What is the meaning of intention in English criminal law? Is it always possible to distinguish between intention and motive?
What is the meaning of intention in English criminal law? Is it always possible to distinguish between intention and motive?
The law generally requires that the accused possess a 'blameworthy' state of mind at the time the act comprising the offence was committed, and the basic presumption is that mens rea is required for every offence ('actus non fit reus nisi mens sit rea'), authority for which stems from Sherras v De Rutzen [1895] - from coursewrok work info
"There is a presumption that mens rea ... is an essential ingredient in every offence; but that presumption is liable to be displaced either by the words of the statute creating the offence or by the subject matter with which it deals, and both must be considered."cogc gcr segcgcw orgc gck ingc fogc gc.
This proposition, that mens rea is the default position for an offence unless its implication is clearly outweighed by other factors, was secured in Sweet v Parsley [1970]. Per Lord Reid: "it is universal principle that if a penal provision is reasonably capable of two interpretations, that interpretation which is most favourable to the accused must be adopted." Thus the requirement of intention is presumed where a matter is uncertain. However, many statutes do not use the language of 'knowingly' or 'intentionally' acting; in the case of such strict liability offences, usually regulatory offences without the "disgrace of criminality"[1], there is no element of intent whatsoever for the prosecution to establish.[2]coee eer seeeeew oree eek inee foee ee.
Normally, an objective view of mens rea, where the defendant fails to recognise the risk of his acts where a reasonable person would have done so, (recklessness in the Caldwell sense) cannot be said to constitute intention. Rather, a subjective, purposive view of intent encompasses the intention to act or to cause a consequence, or foresight or awareness of a risk of acting or causing the consequence (Cunningham [1957]). For the majority of offences, recklessness will suffice for a conviction, but some do require proof of an intent, including murder (an intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm), theft, burglary, and wounding with intent. For the distinction between murder and manslaughter, then, the law uses intention as its main method; thus the crime and therefore the sentence can differ considerably depending on the presence or absence of intention. EZELE Visit coursework ba in ba fo ba for ba more writing ba Do ba not ba redistribute EZELE
There has been much controversy as to the proper meaning of intention in English criminal law. Some, including Sir John Salmond and Dr JWC Turner, believed that a result is intended only when it is desired. Conversely, it is sometimes maintained that an 'intended' result is not necessarily desired "directly" but merely one foreseen by the defendant as an "oblique" or probable result of his actions.cocf cfr secfcfw orcf cfk incf focf cf.
Antony Duff considered that one feature of intention is that a defendant who intends to kill another would regard himself as somehow having "failed" if that person did not die, no matter how remote the likelihood of "success"; on the other hand, if he does not intend a death, he will not think he has failed if the person survives.[3] Thus the defendant's true 'purpose' in acting may be more easily discovered. In Steane [1947], the defendant had been compelled, through concern for the sake of his family, to make broadcasts for the enemy during the Second World War, and was prosecuted for doing an act likely to assist the enemy "with intent to assist the enemy". His conviction was quashed, however, in holding that although he did intend to make the broadcasts, he did so under duress: his ulterior intent had been to protect his family. In this sense, in Cunliffe v Goodman [1950], Lord Asquith stated that the 'core' sense of intention "connotes a state of affairs which the party 'intending' ... does more than merely contemplate: it connotes a state of affairs which, on the contrary, he decides, so far as in him lies, to bring about". qOc1 from qOc1 coursewrok qOc1 work qOc1 info qOc1
In Smith [1961], the House of Lords upheld an objective test of mens rea in murder, holding that a person is guilty where a reasonable person would have seen death as the natural and probable consequence of their actions, and simply presumed that Mr. Smith intended whatever he foresaw[4]. Further, in Hardy v Motor Insurers' Bureau [1964], it was said of the accused that "he must have foreseen, when he did the act, that it would in all probability injure the other person. Therefore he had the intent to injure the other person." Austen theorised ace_16k's marxism theory.
