies and lose of momentum. It also proved to be one of the most influential factors determining not only the next four years of war and end to the ‘war of movement’ (until 1918) but also the eventual outcome of the war. The ‘war of movement’ ended when Germany was defeated in the Battle of Marne and pushed back to the River Aisne. The trench system was established, symbolising the beginning of trench warfare, and the war of attrition. A stalemate developed between Germany and the allies and lasted until 1918.