Manslaughter can voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing with malice aforethought but reduced to manslaughter by the Homicide Act 1957. In cases of Diminished responsibility under s2 of the Homicide Act 1957, Provocation under s3 of the Homicide Act and The Survivor Of a Suicide Pact under s4 of the Homicide Act. On the other hand, involuntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing with no malice aforethought. There are two types, constructive manslaughter and gross negligence manslaughter. Constructive manslaughter is where an unlawful and dangerous act results in a death. Gross negligence manslaughter is where the behavior or omission causing the death is so grossly negligent that only a criminal charge is appropriate. S2 of the the Homicide Act 1957 states that a person may be found guilty of the lesser offence of volutry manslaughter rather than murder, if he was suffering from an abnormality of mind, casused by an inside source, that substantially affected his responsibility for his actions. Constructive manslaughter is known as an unlawful act because it is committed where the defendant has caused the death of a person by an unlawful and dangerous act. The distinction between this type of manslaughter was clearly stated in the case of Larkin 1943, where three elements have to established before a person is liable for constructive manslaughter. There must be an unlawful act, this act must have caused the death and the unlawful act must have been a dangerous one.
The chain of causation has its rules mainly established through case law rather than by statute.
The defendant in some cases will be arguing that the death was the victims fault. The courts will look at two issues. Firstly, did the conduct of the accused cause the resulting harm (what was the factual cause of death?). Secondly, was the defendant also liable in law? The defendant would only be criminally liable if his conduct made a significant contribution to the death. This can be shown in the case of White 1910. In this case, the defendant had the intention to kill his mother by putting poison in her lemonade. However, she died from a heart attack instead. The defendant was hence found liable for attempted murder as he was not the cause of her death. The courts use the ‘but for test’ to decide on the factual cause of death: “but for the act of the defendant, the death would not have occurred.”
In the case of Dalloway 1847, a driver of a cart was not using his reins as he proceeded along a road. A 3 year old child ran into the path of the cart and was killed. Possibly, it could have been argued that, but for the driver travelling along this road, the child’s death wouldn’t have occurred. Due to the fact that the prosecution’s answer was no to establish that, but for the driver’s negligence in failing to use his reins, the death couldn’t be sustained. After the factual cause of the death has been established there is still the second issue to be shown, that the defendant’s act was a significant cause of the death and that no intervening act had broken the chain of causation. In previous cases are was stated that the act of the accused had to be substantial. Liability can arise where the defendant has made a significant contribution to the death. This point was established in Cato 1976 which was then supported later in Malcherek and Steel 1981. The two appellants injured their victims so severely that they had to be put on life support machine. When these machines were switched off by doctors, the defendants tried to argue that this action constituted a novus actus interveniens. Their appeals failed. In the case of Kimsey 1971, it was not thought of as to be a misdirection by the trial judge when he stated the “contribution must be merely be something more than a ‘slight or trifling link’.
A novus actus interveniens means a new intervening act. No intervening act has to arisen to break the chain of causation causing the defendant’s act to cause the actual death. Therefore, the defendant would be able to escape liability if he/she could prove the novus actus interveniens had caused the death and not their act of violence or omission.
Sunil refuses to give consent for a blood transfusion and dies two hours later. Anwar may claim that Sunil has aggravated his condition or refused medical treatment, but this does not always mean that a defendant can escape liability. For example in the case of Wall’s 1801, the Governor of Goree had inflicted an illegal flogging of 800 lashes on the deceased and was charged with his murder. He tried to argue that the victim had aggravated the condition by consuming strong alcohol to deaden the pain of punishment. But the judge refused this claim.
