An examination of British policy with regard to European Unity during the period 1945 to 1949: Why did Britain did Britain diverge from the emerging European Community and was it justified in doing so?

British policy towards Europe has been described as half-hearted and even compared to “haphazard meanderings” (Dell, 1995: 69) since 1948. In many ways British policy was unclear and confusing during the immediate post war period. During 1946 and 1947 Britain appeared to be a strong advocate of European unity; indeed it was a leader of Western Europe and generally assumed that Britain would continue to play such a role. It was Churchill who’s request for "a kind of United States of Europe" during his 1946 speech in Zurich, whom not only sent out a positive message regarding union within Europe but was also one of the founding father’s of the concept. During this time "Britain was regarded as the leader of Western Europe" (Croft, 1988: 617). Britain had come out of the war relatively unscathed and was considered the strongest European nation during this time. Having attained wartime prestige and maintained political strength Britain had "placed herself in the vanguard of the movement to achieve European Unity". Newman potently displays her assets: "She could have played a determining role in shaping the institutional form of a new community" and "others would have followed her" (Newman, 1996: 6).

In-spite of this, British Policy was however, to take a significant leap away from European unity. From mid 1948 Britain began to put up resistance against proposals for a Council of Europe in 1949 and rejected notions of pooled economic sovereignty proposed by the OEEC. These years are of great importance as they set in motion the culminating events in 1951 when Robert Schuman’s plans for a free market coal and steel industry were rejected out right. Thus its is evident that Britain had shifted it’s position of power in Europe utterly. Not only had Britain lost an opportunity to lead Europe, but following the Schuman doctrine "their place in future political developments" (Croft, 1988: 617). Thus is outlined the general sequence of events regarding British policy and its reaction to conceptions of European Unity.

This period of policy was so important as it shaped and molded British/European relations to come. Indeed, abstaining from Europe during these years cited, had the considerable ramification of a belated entry to the European Economic Community; A community that Britain would not join until 1973 under the governance of Edward Heath. This was a delayed entry that was to cost Britain the loss of potentially significant economic gain. The consequences of Britain’s decision to opt out of European unity plans were extensive; hindsight tells us this. However what the essay seeks to underpin is the events, reasons and justification behind Britain’s decision to ‘go it alone’ and seek a future without partaking in a broad European union.

Outline:

a) The first half of the essay will delineate British policy towards European Unity. This will be answered initially with reference to the years of 1945 to mid 1948. This period will be cited to highlight that Britain has not always been in opposition to Western European integration. Following this British foreign policy from the period of mid 1948 to 1949 will be delineated and discussed. This was when notions of Britain as an ‘awkward partner’ emerged and the point from which Britain diverged from the European union ideal. The essay will refer to events leading up to the creation of a Council of Europe and the OEEC. These progressions will be cited as evidence of an increasingly isolationist British stance with regard to European Unity. In such fashion this phase of the essay will outline the extent to which the concept of ‘unity’ was rejected and abstained from.

b) Having outlined and discussed events of the post war period, the reasons behind British policy can next be established. This will form this main part of the essay. The extent to which the 1945-1951 Labour government’s anti-European Unification stance was warranted will be viewed and the major explanations of an isolationist British policy, outlined. The essay will refer to Labour’s socialist principles and commitments, the relationship with the Commonwealth, and the argument that Britain still viewed its self as on of the ‘Big Three’ pillars of global power. These facets will be cited as the prime reasons for British policy during these years.

The Labour government will be criticized with regard to its decision to abstain from Europe. The extent to which British policy was justified and right to adopt an increasingly peripheral and obtrusive role with regard to policy on economic and political European integration will be assessed.

a)1945-1947: Britain’s immediate post war foreign policy

The driving force at the heart of Britain's foreign policy during this period was the Cold War. Britain feared the encroachment of communism into central Europe and as Pilkington (2001) notes there was reason for this fear. An outbreak of civil war in Greece, the Berlin blockade as well as the coup d'etat against Jan Masaryk in Czechoslovakia and the upsurge of communist parties in Italy could all be cited as evidence of an impending Soviet and communist threat to the West (Pilkington, 2001). In light of the Soviet threat Britain sought "European states to provide collective security against the preponderance of power possessed by the Soviet Union" (Croft, 1988: 619). For Bevin and Churchill alike Europe needed to form union in order to quash Soviet menace and overt Europe from the threat of a third and this time atomic World War. British policy was stern; "Europe must unite or perish" (Attlee, date in Shlaim, 1978). Thus it is evident that for Britain "union was fundamentally a Cold War concept" (Croft, 1988: 619). Only in unity could Western Europe "stem the further encroachment of a soviet tide" (Croft, 1988: 620) and it is to this end that British policy was targeted (Croft, 1988).

