The ABMT possesses no capacity to defend against an accidental launch from a nuclear capable state. NMD provides states with an alternative option to such a problem, allowing the United States to defend against an attack, consider all the options that it faced, and react appropriately. Without such a defensive option, the US may believe that the deterrence relationship had failed and that it was now facing a security problem (imminent attack from an adversary). As a result, the US may attempt to launch a nuclear retaliation strike; in order to pre-empt any second wave of attack that it perceived would follow. NMD would provide states with such an opportunity. The logic of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) argues that vulnerability to nuclear slaughter had a sobering effect on the Cold War: the knowledge that nuclear strikes would lead to total catastrophe underpinned stability and prevented either side from nuclear adventurism. However, once a missile had been launched (accidental or otherwise), this logic would be obsolete and the very ‘total catastrophe’ that MAD logic points to could possibly follow. NMD would remove the certainty of catastrophe in such a situation.
Critics of NMD argue that Russia attaches considerable importance to the ABMT and that the introduction of a NMD system would undermine the treaty. This, critics argue, could re-ignite the arms race, as the US attempt to abandon the ABMT would be perceived as an antagonistic act whose sole aim (it would be perceived) would be to emphasise US power and its supremacy over Russia. Therefore, the ABMT may have been negotiated in 1972, but it’s meaning and symbolism remain as relevant today as it did throughout the Cold War.
NMD’s critics are also quick to contend that no rogue state is even close to posing a credible threat in the foreseeable future. Critics also argue that the threat that nuclear-capable rogue states pose is at most, regional. The introduction of an NMD system would therefore at best achieve very little, or at worst would motivate such rogue states/terrorist groups to develop/obtain nuclear capabilities before the deployment of an effective NMD system.
The final argument that critics of NMD advance is much more strategic in character. NMD, it is claimed, may be capable of defending against a long-range intercontinental attack, but would simply be unable to protect the US from a limited nuclear attack. It would, consequently, be logical for any potentially hostile adversary to attack with a submarine (or other similar attacking capability) off a near coast of the US. Even if the NMD system managed to intercept the missile – which would be unlikely – the nuclear fallout and subsequent radiation would be so catastrophic as to render the interception irrelevant. Hence, NMD is a costly defensive system that would fail to actually defend, at the same time instilling citizens and decision-makers with a false sense of security.
Critics of NMD do highlight some matters for concern, but their criticisms are very misguiding. Firstly, Russia may attach importance to the ABMT, nevertheless the relationship between the Superpowers has moved far beyond what it was in 1972. Anyone arguing that the introduction of a NMD system would spark an arms race is still very much in a Cold War mindset. Since the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union, Russia has experienced astronomical economic decline, despite the best efforts of the IMF. It is therefore highly unlikely that Russia could afford to engage in such an arms race even if it wanted to. There have also been considerable strategic developments since the end of the Cold War, with talk of possible Russian admittance into NATO. Western powers would not contemplate accepting Russia to join such a collective defence agency if the US planned to define it as an enemy, or vice-versa. It would be highly illogical and expensive, achieving ver little. Such developments mean that Russia and the US are perfectly poised to work together to develop security measures such as NMD, which many states can enjoy the benefits of. The modern geo-political realities undermine this argument advanced by NMD’s critics.
The second criticism made about NMD, that no rogue state/terrorist group is close to achieving nuclear status, is superficial and timebound. It was previously barely conceivable that terrorists would be able to inflict thousands of deaths on the US on its own territory. The attacks of September 11th 2001 dispelled any such thoughts, which previously took security for granted. Waiting until rogue states/terrorists are nuclear capable before addressing the problem is too late, as they could be in a position to hold the US to ransom. Whether they would launch an attack at this stage or not is irrelevant; democratically-elected US political elites should remember that they are elected to provide their citizens security, not to put such decisions in the hands of foreign decision-makers or terrorists. The current situation with regards to North Korea should surely teach strategists the lesson of acting before it is too late. North Korea has announced its nuclear capability and the international system now faces problems in the way in which it is able to deal with this threat. History demonstrates that leaving security problems and not dealing with them as soon as possible will have disastrous repercussions, as the experiences of the Kosovars, Chechens, Somalis and the Hutus and Tutsis illustrate.
The final criticism advanced against NMD, that it would fail against a limited nuclear attack so should not be deployed, at first appears to carry considerable weight. However, this criticism simply fails to withstand close scrutiny. NMD may not be capable of defending against a limited nuclear attack, but then again, nor would the Army, Navy or Air Force – should the US therefore disband them? Such a proposition would be ridiculous – the services provide a specific defence against a specific attack and the same can be argued of NMD. Highlighting what NMD can not defend against as a reason not to deploy it forsakes all that it can defend against. Critics of NMD fail to present any other national security option that would defend against accidental launch or a deliberate attack from a rogue state/terrorist group. All possible threats must be encountered for in national security policy.
The introduction of a NMD system would not be destabilising. The contemporary geo-political realities are different to those of 1972, when the ABMT was negotiated, and those negotiating could envisage this development, as an opt-out clause was included in the treaty. Russia’s relationship has moved way beyond what it was throughout the Cold War; the East and West are no longer locked in a deterrence relationship. The current economic difficulties experienced by Russia dictate that it would be unable to enter into an arms race even if it wanted to, and these difficulties show no sign of disappearing in the foreseeable future.
The democratically-elected US political elite has been elected to provide security for its citizens against all possible threats. Whilst NMD may not be able to account for all of the nuclear attacks that the US may potentially face, it can play a very specific part in the security of the US. The current system fails to provide security against the threats highlighted throughout this essay and it would be unacceptable not to count for all eventualities. NMD should therefore be deployed and play its specific and essential role in the security of the US.
Bibliography
Butfoy, A. (1999) The Future of Nuclear Strategy in Snyder, C. Contemporary Security and Strategy (London: Macmillan).
Freedman, L. (1981) The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: Macmillan).
Gray, R. (1999) Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in Snyder, C. Contemporary Security and Strategy (London: Macmillan).
Hawthorn, G. Liberalism since the Cold War in Cox, M. (et al.) The Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics 1989-1999 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Rutland, P. (1999) Mission Impossible? The IMF and market transition in Russia in Cox, M., Booth, K. & Dunne, T. The Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics 1989-1999 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Tomlinson, R. (2000) The Big Breach (Edinburgh: Cutting Edge Press).
Butfoy, A. (1999) The Future of Nuclear Strategy in Snyder, C. Contemporary Security and Strategy: 159.
Freedman, L. (1981) The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy: 415.
Gray, R. (1999) Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in Snyder, C. Contemporary Security and Strategy: 186.
Tomlinson, R. (2000) The Big Breach: 179.
Butfoy, A. (1999) The Future of Nuclear Strategy in Snyder, C. Contemporary Security and Strategy: 159.
Butfoy, A. (1999) The Future of Nuclear Strategy in Snyder, C. Contemporary Security and Strategy: 160.
Rutland, P. (1999) Mission Impossible? The IMF and market transition in Russia in Cox, M. (et al.) The Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics 1989-1999:185.
Hawthorn, G. Liberalism since the Cold War in Cox, M. (et al.) The Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics 1989-1999:156.
Rutland, P. (1999) Mission Impossible? The IMF and market transition in Russia in Cox, M. (et al.) The Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics 1989-1999:184-185.