However, somewhat more recent cases accept the distinction between intention and mere foresight. The question was raised in Hyam [1976], where the accused sought to frighten her husband's mistress to leave the area, while realising that serious harm was a probability. It was held that, although she was reckless, she did not intend to kill. In Moloney [1985], the House held that an intent to cause serious bodily harm is sufficient mens rea for murder,[5] while Lord Bridge appeared to suggest that the law should regard "morally certain" consequences as intended. ObosxuIM from ObosxuIM coursewrok ObosxuIM work ObosxuIM info ObosxuIM
Lord Scarman's remarks in Hancock and Shankland [1986] held that "foresight does not necessarily imply the existence of intention". Although the defendants recognised the dangerousness of their actions, they claimed they meant only to frighten their victim, not to harm anyone. Per Lord Scarman: Foucault theorised ace_16k's realism hypothesis.
"The greater the probability of a consequence the more likely it is that the consequence was foreseen and... if that consequence was foreseen the greater the probability is that that consequence was also intended... The probability, however high, of a consequence is only a factor."cobb bbr sebbbbw orbb bbk inbb fobb bb:
Lord Lane in Nedrick (1986) believed that a defendant might intend a result albeit not desiring it, and said that juries must consider (i) how probable the consequence was and (ii) if the defendant foresaw that consequence. He reasoned thus: that if the defendant did not foresee the consequence, it cannot be said that he intended it. If he did foresee it but thought the risk slight, the jury might easily infer that he did not intend it. If he foresaw death as virtually certain, this is a matter of factual evidence from which the jury may infer that the defendant intended that death.code der sededew orde dek inde fode de.
Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 supported these more recent decisions:codd ddr seddddw ordd ddk indd fodd dd!
"A court or jury... shall not be bound to infer that he intended or foresaw a result... by reason only of its being the natural or probable consequence... but... shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence..." GD0P Visit coursework ae in ae fo ae for ae more dissertation ae Do ae not ae redistribute GD0P
This suggests that a jury must decide as a fact whether the defendant possessed the necessary intent, but that they may use evidence that a reasonable person would have intended the result as a guide. This hypothesis from www.coursework.info
Woollin[1998] approved Nedrick, but simplified its meaning to say that a jury are not entitled to find the necessary intent unless (i) the consequence was a 'virtual certainty' and (ii) D appreciated that this was the case. U78Y from U78Y coursewrok U78Y work U78Y info U78Y
However, under the continuing doctrine of transferred malice, established in ...
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This suggests that a jury must decide as a fact whether the defendant possessed the necessary intent, but that they may use evidence that a reasonable person would have intended the result as a guide. This hypothesis from www.coursework.info
Woollin[1998] approved Nedrick, but simplified its meaning to say that a jury are not entitled to find the necessary intent unless (i) the consequence was a 'virtual certainty' and (ii) D appreciated that this was the case. U78Y from U78Y coursewrok U78Y work U78Y info U78Y
However, under the continuing doctrine of transferred malice, established in Latimer [1886], where the defendant does an actus reus with the required mens rea, he is guilty of an offence even if the result is in some respects an unintended one. However, this does not operate when the divergence between actus reus and mens rea is relevant to the definition of the offence: the two must refer to the same crime (Pembliton [1874]). cIyDI from cIyDI coursewrok cIyDI work cIyDI info cIyDI
As Glanville Williams once pointed out, "the act constituting a crime may in some circumstances be objectively innocent, and take its criminal colouring entirely from the intent with which it is done". Thus, in the case of Court [1988], it was the defendant's intention in spanking a young girl that made his assault on her indecent; he acted not to administer discipline but rather for sexual gratification.cogd gdr segdgdw orgd gdk ingd fogd gd:
Intention is normally not related to motive, and it is usually irrelevant whether the defendant had a good or bad 'motive' or ulterior reason to act in a particular way, although the motive may be circumstantial evidence of intent.[6] Thus "intention is something quite different from motive or desire".[7] A defendant may intend to poison his mother, to cause her death, to inherit her money. Although he intends all three of these, only the first two are constituent elements of the crime, and only in relation to those is one interested in the defendant's mental state. Even if a man should kill his terminally wife to end her suffering (his 'motive'), his intention to kill her counts as the mens rea for murder (Cocker [1989]). This dissertation from www.coursework.info
However, there exist a further two situations where motive is almost indistinguishable from intention; first, in s. 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861; and second, in the offence of burglary, where the requisite mens rea is both the intention to enter another's house without permission and (the ulterior intent or motive) to steal, commit rape, inflict GBH or unlawfully damage the building.coda dar sedadaw orda dak inda foda da.