The first step towards the building of a Western Union Bloc was evident on 4 March 1947 when the Anglo-French treaty of Dunkirk was signed. Alliance between Britain and France was established and ensured that each country would help the other out if needed. By pooling common resources the two powerhouse nations of Europe could create stability. More over France was protected from the prospect of a German offensive. Following these developments manifested the signing of the Brussels treaty in March 1948. The treaty was born from debates in the House of Commons and thus was the brainchild of an assertive, pro-active British policy that was shaping the way for the future of Europe. The treaty of Brussels brought together countries of Britain, France, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg in mutual consolidation over an unstable Europe. Such are the origins of European Unity and Britain’s central part in it (Pilkington, 1995).

Economic suability was seen as a fundamental pre-requisite for staving off the Soviet threat. In March 1947 Britain sought America's financial aid and political endorsement of its peacekeeping aims. Truman pledged full support, which manifested in the proposal of the Marshal plan; a plan aimed initially at securing economic stability in the eight non-communist European nations in order that the 'communist creep' would be stemmed. As Newman notes the "US involvement ... was essential to both for the economic recovery and security of Europe" (Newman, 1997: 9). The fact that Britain had brought about US involvement therefore further highlights the notion that Britain was playing a decisive role in the 'building' of Europe. The government too was decisive in signing such protective and stabilizing mechanisms as the OEEC and the North Atlantic Treaty. Both of which further pooled together Western Union and US commitments for stability and security (Pilkington, 2001).

The evidence thus far supports Newman’s claim that Britain had placed herself "in the vanguard of the movement to achieve European unity" (Newman, 1997: 6). This was the nature of British policy during this immediate post war period. Having thus far taken charge it was generally assumed that the United Kingdom would grasp the opportunity to play a continued domineering roll in an increasingly unified Europe. This was not to be the case.

With regard to the pro-active nature of British foreign policy at this time, one important consideration must be taken into account. Croft notes that "it ...

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With regard to the pro-active nature of British foreign policy at this time, one important consideration must be taken into account. Croft notes that "it is important to distinguish between two types of British policy: objectives that the government wanted to achieve, and the interests it wanted to protect" (Croft, 1988: 618). Croft argues that Britain was 'leading' Europe at a time when it was in its own interests to do so. British policy had been devised primarily for the threats to its own security and stability and largely ignored the fears of France with respect to Germany. Where Europe had seen Britain endeavor to partake an active continental role Britain had in fact done so as a means to an end: to attain it’s own military and economic security through union. It is therefore worth considering the point that Britain had adopted a strong position in European policy primarily for it’s own benefit and giving only second precedence to the continent as a whole. In Crofts opinion, leading capabilities displayed by Britain were driven by fundamentally national rather than continental interests (Croft, 1988).

Barker (1983) too resides upon this point. Signing the Brussels treaty and supporting Western union, during this time frame, was for Britain devised as a “sprat to catch a whale... A devise to lure the Americans into giving Western Europe backing in the face of a Soviet threat” (Barker, 1983: 127). Thus, as is further exemplified, Britain had sought unity only when it was in tandem with it’s own needs. In this case, as Barker (1983) notes, Britain displayed an initial willingness for European unity but only with ulterior, selfish motives. The US had sought Europe to unite (a wish latterly to be implemented Truman’s Marshal plan) and thus Britain was able to entice the US into taking a further lead in British national safety one it was seen to be intergrating (Barker, 1983).

Mid 1948-1949: British policy with regard to events of the proposed Council of Europe and fedralist implications of the OEEC

The years of 1948 to 1949 wrought immense changes in Britain's European stance and policy within Europe. British foreign policy became increasingly divergent to that of its continental counterparts. Mid 1948 many European nations, most notably France, sought to evolve the European union that had been established, into European unity; A system of pooled sovereignty, closer economic integration and federalist organization. Britain whose vision of European was one of more of a finite, intergovernmental system of operation opposed and eventually abdicated from the movement. While Europe sought unity, for Bevin (British Foreign Secretary) a relationship of European nations should be one more of 'brotherhood' comprising of loose connections rather than the rigid systems that were to be proposed. With this fundamental rift in mind, by January 1949 the United Kingdom was loosing “the leadership of Europe, and the British were widely regarded as being responsible for undermining the movement towards European unity" (Croft, 1988: 626).

The council of Europe

Britain’s altercations with Europe will first be considered with regard to plans for a Council of Europe. On May 1948 delegates from sixteen European states attended a congress in The Hague. Here was voiced by the majority of nations, a desire to establish a federal based European parliament. Negotiations during the latter half of 1948 led to the conception of a Council of Europe. Its official objectives were for generating "greater unity between its members for the purpose of safe guarding ... common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress" (Watkins, 1992 in Pilkington, 2001: 8). The British foreign office was vehemently opposed to the creation of a federal European parliament. It was only after extensive talks that Britain attained a compromise for the Council comprising both French federalist aspirations and the British intergovernmental approach. A statute was signed on May 1949 by ten governments including a somewhat reluctant British government. Although Britain did finally sign the treaty for Melissen and Zeeman the damage to EU relations had already begun. “Bevin’s grand vision of Western Union had narrowed as a result of the experience” and Europe increasingly viewed Britain as an obstacle in the way of federalism (Melissen and Zeeman, 1987).

