English legal system

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Eve Emedo                November 2002

English Legal System Course Work

At the Royal Courts of Justice on the 21 November 2002 was the case of Stonebridge Housing Action Trust v Gabbindon & anr.  It was heard in the Chancery Division of the High Court by Mr Justice Lloyd.  It was an appeal against an order to suspend an existing warrant for possession in Willesden County Court by District Judge Sitch.

Summary of facts

The case involved a tenant of the Stonebridge Housing Action Trust (SHAT went into arrears in 1997, which led to a suspension order being given under the condition that she would make the repayments needed in weekly instalments.  Following this, there had been five proven incidents with one further alleged against the respondents. A warrant for possession was issued in October 2001 because of the continued arrears, the tenant now being in the position of a tolerated trespasser.  This led to the hearing by Judge Sitch in February 2002 in which the respondents’ application to remain on the property was successful on the condition that there were to be no more incidents of misconduct on Gabbindon’s part and that rent owed be repaid in instalments.

Appellant’s argument

It was submitted by the appellants that the respondents should not have been granted further permission to remain in the property.  She was already a tolerated trespasser in breach of a suspension order and therefore at mercy (reference made to Rent Act 1977).  The five drugs related matters could not have been correctly taken into account by the previous judge in the opinion of the appellants because if he had done so, he would have seen that these factors alone would have been sufficient grounds for possession.  Instead, they claimed he allowed the fact that Gabbindon had two small children (one merely a matter of months old) to cause him to suspend the possession order.  This they submitted made him at fault on a point of law.  

The case W v Lambeth was produced by the appellants who used it to show that the Court of Appeal had made their decision per incuriam (i.e. in error, because some relevant precedent or statute was not correctly considered by the court).  In A v Lambeth the Chadwick LJ had incorrectly concluded that there was no power under s.17 of the Children Act 1989 for the housing authority to accommodate a family.  The appellants in this case stated that the trial judge had been wrong in considering whether there was or was not a duty on the housing authority to provide suitable alternative accommodation before he had decided whether or not to make an order.  They also said that this did not matter anyway as there was already an existing duty under s.20 of the Act.  The correct procedure after deciding the grounds had been proven would have been to decide whether it would be reasonable to make an order before deciding to stay or suspend it for any reason.

The appellants the brought to the attention of the court the case of Sheffield v Hopkins in support of their argument that all matters leading up to the date of the hearing can be looked at, even if they have nothing to do with the original claim.  The case of Castle v Gallagher was then mentioned, with the appellants advising the judge to read through certain highlighted points made by Blackburne LJ and Sedley LJ.  Lord Justice Blackburne stated the grounds under which possession may be obtained as set out in the 1985 Housing Act.  They submitted that the grounds had been fully met via the conduct of the respondents and their associates and so in the interests of the public, SHAT would be better served re-letting the property.

The appellants then brought forth the argument that an appeal judge could only interfere on a point of law in such a case as this.  Sedley LJ then made a statement regarding section 77(6) of the County Courts Act 1984. The barrister for the appellants then went on to say that the breach in question in this case was very serious and it would be unreasonable to make an order in very exceptional cases.  A lesser remedy would be disproportionate to the offence and the decision made at the first instance should have been to uphold the warrant for possession, as there was no other suitable alternative.

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They then concluded their argument by reiterating the fact that they were of the belief that the trial judge had made an error even though, prima facie, it had been a model exercise of judicial discretion. To end finally, they placed two options before the court if the judge was to find his ruling in their favour: their preferred choice would be for a possession to be made.  If not, in accordance with article 8 of the Human Rights Act, the respondents should then plea all matters before the court again in order to establish what should be done.

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