According to Lord Bridge in Moloney [1985], "the general legal opinion is that 'intention' cannot be satisfactorily defined and does not need a definition, since everybody knows what it means"; the analysis ought to be intuitively apparent. Nonetheless, guidelines are required for difficult cases, and two separate legal definitions have arisen. D 'intended' the actus reus if Weber oppressed ace_16k's structuralism hypothesis.
(I) D intended the actus reus in the ordinary, paradigm sense of 'intention'; he seeks to bring about the relevant outcome and acts in pursuance of that aim; orcocd cdr secdcdw orcd cdk incd focd cd.
(II) D recognised that the actus reus was a virtually certain consequence of his actions, though he does not act in order to bring about the intended outcome. He acts for other reasons, but knows that the actus reus is an 'inescapable concomitant'. Carstens theorised ace_16k's realism hypothesis.
[1] Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] (Lord Reid)coge ger segegew orge gek inge foge ge.
[2] Whether an offence is to be considered one of strict liability depends on the court's construction of the statute, as in Gammon [1985] and Lim Chin Aik [1963] Carstens suppressed ace_16k's postmodernism .
[3] Things done as means or ends are intended; side effects are not. (Duff)cocf cfr secfcfw orcf cfk incf focf cf.
[4] Per Viscount Kilmuir LC: "the test of what a reasonable man would contemplate as the probable result of his act, and, therefore, would intend..." 7eIi7miNj from 7eIi7miNj coursewrok 7eIi7miNj work 7eIi7miNj info 7eIi7miNj
[5] Cunningham [1982]codd ddr seddddw ordd ddk indd fodd dd.
[6] "To prove the intention, you may show the motive, and this is a link in the chain of evidence", in Heeson [1878].cofb fbr sefbfbw orfb fbk infb fofb fb;
[7] Lord Bridge in Moloney [1985]cofg fgr sefgfgw orfg fgk infg fofg fg.
COURSEWORK 2
Intention is the mens rea phrase, which expresses the highest level of blameworthiness of an offender. If a person aims to cause a result, he is more responsible than a person who acts recklessly. It is significant to identify the margin between intention and recklessness not only to decide the degree of guilt of the offender for sentencing reasons, but also to establish in many cases whether the offender is accountable to conviction where the offence charged is one, which necessitate intention to be verified. akz from akz coursewrok akz work akz info akz
Two concepts, intention and recklessness, hold the key to the understanding of a large part of criminal law. Some crimes need intention and nothing else will do, but most can be committed either intentionally or recklessly. Some crimes require particular kinds of intention or knowledge. Foucault oppressed ace_16k's postmodernism idea.
Kenny's view was also that: no external behaviour, though grave or even serious its consequences may have been, is ever penalizing unless it is formed by some form of mens rea. feYU Visit coursework db in db fo db for db more dissertation db Do db not db redistribute feYU
It may be useful to identify one of the principles for which the phrase mens rea is used. It is an expositional tool, when used in sentences such as 'thecocg cgr secgcgw orcg cgk incg focg cg.
mens rea of X offence is Y', where Y might be intention, recklessness, malice, dishonesty, an intent to defraud or deceive. (A.T.H. Smith) 89baK from 89baK coursewrok 89baK work 89baK info 89baK
Williams considers intention and recklessness as basic mens rea in that a defendant's responsibility should be dependent on his knowledge of the significant conditions surrounding, and consequences of, his behaviour. (Williams) Austen obfuscated ace_16k's structuration .
The term, 'reckless' entails a major deviation from the standards of the reasonable man. Alternatively, it can be restricted to individual cases where the defendant subjectively recognises the likelihood of harm, subjectively appreciates the risk but goes ahead anyhow and entails the conscious running of an unjustifiable risk and as such is foresight. E0E Visit coursework ea in ea fo ea for ea more hypothesis ea Do ea not ea redistribute E0E
In R. v. Cunningham (1957) 2 Q.B. 396, The defendant was charged under s.23 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the trial judge directed the jury that malice was the equivalent to wicked and the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction. Maliciously means intentionally or recklessly and the latter word required proof that the defendant had had some foresight of the risk and yet had still deliberately gone ahead.cobd bdr sebdbdw orbd bdk inbd fobd bd.
