‘Plan Green’ was held up as an example of the planned aggression by the Nazis at the Nuremburg War Crimes Trial along with the ‘Hossbach Memorandum’, minutes of a meeting conducted by Hitler in which he set out his aims for Foreign Policy and the expansion of Germany over the coming years. The memorandum contained numerous references to the “need for expansion” and shows that Hitler could foresee this happening before 1943. The document appears to uncompromisingly suggest that Hitler’s plans for expansion lie in the East, notably Russia and Czechoslovakia. Whilst specific plans are not evident from the memorandum, Hitler’s justifications for the need for rapid expansion (and hence, for the change in direction of Foreign Policy) feature prominently.
Hitler’s desire for Lebensraum was always based on a basic need for enough food to feed the German people but in the Hossbach memorandum he made reference to the problems that Germany would face unless it acquired Lebensraum soon. Hitler argued that Germany’s Foreign Currency reserve was running low, leaving Germany unable to trade, and no other country wanted Deutsch Marks anyway as Germany wasn’t producing anything other than armaments. This meant that the food supply would eventually stop coming into Germany and Hitler’s ‘Master Race’ would die of starvation. Hitler also noted that the Depression of the early 1930s had caused countries to erect barriers to trade, which made trading outside of their ‘empire’ (e.g. Britain and its colonies) highly expensive. This, he claimed, highlighted the German need for an empire, and would account for a more expansionist Foreign Policy. This idea was used when the Anschluss with Austria was completed. Germany gained 100,000 men for its Army as well as access to Austria’s plentiful Foreign Currency reserves and industrial output, such as steel.
The Anschluss was also important for the implementation of a new, expansionist Foreign Policy not because it was thought of as Lebensraum itself, but because it was strategically important for both the attack of Czechoslovakia and defence against Britain and France. Hitler is quoted as saying, in the Hossbach Memorandum, that “our first objective…must be to overthrow Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove the threat from our flank of any possible operation in the West”. In other words he was wary of the fact that as France was an ally of Czechoslovakia, France may be able to resist a German invasion of Russia or the Balkan states. The Czech border with Germany was heavily defended but the Czech border with Austria was hardly defended at all, and it would therefore be much easier for the German Army to attack Czechoslovakia from there. Anschluss with Austria was also crucial to any plan of defence against a British or French attack as it formed an unbroken front from Germany, through Austria, to Italy.
In the Hossbach Memorandum, Hitler also made reference to the fact that by 1943, Germany’s “relative strength would decrease in relation to the rearmament which would then have been carried out by the rest of the world” and Germany’s arms production would have to decrease in response to rising demand for consumer goods. Therefore Hitler concluded that a more aggressive Foreign Policy was necessary if Germany was ever to obtain Lebensraum, as the conditions had fallen in Germany’s favour and it was important to take advantage of this.
By 1937 the International situation was indeed falling more in Germany’s favour. The League of Nations was deemed defunct, highlighted by its failure to prevent the German army marching into the Rhineland in March 1936. As well as this Germany was slowly coming out of isolation and the intervention in the Spanish Civil War (July 1936) led to the declaration of the Rome-Berlin axis with Italy and the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact with Italy and Japan in November 1936. From 1936 Hitler formed a closer working relationship with Mussolini, which Hitler saw as a potential alliance. Not knowing that Italy’s army, weapons and defence were minimal and useless, Hitler believed that Germany would soon (before 1943) be able to begin acquiring Lebensraum. Also falling in Germany’s favour was the election of Chamberlain as British Prime Minister who, as an advocate of Appeasement policies, would leave Hitler some leeway and concessions.
Hitler also believed that the Locarno system in the West had collapsed with new treaties being signed (for example the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of June 1935) and Britain failing to promise to come to the aid of France’s allies (i.e. Czechoslovakia). Hitler saw relations between Britain and France faltering and this supposed weakness reinforced his case for a more aggressive Foreign Policy.
Finally, the ideas put forward in the Hossbach Memorandum of a more aggressive approach to International relations was aided by a change of Foreign Minister. Von Neurath was Foreign Minister from 1933 until 1937 and represented a more Traditional view, that of revisionism. He was present at the meeting in 1937 from which the Hossbach Memorandum was written and subsequently expressed his dislike of the Fuhrer’s proposals, a move which saw him removed from office within three months along with many other senior Nazi members. He was replaced by Ribbentrop, a more compliant, if hopeless, Foreign Minister. This final move by Hitler allowed him to embark on a rapidly changing Foreign Policy with little interference from senior Party members, with the eventual goal being the acquisition of Lebensraum.
In conclusion, there were two main types of reason as to why German Foreign Policy changed direction in 1937. The first of these is the improving International situation which Germany found itself facing and the way in which Hitler saw this progressing. For example, the failure of the League of Nations, the prospect of facing a policy of appeasement and increased alliances with Italy and Japan, all meant that German expansion would not face as strong an opposition as in previous years.
The second type of reason relates to Internal pressures, within Germany. Hitler foresaw the problems associated with maintaining a military-based economy and isolation, i.e. that the German people would soon face severe food shortages and were becoming increasingly discontent with the lack of consumer goods available. His solution to these problems was to aim for “expansion” (war with Russia) within the next few years, while Germany still had the support of an army of workers and an arms advantage.