The law relating to the defence of insanity is out dated and unsatisfactory. Reform is long overdue in the interests of both justice and common sense. Evaluate the accuracy of this statement.

Under the definition of insanity, a person with a condition such as diabetes and epilepsy will be labelled as insane, as opposed to a medical definition where the two are defined very differently. The law where diabetics are concerned creates a very difficult situation as shown by the cases of Quick and Hennessy. Quick had taken his insulin, but failed to consume enough food(this causes low blood sugar, affecting his brain). Whilst in this state, he assaulted a patient. The Court of Appeal ruled that his condition was not insane, but an external matter. This allowed Quick to rely on the defence of automatism and be entitled to an acquittal. Hennessy was another diabetic, who did not take his insulin for a period of 3 days. He was seen getting into a car that was reported stolen and drove off, but had no recollection of this. Hennessy pleaded guilty because he didn’t want to be innocent through insanity. On his appeal, where he felt he should have been allowed to use non insane automatism, this was rejected by the Court of Appeal because diabetes was affecting his mind, and therefore was classed as insane. Quick was acquitted because his seizure was triggered by the external factor of not eating, however Hennessy’s seizure was triggered by an internal factor, his diabetes. This is inconsistent and the same rule should be applied to anyone who is diabetic. Anyone who is found not guilty by reason of insanity would usually be referred to a mental institution, which more than explains why some people, such as Hennessy, did not want to use the defence. The medical definitions of insanity and diabetes are very far apart and this should be reflected in the law to stop injustices like this. Even the judges are uneasy about declaring conditions such as this ‘insane’; LJ Lawton in Quick stated that ‘’common sense is affronted by the prospect of a diabetic being sent to a hospital when in most cases the situation can be rectified with a lump of sugar’’. Lord Lane in Burgess also stated that ‘’too much sugar in the blood can also be resolved and this matter should go before Parliament’’, indicating that there are other ways to better treat diabetics. In situations such as where diabetes is concerned, the law can appear irrational and unfair. If automatism is pleaded successfully that is a complete defence and the defendant escapes all liability as opposed to being sent to a mental institution. Insanity overlaps with automatism, so any illness which affects the mind of the defendant automatically amounts to insanity, removing the defence of automatism completely. Of course, the public does need to be safeguarded from violent patients with medical disorders, some which are simply triggered by failing to take their medication. The Criminal Procedure Act 1991 has sought to alter the views of the courts, which indicates some hint of reform which is badly needed.

Insanity is also the only defence where it is up to the defendant to prove they are insane, instead of the prosecution having to prove they are not insane. Again this creates inconsistency within defence law and this should be updated as such. If the defendant knows his actions are wrong, he cannot declare insanity, as resolved in Windle where the defendant assisted his wife who wished to commit suicide, but immediately acknowledged that ‘’I suppose they will hang me for this’’, he knew what he was doing but believed what he was doing was morally right, even though it was also legally wrong. Now assisted suicide is illegal and as such should be punished under the law, however the Windle ruling was in 1952 and surely there is a more modern definition that can be used.

The statement hints at reform, which has widely been suggested in previous rulings. The state on the law of insanity was criticised as far back as 1953 where Morris described the M’Naughton rules as ‘’woolly, semantically, confused, psychologically immature nonsense’’. In 1989, the Royal Commission, Butler Commission and Law Commission all recommended a change to ‘’mental disorder’’, where it should be defined broadly to include mental illness, arrested and retarded development, and psychopathic disorders. This is already the position in Canada, and as it is proven there the UK can learn from the Canadians in implementing this updated decision. As the laws of insanity have been criticised for so many years and has been widely described as out dated, the statement is correct in acknowledging that the defence of insanity needs to be updated in the interest of common sense as well as in a judicial sense. Ordinary people with no medical knowledge are being forced to make a medical decision, based on rules where the definition is completely legal and ignores all medical terminology relating to mental health. Declaring someone as ‘insane’ is not an easy decision for a jury to make at the best of times. A jury may be so revolted by the crimes of the accused that they will not even consider finding him ‘not guilty’, even if it is by reason of insanity(Peter Sutcliffe aka the Yorkshire Ripper is a perfect example of this). Parliament can learn from other nations such as Canada who have already modernised their law relating to insanity, but they can also simply apply some common sense. The amount of advances in the field of mental health even since the 1990’s is astonishing, which is widely agreed upon, so why the law of insanity relying on a legal definition set over 160 years ago? Insanity deserves a medical definition, and a vast update in the interests of both justice and common sense, and the statement is correct in acknowledging this.