This policy was first used in Greece in 1947. After the monarchy had gained control against the communists there with the help of the British, Russia tried to take control by force, and the British withdrew, knowing that they could not afford such a war. At this time, Truman stepped in and, paid for by the Americans, some British troops stayed in Greece to prop up the monarchy. By this action, a new era in American foreign policy had begun, and it was made clear to the Soviets that, to an extent, America was willing to use military force against them.
The Korean War was to confirm to the U.S. that the communist powers were not to be underestimated. In 1949, China had become had become communist, and following this, the U.S.S.R was suspected by the U.S. to be conspiring with the other communist countries to spread communism in countries like Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines and Korea. In 1950, Russia invaded South Korea, and the U.S. felt that it had to take action. With the help of the U.N., the U.S. pushed back them back, but the U.S. did not want to stop, and on its own, it attempted to take the rest of Korea. Ignoring threats from China of them joining the war, the U.S. pressed forward, but when they came face-to-face with the Chinese, they were surprisingly pushed back into South Korea. Although fighting eventually reached a stale mate near to the initial borders, America had faced surprising strength from the communists, and knew from this point that the U.S. would have to go further next time, if they wanted to effectively contain communism.
The fear was that if one or two of the Southeast Asian countries were to fall to communism, others would fall as well. This was explained by Vice-president Nixon in a speech on the 23rd December 1953, and was known as the ‘domino theory.’ It stated that, ‘…If Indochina falls, Thailand is put in an almost impossible position. The same is true of Malaya with its rubber and tin. The same is true of Indonesia. If this whole part of Southeast Asia goes under communist domination or communist influence, Japan, who trades and must trade with this area in order to exist, must inevitable be orientated towards the communist regime. That indicates to you and to all of us why it is vitally important that Indochina not go behind the Iron Curtain.’ J.F. Dulles, the U.N. secretary of state and an overt anticommunist took action by setting up a network of anticommunist alliances around the world. In 1954, the Southeast Asian Treat Organisation (SEATO), and in 1955, the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) were formed, so that communism could possibly be contained in these areas.
In Vietnam the target of containment was Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh front he had created in 1941. Ho and his chief lieutenants were communists with long-standing connections to the Soviet Union. Truman and other American leaders, having no sympathy for French colonialism, favoured Vietnamese independence. But expanding communist control of Eastern Europe and the triumph of the communists in China's civil made France's war against Ho seem an anticommunist rather than a colonialist effort, so the United States decided to support the French position.
The defeat of the French in the war was a problem for the Americans. By 1953, 74,000 French soldiers had been killed, with nearly three times as many still fighting in Vietnam. This defeat also affected the U.S. who had been paying for 80% of the French costs, and the side it had so eagerly backed had lost, causing another blow for the ‘containment’ policy. The day after the defeat, an international conference took place in Geneva, to produce a settlement for the Indo-Chinese conflict, but most of the points agreed were only confirmed verbally. It was clear that the U.S. were not happy to leave the situation so unstable, as a communist take-over could occur at any moment. In the Geneva Conference, the U.S. declaration did include information about future elections. ‘…We shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the U.N., to ensure that they are conducted fairly.’ The significance of such a declaration was in the fact that North Vietnam was communist, and achieving fair and free elections over the whole of Vietnam would be impossible. Either way, the most support would go towards the communist regime, due to the legacy of colonial rule, and their chance for revolution, given to them by their new inspirational leader, Ho Chi Minh. The U.S. had to seem like liberators from an evil communist regime, so U.S. involvement was slowly becoming imminent.
In June 1954, the Emperor Bao Dai, a man associated with the hated French, chose Ngo Dinh Diem to be his Prime Minister and head of state. Diem, a strict catholic and fervent nationalist, was supported by the Americans when he refused to hold elections. It was to be Diem, and his lack of support that would lead to involvement increasing further for the U.S. The nepotistic way in which he chose his family members to occupy positions of power was greatly resented by the public, as was choice of government members being catholic-orientated. Dealing with land reform was seen as being a good way to gain more public support, so as to make the people see Diem as being fair. However, he slowed the process of redistribution of land, so that he could keep the support of the larger landowners, so the mass of the population did not receive any benefit from Diem’s reforms.
