On the Soviet side of the frontier the scene was one of greatest confusion. The Red Army divisions on the frontier were away from any defensive positions and had been engaged in normal peace time routine duties; some commanders were absent, and many divisional artillery regiments and signal battalions had been sent away to firing camps or arms centres to carry out specialized arms training. The USSR still had not taken note of the revolutionary tactics of Blitzkrieg and thus were still on the defensive and without imagination when it came to strategy – indeed, this had cost the Soviet Union early on in the war. German aircraft had almost undisputed air superiority and made the Red Army road movement almost impossible, while the control and communication system in the forward areas was uncoordinated and insignificant and as mentioned earlier, the tactics of Blitzkrieg were initially successful, with the idea of encircling and capturing key areas. The Luftwaffe quickly gained air superiority, especially after they eliminated various Soviet airfields whilst planes were still on the ground. The whole organisation of the German army was of 1st class standard, with the added advantage of radio communications compared to the USSR’s obsolete radio communications centres. Added to the disorganisation of the Red Army was that many fortifications on the Russian border was not even finished; there were 2,300 fortifications, but only less than 1000 were manned or equipped. This allowed German troops to bypass many key areas of Russia where they could easily have been challenged if the Red Army was fully mobilised.
Not only this, but the attack came as a complete surprise to the leader of the Soviet Union – Joseph Stalin. Despite repeated intelligence warnings, which included the precise day and hour of Germany’s incipient assault, Stalin remained convinced that Hitler would not risk an eastern war as long as the British Empire remained undefeated. It has been argued that Stalin in fact planned a pre-emptive attack on Germany for the early summer of 1941, and was then thrown off balance by the German invasion. The government at that time, although theoretically collective in form, was entirely subordinate to the will of the dictator. Stalin, cautious and doubtful, continued to appraise the situation coolly and logically. Stalin himself went into hiding – evidently he was not at all expecting an offensive from his so called ‘ally’. As Beira (a close aid to Stalin) said: “My people and I, Joseph Stalin, firmly remember your wise prediction: Hitler will not attack in 1941!” The mistake he made was to put himself mentally into Hitler’s place and view the European and world situation through his own communist eyes, rather than to study the German dictator’s mentality and appreciate what he, Hitler, was likely to do in a given set of circumstances. Stalin could not bring himself to believe that the Germans would defy all reason and enter into a war on two fronts. This led to a massive delay in mobilisation of the Red Army, with many Russian commanders afraid to speak out to the USSR leader and inevitably, it allowed Germany, combined with their Blitzkrieg tactics, to get the upper hand in Operation Barbarossa. To the contrary, however, we must remember that Stalin was quick to learn that it would be best to give the job of commander-in-chief to the more highly trained person in military strategy, hence the appointment of Zhukov in the later years of the war; even Hitler was too stubborn and not listen to his own commanders. Indeed, it was Germany’s tactic to catch their opponents by surprise by not declaring war on a country but rather going in and invading without warning – speed was of the essence and due to the reasonable weather conditions, Germany managed to achieve swift victories initially. The Germans achieved further spectacular success in another battle of encirclement at Vyazma-Bryansk near Moscow, in which three Soviet armies, totalling 665,000 men were captured. These immense battles of encirclement, so characteristic of 1941, were partly the result of the speed of the German advance; but they were also due to Stalin’s refusal to allow any retreat and the inferior quality of the Russian generals. However, we must not forget that every time the USSR was defeated in a battle, they were continuingly learning and taking Blitzkrieg ideas which could explain the Soviet successes later on in the war.
Even though the Soviet Union had superior numbers of men, the quality of the German soldiers helped greatly at the initial stage of the battle. Germany had the rigorously trained SS troops and were capable of fulfilling demanding operations. In contrast, the Russian army was much bigger yet didn’t consist of as highly trained troops. This was evident from the huge losses of 2 million men within the initial stages of the battle.
In conclusion, I believe that the successes made by Germany in 1941-42 were due to a culmination of the reasons mentioned above. Stalin was seen as a problem by many of the Russian commanders who believed in the intelligence of an imminent attack from Nazi Germany, yet they were too afraid to go against Stalin’s wishes and mobilise the army. Added with this was the swift movement of German artillery and troops, which gave the German army a considerable gain in Western Russia. It could just be that Soviet Russia was simply not ready for war, hence the huge number of losses in the Red Army. However, the Red Army was fortunate that in 1942, Stalin finally decided to play a less prominent role in defence planning and discovered in a young Russian general, Zhukov, a remarkable deputy whose brusque, no-nonsense style of command, and intuitive operational sense, we indispensable in making the Red Army a better battlefield force. By 1943, the whole situation had changed – Hitler was commander – in – chief against the less dogmatic Zhukov. Soviet Russia may have started off slow, but once it transformed itself to a total war economy, defeat of the Nazi Germany was inevitable.