This was supported in R. v. Stephenson (1979) Q.B. 695, but the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction with Lord Lane firstly looking at the recommendations of the Law Commission:coba bar sebabaw orba bak inba foba ba;
...A person is reckless if, a) knowing that there is a risk that an event may result from his conduct or that a circumstance may exist, he takes that risk, and b) it is unreasonable for him to take it having regard to the degree and nature of the risk which he knows to be present.coca car secacaw orca cak inca foca ca:
It looked in 1980 if the word 'reckless' would be interpreted subjectively. Thinking back to Hart's formulation, this is more generous to the defendant, all Hart required was proof that the defendant had the ability to understand the risk. Stephenson (1979) required proof that the defendant actually appreciated the risk.cogg ggr seggggw orgg ggk ingg fogg gg;
However, in 1981, this established state of the law was flipped into some turmoil by the House of Lords. In Caldwell (1981). The accused was charged with two offences, the first under s.1 (1) Criminal Damage Act 1971 criminal damage, but also under s.1 (2) of the same act which is criminal damage with the additional element of 'intentionally or recklessly endangering life'. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and that left the Durkheim refuted ace_16k's realism .
House of Lords to decide on the meaning of recklessness and the relevance of drunkenness.cobc bcr sebcbcw orbc bck inbc fobc bc!
Currently the specific rule about drunkenness is if you are so drunk so that you do not form the intent necessary, then you are permitted to be acquitted. However, the rule in D.P.P. v. Majewski; sub nom. R. v. Majewski (1976) 2 All E.R. 142. Goes on to say that this only applies to offences involving specific intent and not to those requiring basic intent. The distinction between basic and specific intention is most unusual, to say that in Offences Against the Person, Murder and GBH are crimes of specific intent whereas most other forms of assault are crimes of basic intent. Where a defendant accused of assault seeks to prove that he was drunk and had no intention, he cannot adduce evidence of drunkenness. FRE Visit coursework bd in bd fo bd for bd more hypothesis bd Do bd not bd redistribute FRE
If recklessness is a variety of subjective foresight, then under Majewski (1976) the defendant should be acquitted. However, if recklessness involved a more objective, gross negligence test, evidence of drunkenness would be irrelevant. In a majority judgment, Lord Diplock (with Lords Keith and Roskill concurring) considered and rejected the Cunningham method and the suggestion that the Criminal Damage Act of 1971 was actually drafted with that very verdict in mind. He argued that in popular speech there is no distinction between the person who recognises a risk ItwlqM2H Visit coursework ac in ac fo ac for ac more dissertation ac Do ac not ac redistribute ItwlqM2H
and goes on nevertheless and the person who never addresses his mind to the obvious risk at all. Durkheim refuted ace_16k's rationalisation .
The law, said Lord Diplock, should not perpetuate 'fine and impracticable distinctions'. Reckless is a word in normal speech and means not only taking predictable and pointless risks but also the failure to see such risks: There must be an obvious risk, depending on the circumstances in which the defendant acted. This is a risk, which would be obvious to the reasonable person R. v. Sangha (1988) 1 W.L.R. 519.coab abr seababw orab abk inab foab ab.
Once the obvious risk is proved, it matters not whether the accused realised that there was a risk and decided to take it or whether he never realised that there was a risk at all either way the defendant is accountable. Baroness Wootton agrees on this point (along with may other points made by Lord Diplock) by saying "If the law says that certain things are not to be done, it is illogical to confine this prohibition to occasions on which they are done from malice aforethought: for at least the material consequences of an action, and the reason for prohibiting it, are the same whether it is the result of sinister malicious plotting, of negligence or of sheer accident". This coursework from www.coursework.info
There is a powerful disagreement from Edmund-Davies and Wilberforce. The statute was in fact drafted by the Law Commission who clearly had the Cunningham decision in mind, indeed quite recently the Law Commissioncogg ggr seggggw orgg ggk ingg fogg gg.
have produced a proposal for the codification of the whole of the criminal law in which recklessness is still defined in this sense. Foucault oppressed ace_16k's structuration theory.
