In addition to the Depression- an external factor, there were many ‘internal’ weaknesses within the League’s actual organization. These can be traced back to 1919, when it was first formed. For example, decisions made by the Assembly had to be unanimous; this was problematic, mainly because resolutions took longer to reach; this was also mirrored by the fact that it met only once a year. There were also problems with the League’s membership; Germany did not join until 1926, and the USSR until 1934, along with the losers of the First World War, who were never invited to join in the first place, therefore increasing the hate harbored within them. However, the most significant blow to the League was the USA’s refusal to register. The country’s isolationist policy would later have a staggering effect on the organization’s ability to enforce decisions.
Without the USA, economic sanctions were ineffective. For example, in the Abyssinian crisis of 1935, the League cut off several supplies to Italy, including rubber, tin and metals. However, oil was not sanctioned, as Britain and France feared that the USA would not support these. In addition, arms and artillery were still exported to Italy from the USA, and thus the League’s bans had almost no effect. The idea of sanctions was initially introduced as the main method of stop a country’s aggression, and yet, following the Abyssinian crisis, it was discredited all together.
Another reason for the unsuccessfulness of sanctions and the downfall of the League was the fact that it had no army of its own. It had previously been decided that upon the failure of the former, military force would be used in an attempt to hinder aggressiveness. However, Britain and France-largely due to self-interest, which shall later be discussed-were not willing to provide armed forces, and thus there was no means by which verdicts or decisions could be enforced. League lacked muscle, and was not taken seriously. It can therefore be concluded that the policy of collective security in Europe could never be successful, as it shirked military action.
In 1932, the World Disarmament Conference was held in an attempt make countries agree to limit their army, air force and naval weapons. It was attended by sixty-one nations, and although at first it appeared promising, it soon collapsed hopelessly, resulting in the further augmentation of the irrelevance of the League. Germany proposed, perhaps rightly, either that all countries disarm down to its level, or that she rearmed up to the level of the major powers such as Britain and France. The first choice was not an option, and the second was heard with reluctance. When Hitler came to power in 1933, Germany began secretly rearming anyway, and German delegates, following Japan’s example, withdrew from the conference.
The World Disarmament Conference failed for several reasons, namely the fact that the League was bound to the Treaty of Versailles implemented years ago, and that Britain and France now had each had their own ideas and opinions about issues such as Germany. Britain was sympathetic towards the country, feeling that the terms of the Treaty were unnecessarily harsh, and that she should be given some free license. This view was shared by several people, for now, over ten years after the war, hate and blame towards the Germans was diminishing in the hearts of Britons. In fact, Britain signed an agreement in 1935 with Germany allowing it to build up its navy within a certain limit; this was a blatant defiance of the an act prohibited and angered France, who felt she would become threatened by this. The question of whether or whether not to follow the Versailles Treaty arose several controversies, and this was exactly that the League, given its present state, did not need.
Throughout the 1930s, self-interest of Britain and France prevented it from succeeding in mastering its task; however, it was in 1935 that this repeated offence resulted in its greatest failure. The Abyssinian Crisis marked the official death of the League in many ways. Whilst Mussolini marched troops into Abyssinia, the two main powers acted as bystanders. Although they imposed sanctions, they were futile, and oil was not sanctioned. The Suez Canal ran from Italy to Africa; it is a high probability that had France and Britain closed this to Italian ships, the invasion could have been thwarted. Unfortunately, the canal was left open; both countries deemed that a closure of it would result in war with Italy. In addition, France was reluctant to oppose Mussolini or provoke a dispute, for she wanted Italy to remain an ally against Germany, as well as maintaining the Stresa Front. These actions once again undermined the League.
The final blow was the leaking to the press of the Hoare-Laval Pact. Secret diplomacy was something the League had set out to eradicate; instead, people found its main members doing exactly that. This pact, signed furtively, offered Italy the bulk of Abyssinia. It caused a public outcry; both Hoare and Laval were discharged. It proved fatal to the League, for now, sanctions lost all momentum, delayed further and further until they were abandoned. When Mussolini formally annexed Abyssinia, the organization could do nothing but watch helplessly.
After Abyssinia, the League was fruitless. It failed to prevent Hitler’s remilitarizing of the Rhineland, his Anschluss with Austria, his annexation of Czechoslovakia, and finally, the break out of World War Two. In conclusion, it can be summarized that the League failed due to internal weaknesses such as lack of troops, unsuccessfulness of sanctions and the absence of the USA, as well as self-interest of its members, a general loss of the ‘will to make it work’ that was so abundant in the 1920s, and ofcourse, the Depression. As remarked by British Statesman Sir Austen Chamberlain, by the end of the 1930s, the League of Nations was “… a dead thing…”