Another important case which shows the development of the law of coincidence is that of Fagan v Metropolitan Police Constabulary. This somewhat unusual case in which a man drove onto a police constables foot by accident and the refused to move off once he realised the accident illustrates the difficulties in establishing the temporal coincidence of actus reus and mens rea. Fagan’s actus reus was driving onto the police constable’s foot which initially was accidental and without mens rea thus there is no crime. However, at the point which Fagan realised the situation and that the actus reus had occurred he demonstrated evidence of mens rea by telling the policeman “Fuck you, you can wait!” At this point after the actus reus has committed Fagan has now developed the mens rea, it would seem that the two don’t overlap and thus there can be no conviction. The courts solution to this is clear in James J dictum, he states:
“It is not necessary that mens rea should be present at the inception of the actus reus; it can be superimposed on an existing act.”
The judgement established that the battery on the police constable (the actus reus) was a continuing act which was not complete until the battery ceased i.e. such time as the car was removed from the police constables foot. Thus as the actus reus continued the subsequent mens rea existed at the same time as the actus reus even though it was not at its inception. A conviction was then made and an important point in law was also set out.
Thus far we have established that actus reus and mens rea must overlap and exist in the same point in time. It has also been shown that guilt can be established even if the mens rea is not present at the inception of the actus reus, all that is required is that coincidence occurs before the actus reus is completed. The case of R v. Miller further widens the rules as it was shown in Miller that recklessness was sufficient mens rea. This confirmation meant that even if d. was not actively thinking or intending to commit the actus reus his omission when under a duty of care or recklessness towards risk can form the necessary mens rea and complete the offence.
Another important part of the case law on coincidence is the Attorney General’s reference No.4 of 1980. This ruling in this case is that if there are multiple acts, one of which caused the death of the victim, it is not necessary to prove which act it was which caused the death in order for a conviction to be successful. The mens rea was carried on throughout as is seen in the Thabo Meli case described as part of the “same transaction” and also in the Church case in which it is described as part of the “same series of acts”. Thus it can be seen that when disposing of a supposed corpse the initial mens rea can be continued to cover the eventual actus reus of murder/manslaughter.
Finally on the point of coincidence the discussion leads us to the more recent case of R. v Le Brun. This case involves a man who killed his wife by dropping her on her head accidentally after knocking her out in an argument, it mainly deals with the issue of separate transactions. Lord Lane refers to the learned editors of Smith and Hogan:
“……an intervening act by the original actor will not break the chain of causation.”
Thus it can be said that even though the defendant had no mens rea for dropping his wife on her head, he did have mens rea for the preceding assault was sufficient to continue until such time as a 3rd party interrupted the chain of causation which he created when he assaulted his wife.
As the wording of the statement in the question states, the law on causation has changed and widened to allow more defendants. Firstly, before considering this let us look at the notion of causation. The draft code on causation is helpful despite it not being a legally forceful document as yet. Causation is defined in the draft code as an action by the defendant “which makes a more than negligible contribution to it’s [the offences] occurrence. It also goes on to include omissions or failure to act when under a duty of care. So put plainly, causation or a chain of causation is started when a defendant acts and makes some recognisable contribution to the offence’s occurrence. It is important to note that the basics of causation lie entirely within the common law.
As common law is the basis for the principle of causation, it is prudent to consider some key cases which establish it. The first of which is the case of R. v White, this case is crucial when considering the principle of causation. In this case, the defendant attempted to poison his mother by putting cyanide in her drink. She died of a heart attack before she drank the poison. Nevertheless, the defendant was held to be guilty of attempted murder as he had started a chain of causation by putting the cyanide in her drink and that chain could not be broken by her dying before she drank it. While her natural death formed a novus actus interveniens and excused the defendant from murder it did not excuse him from attempted murder as the chain of causation formed by his attempt remain uninterrupted and unbroken. This is an important principle, once a chain of causation has been started only a 3rd party can intervene and in many cases the defendant may still be guilty of the attempt, only if a 3rd party stops the defendant from committing the attempt can that chain of causation be broken.