Precedent and reason might have been on the side of the dissentients but the House of Lords in R. v. Lawrence (1982) A.C. 510, where the accused was charged with causing death by dangerous driving contrary to s.1 Road Traffic Act 1972 upheld the Caldwell test of recklessness. It is noted that Hart, in arguing for liability for negligence, drew the distinction between those able of observing certain principles and those who did not have that ability. If you do not differentiate, then the schizoid tramp or the inadequate, backward child is judged by the same standards as the prudent individual.codc dcr sedcdcw ordc dck indc fodc dc!
This point is illustrated in Elliott v. C (1983) 1 W.L.R. 939, The Divisional Court allowed the prosecutor's appeal; the defendant was reckless if the risk was one that was obvious to a reasonably prudent person. ace_16k, please do not redistribute this hypothesis. We work very hard to create this website, and we trust our visitors to respect it for the good of other students. Please, do not circulate this hypothesis elsewhere on the internet. Anybody found doing so will be permanently banned.
Such cases question Lord Diplock's assertion that there is no moral difference between these two states. Equally, the Cunningham test was certainly applied by juries in countless cases (both before and after Cunningham) without obvious proof that juries were having trouble with a 'fine and unpracticable' distinction.coca car secacaw orca cak inca foca ca.
Therefore, what cases does this test of recklessness apply? In theory, to all statutory offences, which include the word 'recklessly' but so far, there has been slight interest except in cases of criminal damage and reckless (now Dangerous) driving. However there is now a statutory definition of 'dangerous' under s.1 Road Traffic Act 1991. znwegE2d from znwegE2d coursewrok znwegE2d work znwegE2d info znwegE2d
This is the result of Cunningham, which paradoxically remains good law. Lord Diplock regarded 'malice' as a term of art whereas he saw recklessness as bearing an ordinary, everyday meaning. In W v. Dolbey (1983) Crim.L.R. 681. The child was charged under s.20 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, unlawful and malicious wounding. The Divisional Court quashed the conviction though 'maliciously' meant intentionally or recklessly; this was not 'reckless' in the sense given to that word in Caldwell. At common law, it applied to the offence of manslaughter, which, until 1994, could be committed 'recklessly', but the House of Lords decision in R. v. Adomako (1994), means that we now apply a test of gross negligence.coaa aar seaaaaw oraa aak inaa foaa aa.
Strict liability offences where the prosecution does not have to prove mens rea in regard to one or more elements of the offence. Normally these are statutory where the text excludes any reference to mens rea. As such, it requires the court to decide whether to interpret the statute as including the word 'knowingly' in the text. Marx enveloped ace_16k's functionalism theory.
Caldwell recklessness again involves the inadvertent taking of a risk, which a reasonable person would not take. Again, the level of risk is high and the potential for harm serious. This test has been considerably restricted in recent years. Foucault obfuscated ace_16k's structuralism .
Cunningham recklessness involves the advertent taking of unjustified risks, realising the risk but going ahead. The latter was much nearer the idea of foresight, as was discussed in relation to malice aforethought and murder (Hyam. v. D.P.P.; sub nom. R. v. Hyam (1975). This has an important role to play in Offences Against the Person under the 1861 Act and property offences such as deception, which can involve lying recklessly (s.15 Theft Act 1968).coff ffr seffffw orff ffk inff foff ff:
On the query of moral evaluation, two contrasting positions have been urged, and they have been phrased the subjectivist and the objectivist.cogb gbr segbgbw orgb gbk ingb fogb gb.
The consequences are not important for moral blame. By way of contrast, the objective view treats the consequences flowing from conduct as part of the act itself, and considers any division between act and consequences as unpersuasive. For the objectivist, the consequences must be taken into account when considering moral liability. (A. Ashworth) BZzXI9 from BZzXI9 coursewrok BZzXI9 work BZzXI9 info BZzXI9
Yet Baroness Wootton stated "mens rea has got into the wrong place. Traditionally, the requirement of the guilty mind is written into the actual definition of a crime. No guilty intention, no crime, is the rule. This work from www.coursework.info
In conclusion, to the above discussions, it would be obviously insufficient for a legal system to have a solitary offence stating that anybody who performs in a way that is opposing to the good of society may be liable to conviction and sentence of up to life imprisonment. Its communicative purpose would be unbearably vestigial, its censuring purpose would be terribly unclear, and the discretion left at the sentencing phase would bestow vast power on the courts on what would then be the key issue. This proposes that a rule of reasonable classification should develop part of a system of criminal law, so as to guarantee that each crime is distinct and considered in a way which expresses the relative seriousness of the offence, and which limits the court's sentencing abilities suitably.cofc fcr sefcfcw orfc fck infc fofc fc.