Diem himself, being a catholic, was very unsympathetic to the diversity of religions in Vietnam, and saw them as obstacles to his creating a unified government. Through his corrupt methods of bribery and force through the army, he attempted to deal with religious sects in Vietnam, but many continued to fight against him in smaller numbers, or join the communists. It was clear the Diem’s methods were not benefiting South Vietnam at all. Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem's brother, led a brutal suppression of the Buddhist resistance.
Predictably, his anticommunist campaigns were unpopular as well. In the summer of 1955, Diem launched what was known as the ‘Denunciation of the Communists’ campaign. 8000-10000 members of the Vietcong still remained in South Vietnam, so those who had opposed the French, or those who had been in any way disloyal to the government were suspected of being communists. Thousands of these suspects were killed, and a number around 50,000 were sent to labour camps. This campaign caused widespread terror in Vietnam, and many more hated Diem because of it.
In 1957, enough anger against the Diem regime had built up in South Vietnam for the South Vietnamese communists to come out of hiding, and begin a campaign of counter terror against Diem. By the next year, this had expanded into a full-scale guerrilla war, and the National Liberation Front was formed.
Despite over $1 billion of U.S. aid between 1955 and 1961, the South Vietnamese economy languished and internal security deteriorated. President John F. Kennedy concurred with his predecessor's domino theory and also believed that the credibility of U.S. anticommunist commitments around the world was jeopardised in 1961. Consequently, by 1963 he had tripled American aid to South Vietnam and expanded the number of military advisers there from less than 700 to more than 16,000. But the Diem government still failed to show economic or political progress. Total aid given to Diem (both military and economic) increased from $241.9million in 1958, to $376million in 1963 and it became clear that Diem could not survive without the aid.
The situation at home for the U.S. also played a part in increasing involvement of the U.S. in the Vietnam War. Many different presidents had contributed to the state of the Vietnamese affairs, and in 1960, John F. Kennedy, the youngest president of the 20th century, was elected. He, like his predecessors, followed the anticommunist trend. As soon as he come to power, in his inaugural address, he confirms his belief in the Truman Doctrine. ‘Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support and friend, oppose any foe, to ensure the survival and success of liberty.’ Kennedy was to suffer a great deal of pressure during his presidency, both at home, and in foreign policy.
In April 1961, Kennedy tried to accelerate his containment policy with reference to Cuba. After changing his promise to the anti-Castro exiles to send troops to help them, he sent arms, equipment and transport for these exiles to attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro. The invasion was a complete failure, with all of the 1400 exiles being killed or captured, showing Kennedy as weak and inexperienced.
In June 1961, John F Kennedy met Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union. Kennedy had authorised the invasion of Cuba and was encouraging the rearming and modernising of the West German army. The Germans were long-time Russian enemies and feared in Moscow more than the Americans were. The meeting came to nothing and on August 13th 1961, the East Germans closed the Berlin checkpoint. On August 17th, the best the Americans, the British and the French could do was send protest notes to Moscow calling for an end to restrictions in Berlin. The Russian response was simple: they started to build the Berlin Wall. After the wall had been built, Kennedy, left helpless, spoke after the building of the wall with the following statement: ‘There are some who say, in Europe and elsewhere, we can work with the Communists. Let them come to Berlin.’ Here, Kennedy was shown as weak in dealing with foreign policy.
After the embarrassment of the Berlin Wall, Kennedy decided that Vietnam would be a good place for his to demonstrate to the people at home, and to the world, the power of the Americans. Promising to help Diem, he increased the number of military advisors there from 700 to 16,000. This step was very significant for the Americans, as it showed a major step forward in the involvement of military personnel in the war in Vietnam. Many others were helping the government forces by showing them how to improve the lifestyles of the peasantry. The idea of this was to get the support of the peasantry by winning their ‘hearts and minds,’ but despite this, the Vietcong continued to grow in numbers, as I shall explore later. It was the policy of Diem known as the ‘strategic hamlets’ policy that saw Kennedy clearly displeased with Diem. Diem’s policy consisted of the removal of villages to be fortified against the Vietcong. Though seemingly a good idea, Diem’s methods of doing this were cruel and distressing to the peasantry, as it took them away from their land, which was a sign of their identity and ancestry. The whole policy was hugely unpopular, and led to many more people joining the Vietcong.
