The actus reus also includes omissions which is a failure to act. For an omission to result in an actus reus, there must be a duty for the defendant to act. For example in R v Gibbons and Proctor 1918 there was a relationship between the defendants and the victim, as they were supposed to be looking after the child who died from being starved to death by them. Similarly, in R v Pittwood 1902, there was a contractual duty for the defendant to act, his omission resulted in a driver being killed after he went over a crossing, where the gate should have been closed, at the same time as a train. There is also a duty for the defendant to act when they have created a dangerous situation, as seen in R v Miller 1983, where the defendant accidentally started a fire but ignored it and went to another room. The fact that the law has imposed these conditions where people will be blameworthy for their action (or inaction) shows how much the law revolves around the concept of fault.
The actus reus can also be satisfied by causation issues, where it has to be established if the defendant caused the outcome. Causation in fact is where the courts ask if the result would have happened ‘but for’ the actions of the defendant. This was seen in R v Pagett 1994 where the defendant used his girlfriend as a human shield resulting in her being fatally shot. More recently, there has been the case concerning the paedophile Thomas Titley who asked for a sentence ‘as long as possible’ in 1996 when he was found guilty of similar crimes. However, the state failed to act on this advice leading to Titley only receiving a 4 year sentence. Since his release he has committed sex attacks on two boys and in March 2004 received a life sentence. It is clear to see that upon his initial arrest in 1996, Titley was at fault for his acts having committed the appropriate actus reus and mens rea. If the courts knew this, and with Titley himself admitting he was a ‘danger to society’, it can be argued that the English legal system cannot be completely focused around fault if they ignored warnings and did not give a sentence proportionate to the crime. The courts failed to achieve justice for the victims in 1996, and it could therefore be argued that perhaps the courts were taking too much of a lenient stance towards the criminal that they failed to protect society, and even themselves. It can be asked then, if the victims in this case would have suffered their horrific situations ‘but for’ the actions of the courts. The answer is most likely to be ‘no’ and going by this, the courts are at fault. Obviously, they will not be punished and it can be argued that it is the courts themselves that have brought about many miscarriages of justice and do not face any sanction for it. However, from causation in law perspective, where the defendant’s actions must be a significant contribution to the outcome, there must be no intervening act, and if there is the defendant will escape liability. Looking at the same case, the courts would not be a fault as Titley’s actions would have been enough to break the chain of causation. This highlights the fact that a defendant found to be at fault in factual causation could escape liability in the legal causation. It could be argued that if the law was so concerned with the concept of fault, there would not be any contradictions in it policies.
Although it is the law that for fault to be found the actus reus and mens rea must be present, there is an exception to the rule where strict liability cases are concerned. Strict liability refers to cases where it is not necessary to have the mens rea to commit a crime. This was seen in Sweet v Parsley 1969 where a landlady was convicted of being involved in the management of premises being used for the consumption of illegal drugs, even thought she did not know of the activities of her tenants. More recently in B v DPP 2000, it was held that the more serious the offence the greater the need for mens rea. Strict liability usually concern regulatory offences, as seen with the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 that states that if the moving parts of machines are not guarded to protect workers from harm, employers will be strictly liable. As it is important for health and safety standards to be high, strict liability shows that English law is very concerned about the concept of fault, however as strict liability does not necessarily need the mens rea, it can be hard to pinpoint blameworthiness and so punishments may not always be suitable.
In criminal law, the mens rea refers to the defendant’s state of mind at the time of their crime and there are several levels reflecting the need to have a particular mens rea for the offence committed. For example, in murder or a S:18 offence in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the mens rea present must be that of specific intent, which is where the defendant desired that particular outcome of their actions. However, it was held in R v Cunningham 1982, that the intention to cause serious harm was enough to satisfy the mens rea for murder. This shows that, where murder cases are concerned, that it is relatively easy to prove the required mens rea and in doing so the concept of fault is often satisfied. This is once again shown in oblique intent, where a defendant may claim they did not mean the result to happen despite realising that it was possible for this to happen from their actions. This was the case in Woollin 1996, where the defendant claimed he did not mean for his baby to die when he threw him across the room. However, it was held in this case, reaffirming the decision in Nedrick 1987, that if it was ‘virtually certain’ what may arise as a result of the defendant’s actions, then the mens rea for murder had been satisfied. Although oblique intent is considered to less serious than specific intent, the importance of fault and the need to convict people when they have clearly done wrong means that there is no lessening of the punishment imposed on the wrongdoer. However, there are defences to murder, and also non-fatal offences, which reduce the conviction to one of manslaughter. Special, partial defences to murder are diminished responsibility and provocation, both found under S:2 and S:3 Homicide Act 1957. These are particularly important in the concept of fault, as seen with R v Ahluwalia 1992, where the defendant had faced years of abuse from her husband before setting him alight while he was sleeping. On the original hearing, Ahluwalia was convicted of murder as the law on provocation required the loss of self control to be immediate, not premeditated and this may have been the case as the defendant waited for her husband to sleep before murdering him. However, the law has since developed and provocation now recognises ‘battered woman’s syndrome’ and the slow burn effect it may cause. If this is the case, then surely a defendant in such a situation cannot face the full wrath of ‘fault’ when much of what surrounded the killing was not out of their choice. Even though the actus reus and mens rea in this case, and also similar cases of R v Duffy 1949 and R v Thornton 1992, were present, the law’s introduction of a Domestic Violence Bill is perhaps confirmation that the concept of fault can only be appropriately applied when the full circumstances are looked at. This signifies the importance of defences, as it is here that the law can decide whether or not a person is to blame for their actions and to what extent it was their fault that the actus reus and mens rea were present.
To conclude, English law is concerned with the concept of law to the fullest extent, as this is the only way justice can be achieved. Fault is not as difficult to prove as one would expect with the several areas of actus reus and mens rea that exist. The introduction of defences may mean that those at fault could escape liability, but ultimately these are safeguards for those who deserve their circumstances to be taken into consideration, and as justice is the whole aim of English law, this is only fair.