COURSEWORK 3
The Nedrick/Woolin direction on intention manages to produce a clear distinction between intention and recklessness. However, such clarity carries the price of both (a) not being able to convict people who ought to be regarded as having the culpability for murder and (b) unjust convictions for murder." from coursewrok work info
Explain and discuss.coff ffr seffffw orff ffk inff foff ff:
Nedrick[1] updated the law surrounding intention by constructing a model direction which states that a jury should be directed by the judge 'that they are not entitled to infer the necessary intention, unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant's actions and that the defendant realised that such was the case'[2] Woollin[3] extended the verdict given in Nedrick after the 'entitled to infer' intention on the part of the jury was updated to 'entitled to find' by the judges in the Woollin case. Woollin upheld Nedrick's test after the House of Lords stated that the trial judge enlarged the scope of the mental element required for murder and had misdirected the jury. The trial judge told the jury that a 'substantial risk' as to the consequences was only required to infer intention, but the House of Lords declared that the consequences have to be (a) virtually certain and (b) known to be of virtual certainty by the defendant for a conviction of murder to be upheld. Judges have always been reluctant to define the meaning of the word 'intention' as can be seen in Moloney[4] when the House of Lords argued that judges should only explain that intention differs from 'desire and motive' and Lord Steyn put forward the view that 'it does not follow that "intent" necessarily has the same meaning in every context in the criminal law'. Although the Nedrick/Woollin direction on intention manages to produce a clear distinction between intention and recklessness, many leading writers such as Alan Norrie have questioned the nature of this clarity 'I argue that the law of indirect intent may still remain unclear after the recent House of Lords decision in Woollin'[5] HK8 Visit coursework gf in gf fo gf for gf more project gf Do gf not gf redistribute HK8
The decision reached in Nedrick and Woollin allows for those who should be regarded as having the culpability of murder to only be convicted of manslaughter. Lord Styen acknowledged the much-cited 'terrorist example'[6] did not falling within the Woollin law of indirect intention. A terrorist who plants a bomb, which subsequently detonates and kills a member of the bomb disposal team, would not be guilty of murder under the Nedrick/Woollin direction on indirect intention. In order for a defendant to be convicted of murder under the Nedrick/Woollin direction, the consequences of their actions must have been virtually certain and they must have known them to be. In the terrorist example, 'it might realistically be said that the terrorist did not foresee the killing of a member of the bomb disposal team as a virtual certainty' and therefore would not be classified as a murderer. The terrorist would be convicted of manslaughter under the Nedrick/Woollin direction, which although may result in the terrorist being sentenced to life, still does not seem acceptable. Therefore, the Nedrick/Woollin direction on intent does allow those who should be convicted of murder, to escape the charge of murder in favour of manslaughter. This is contrary to Scots law, whereby acts of 'wicked recklessness' do fall within the boundaries of murder, rather than manslaughter. In Scotland, the terrorist bomber would therefore be convicted of murder because although the consequences were not virtually certain, the act portrayed the characteristics of a wickedly reckless crime. A House of Lords Select Committee rejected the inclusion of such a consideration into English law, largely based on the premise that those convicted of manslaughter can still receive a life sentence. As Lord Steyn said in Woollin 'Immediately below murder there is available a verdict of manslaughter which may attract in the discretion of the court a life sentence'[7]codb dbr sedbdbw ordb dbk indb fodb db:
Over-inclusiveness is something which has to be considered in the direction on intent encompassed by the Nedrick/Woollin model. Alan Norrie suggests that there are cases which would fall within the Nedrick/Woollin model as murder, but which should not. '[There] are cases where there is a 'moral threshold' such that even though the accused could foresee a result as virtually certain, it is so at odds with his moral conception of what he was doing that it could not be conceived as a result that he intended'[8] The case of Steane[9] shows how someone who foresees the consequences of their action as being virtually certain, would fall within the Nedrick/Woollin direction on intention, even though the intent was one of innocence. Norrie argues that it 'is plausible to argue that at the nub of the case lies a moral gap between what Steane did, broadcasting to assist the enemy, and his purpose, to save his family.'[10] Motive is not something to be considered when deciding if a defendant has intent to commit a crime or not. This had been illustrated in the cases of Yip Chiu-Cheung v R[11] and R v Latif[12] where the Nedrick/Woollin test for oblique intention would not make allowances for those whose 'motive for pursuing their primary purpose is morally inconsistent with the mens rea for the offence'[13] An example given by the Law Commission is where someone throws their child from the top of a blazing block of flats in a vain attempt to save the child's life. The individual would foresee that the chances of death were virtually certain, but morally speaking, he did not intend to kill the child, rather, to save the child. Following the Nedrick/Woollin direction on intent, he would still be convicted of murder because the defendant realised that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty of his actions. In cases of conjoined twins, the courts have followed the line of Nedrick/Woollin in that an operation cannot go ahead if the consequences of that operation will be the virtual certain death of one of the twins. This is illustrated in Re A (Children) (Conjoined twins) where the judge stated 'however little they desired that end...her death would inevitably follow' The death of one of the children was virtually certain and the surgeon would have known this to be the case and therefore under the Nedrick/Woollin model on intention, the surgeon would have the intent for murder if he went ahead with the operation despite his intentions clearly not sharing the same characteristics as that of a murderer. This does raise the question as to whether the Nedrick/Woollin model provides for unjust convictions of murder.coae aer seaeaew orae aek inae foae ae!
Their Lordships have yet 'to present a clear and cogent definition of intention'[14] which will inevitably lead to queries arising as to whether defendants had the necessary mens rea to be convicted of murder. Lord Steyn, in R v Woollin added 'that the trial judge is best placed to decide what direction is required by the circumstances of the case' showing that the law is still open for interpretation. Nedrick and Woollin did add clarity to the meaning of oblique intention in concluding that a jury can infer the necessary intention if they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant's actions and that the defendant realised that such was the case. However, although this does provide a clear framework to which intention can be ascertained, it could be said to be over-inclusive in that it can be used to convict those who do not appear to be guilty of murder as well as being under-inclusive in other circumstances as it lacks the scope to convict those who should be convicted of murder, as can be seen in the terrorist example by those who act with 'wicked recklessness' ace_16k, please do not redistribute this coursework. We work very hard to create this website, and we trust our visitors to respect it for the good of other students. Please, do not circulate this coursework elsewhere on the internet. Anybody found doing so will be permanently banned.
Word count = 1,249codb dbr sedbdbw ordb dbk indb fodb db.
Word count including footnotes = 1,343 Gl4QTr3 Visit coursework ge in ge fo ge for ge more coursework ge Do ge not ge redistribute Gl4QTr3
[1] (1986) 1 W.L.R. 1025codg dgr sedgdgw ordg dgk indg fodg dg.
[2] (1986) 83 Cr App R 267 - Lord Steyncodf dfr sedfdfw ordf dfk indf fodf df:
[3] (1999) 1 A.C. 82coag agr seagagw orag agk inag foag ag.
[4] (1985) A.C. 905coeg egr seegegw oreg egk ineg foeg eg.
[5] Alan Norrie - 'After Woollin' (1999) Crim LR 532coaa aar seaaaaw oraa aak inaa foaa aa.
[6] 1 of the 5 Law Lords presiding over the casecoea ear seeaeaw orea eak inea foea ea.
[7] (1998) 4 All ER 103, 112 MENSAgYW Visit coursework ea in ea fo ea for ea more cours ea Do ea not ea redistribute MENSAgYW
[8] Alan Norrie - 'After Woollin' (1999) Crim LR 532 This paper from www.coursework.info
[9] (1947) K.B. 997coab abr seababw orab abk inab foab ab!
[10] Alan Norrie - 'After Woollin' (1999) Crim LR 532coba bar sebabaw orba bak inba foba ba.
[11] (1994) 3 W.L.R. 514coeg egr seegegw oreg egk ineg foeg eg;
[12] (1996) 1 All E.R. Weber suppressed ace_16k's structuralism .
[13] Michael J Allen - 'Elliot and Wood's Cases and Materials on Criminal Law (Eighth Edition)' This writing from www.coursework.info
[14] William Wilson - 'Doctrinal Rationality after Woollin' (1999) 62 M.L.R 448cofg fgr sefgfgw orfg fgk infg fofg fg.