According to the U.S. government, this was one of Diem and his family’s many mistakes. In September 1963, they imposed a freeze on loans to Diem, and threatened to withdraw military aid. Encouraged by the Americans, a plot to assassinate Diem was successfully deployed on the 1st November 1963, where he, and his brother Ngu, were killed. Whether these developments would have led Kennedy to redirect or decrease U.S. involvement in Vietnam is unknown, since Kennedy himself was assassinated three weeks later. Kennedy’s vice-president, Lyndon Baines Johnson, who now became the president, was a man with a vision of a ‘great society’ in America, but also had a commitment to the situation Vietnam as well. Johnson himself was in a very difficult situation, as to whether escalation of U.S. involvement was a good idea. If Johnson did nothing about the problem, he would be seen to fail with his foreign policy, but if he got too involved, he would risk being blamed if the input of troops failed.
By this time, the growth of the Vietcong had been immense, with an increase from 1957, with 2000 fighters, to 23,000 in 1963, when he was assassinated, partially due to the extreme failure of the ‘strategic hamlets’ programme.
Diem's death left a leadership vacuum in South Vietnam, and the survival of the Saigon regime was in jeopardy. Between November 1963 and April 1965, 9 different governments ruled South Vietnam, with not one of them being able to help the peasantry any more than Diem did. This time became known as ‘the revolving door republic.’ Such political chaos made Johnson’s advisors want to escalate U.S. involvement, and they drew up plans to send in U.S. troops of up to 200,000 men. However, Johnson shared with Kennedy the reluctance to get too involved in the war, and held off these plans for a while.
It was to be the ‘Gulf of Tonkin’ incident that would spark off the major increase in U.S. involvement in the war. On the 2nd August 1964, the North Vietnamese attacked a U.S. intelligence vessel in the Tonkin Gulf with torpedoes. Two days later, the same thing occurred for a second time, and on appeal to Congress, Johnson took advantage of the situation, and was granted permission to take any necessary military measures. At this point, Johnson ordered U.S. planes to bomb patrol boat bases and supply depots in North Vietnam, in the first U.S. bombing raid of the war.
In December 1964, he then moved on to ‘surgically’ bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail in North Vietnam, as well as many other specially selected targets. However, at this point, he did not let his planes bomb inner North Vietnam until he could find a way to justify his attacks to the U.S. public. On the 6th February 1965, the Vietcong attacked the U.S. base at Pleiku, and Johnson used the deaths and casualties at this event to justify his bombing of North Vietnam. He gave the following reasons for his bombing of North Vietnam: ‘To increase confidence of the brave people of South Vietnam, to convince the leaders of North Vietnam that we will not be defeated, and to reduce the flow of men and supplies from the North.’ On the 11th February, the U.S. and A.R.V.N. warplanes began a joint offensive on North Vietnam, in what was called ‘Operation Rolling Thunder.’ Hanoi and Haiphong, two of North Vietnam’s largest cities were not bombed, so as to preserve the somewhat stable relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
U.S involvement in the war was due to many different factors all mounting up to lead Johnson to take major steps towards involvement in the war. However, I feel that the anticommunist beliefs of the U.S., in combination with the Truman Doctrine, played the most important part in convincing the U.S. that happenings in Southeast Asia were their business. Rooting back to the Cold War, the rivalry between the superpowers, the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R made the Soviet spread of communism even more significant. The Truman Doctrine provided a foundation for the policies of future presidents, and belief in the doctrine was a way of gaining the support of the public at home. The fall of the French was also important, as the defeat led to the U.S. having to get more directly involved with the governmental affairs of South Vietnam, and in particular, instructing Diem to carry out their will. The failure and downfall of Ngo Dinh Diem, though in my opinion less significant, also played a part in the increase in U.S. involvement in the war, as his character, policies and beliefs lost a great deal of support from the Vietnamese public. The disposal of Diem created further problems, with the lack of stable government. The assassination of Kennedy left it upon Johnson to take action, and that he did, with the approval of the government after the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was passed. The U.S. would have to get more involved to battle against this, and win ‘the hearts and minds of the people.’ Kennedy’s personal domestic policy of impressing the world with his foreign policy techniques was less influential on the general increment in U.S. involvement in the war, as it only lasted 2 years, and all that happened in this period was an increase of military advisors. However, this did lead the way for Johnson to increase involvement with the more extreme measures of ‘Operation Rolling Thunder’ and the sending in of troops.