A further illustration of causation exists in the cases of R. v Latif ; R. v Shahzad in which it is established that as long as there is intent (mens rea) to commit the full offence and the accused has actually committed some act (actus reus) which is more than preparatory then guilt can be established. The defendant in this case had the intent to export heroin into the United Kingdom and took steps to see that it was exported whilst the customs officers undercover actually physically imported the drugs. It was held by the court that he had the requisite intent and he also took steps that were more than preparatory to see that the offence was committed. It was also held that he was the cause of the offence being committed as he had instigated the chain of causation leading to the commission of the offence thus he was guilty.
The House of Lords decision in Empress Car Co v National Rivers Authority recently gave a more subjective view of causation. Lord Hoffman moved away from the common sense application of causation and said “The answer will depend upon the rule by which responsibility is being attributed.” The ruling showed that causation can be applied to several separate parties depending upon who is on trial. For example, the person who turned the tap and directly allowed the pollution offence to occur is liable for their actions which led to the pollution of a river. The company who failed to secure the tap properly is also liable as it is there actions which initiated the chain of causation which led to the offence.
Causation can be said to have begun with R. v Thabo Meli and R. v Church in which it was established that 2 acts could be grouped together as either part of the of the same transaction or series of acts. This meant that a person’s actions could be determined to be the start of a chain of causation thus making them liable for the ultimate result. For example if A aims to shoot B and fires, he has started a chain of causation that will ultimately result in B’s death. Unless there is a novus actus interveniens by C, A will be liable. The very existence of causation means that actus reus and mens rea may not coincide at the inception of the chain of causation but do at some point in the chain and thus a conviction can be successful.
The principles of both coincidence and causation have developed considerably over the last century as has been shown in the discussed case law. Coincidence, once a very strict principle of the temporal coexistence of mens rea and actus reus has changed. Largely owing to causation, what we now have is a wider definition which hallows judge and jury to consider whole series of acts or one prolonged transaction. This has facilitated many more defendants being tried for their crimes and also allowed juries to convict those who would have been acquitted on a technicality. The rules governing causation itself have widened since its beginning. It has evolved from being just a chain of events initiated by one actor to a more flexible form in which more than one actor can be tried for their part in causing or contributing to the chain of causation leading to the commission of an offence as is seen in Empress Car Co. v National Rivers Authority
In conclusion, it can be seen that the case law on coincidence and causation has developed considerably over the last 50-100 years. Since its beginning in c.1954, causation has added a valuable new facet to coincidence and the way the law looks at the coincidence of actus reus and mens rea. It has also facilitated a greater number of defendants to be tried and brought to justice. The main improvement in the law was arguably established in Fagan v MPC as it allowed the court to recognise a continuing state of actus reus and also that mens rea does not necessarily have to be present at the inception of the actus reus. This crucial point along with the other effects implemented by causation show that the general rules have widened in both the cases of coincidence and causation. I would suggest that this widening of the rules has proved beneficial for the judiciary and has allowed a greater freedom to apply the law as it was intended to be applied.
Bibliography
Thabo Meli v R. [1954] 1 All ER 373 Privy Council
Thabo Meli v R. [1954] 1 All ER 373 Privy Council
R v Church [1965] 2 All ER 72 Court of Criminal Appeal
Fagan v M.P.C [1968] 3 All ER 442 Queens Bench Division
R v. Miller [1983] 77 Cr.App. R. 17
Attorney Generals Reference: (No.4 of 1980) [1981] 2 All ER 617 Court of Appeal, Criminal Division
Thabo Meli v R. [1954] 1 All ER 373 Privy Council
R. v Le Brun [1992] 94 Cr. App. R. 101
R v. White [1910] 2 KB 124
Latin meaning “Independent intervening act”
R v Latif; R v Shahzad [1996] 1 All ER 353
Empress Car Co. v National Rivers Authority [1998] 1 All ER 481, House of Lords
Empress Car Co. v National Rivers Authority [1998] 1 All ER 481, House of Lords
Fagan v M.P.C [1968] 3 All ER 442 Queens Bench Division