This is where the first clear distinction evolved between the loose conception of ‘Union’ that Britain had endorsed in earlier years (in mind of the Soviet Union) and a ‘Unity’ that the majority of Western European countries were now seeking. With the creation of European Council it is evident that Europe had began to move in a very new, supranational direction; a direction fundamentally different to that of Britain whose calls for limited integration became increasingly ostracized.

OEEC

The Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was another prime example of British’s increasingly peripheral role in Europe. The OEEC was one of the first steps in Truman’s Marshal Plan set up to administer European economic recovery. For Britain the security benefits to be gained from economic stability in Western Europe were substantial and thus initially full support was pledged. Events were however to take a dramatic shift. In the few months that followed heavy criticism of the proposal came from the British Treasury based upon fears that the OEEC was stifling national economic flexibility. The Labour government was concerned that the OEEC was threatening the welfare state, economic planning and weakening British influence over the sterling area. More significantly the OEEC signaled a wider movement towards supra-national unity and thus once again the British government expressed strong disagreement (Croft, 1988). British fears were enforced when Paul-Henri Spaak became a candidate to run the OEEC. His views strongly supported the concept of European integration and he pledged to make OEEC a tool for the creation of federalist unity. Bevin, in objection, vetoed Spaak’s nomination and sought that the anti-federalist Oliver Franks take up the position (Pilkington, 2001).

Thus far Britain’s foreign policy can be seen to be somewhat confusing, even contradictory; seeking European union (or an unofficial ‘closeness’) but rejecting, out right, notions of economic and political unity. As Baumann (1951) reflects Britain’s stance can be summed up as follows: “By refusing to grasp the nettle of participation, Britain has preferred thus far gingerly to tread her chosen path of ‘close association’” (Baumann, 1959: 351). Thus forth the essay will consider the reasons behind Britain’s ‘gingerly tread’ towards ‘participation’ and view the rationale behind the governments inability to bridge this gap between close association and participator.

b) Explanation and criticism of this Foreign policy

This paper will now assess the reasoning behind Britain’s ani-Europe foreign policy. It will consider this shift in policy in light of criticism aimed at the British government. In explanation this phase of the essay will consider the extent to which Britain may have been wrong to abstain from the movement for building an integrated European Community.

The Labour Government

Explanations of Britain’s European aversion will begin with a study of the Labour governments political and socialist agenda. Both Labour's socialist reasoning and the pragmatic limitations on foreign policy will be considered. As a socialist party, Labour was principally hostile the concept of federalist rule in favour of intergovernmental relations. Attlee set out Labour's agenda in 1945 asserting "when we win this election, we want to be free in socialist terms to make our policy for our own socialist purposes" (Attlee, 1945 in Shlaim, 1978: 86). From the onset it is evident that Labour intended to pursue it's discourse primarily with national interests at heart. The government was held to its pledges and radical manifesto included in which lay commitments for implementing a welfare state and the socialization of basic industries and services such as transport, health and education (Shlaim, 1978). Political and economic sovereignty was key to enabling the fulfillment of these pledges. In apathy of Labour’s position, Croft (1988) notes the “government could not have accepted the approach espousing European unity without sacrificing many important policies" (Croft, 1988: 618). Purely in terms of pragmatic consideration it can thus be argued that the government was not in a position to participate in Europe. In doing this the very proposals that gained Labour a landslide general election victory would to some extent be neglected. -Thus, in defense of the government is the argument that the Labour party was maneuvered into a position where by even if it desired it could not partake an active role in the building of Europe.

These pragmatic considerations perhaps justify Britain’s caution with regard to the OEEC. For Croft (1988) comments, "economic sovereignty had to remain in London in order to implement the transformation of society". The government needed complete sterling independence to initiate the massive, internal, socialist changes it had proposed. The Labour government, as it took the reigns of power in 1945, had a huge under taking. For Croft sovereignty of Britain’s economic sphere was an essential prerequisite for the successful restructuring of British society during this turbulent post war period (Croft, 1988).

Notions of handing over Sovereignty

Perhaps the prime reason for Britain’s aversion to towards a participatory role in Europe was the prospect of giving up national sovereignty. Any handover of national independence, be it political or economic, has been vehemently opposed by successive governments through out Britain’s history and the post war Labour government was no exception. The accepted view was that “Britain should not surrender the ultimate decisions of foreign policy or economic affairs to any organization or parliamentary body which she could neither control nor veto” (Baumann, 1959: 352). Here in lies a fear and insecurity with regard to power and control; the fear that European federation “would reduce the United Kingdom to the status of a Virginia in the United States” (Soward, 1950 in Baumann, 1959: 353). Thus lies the general conception that British influence would be diluted within a ‘United States of Europe’.

Not only did Britain oppose the concept of pooled sovereignty in principle, but in practice it too perceived limited benefit. Other than pressures for integration imposed by the US (and Truman’s Marshal Plan), Britain saw little practical reasoning in subscribing to European federalism. Europe was in a phase of sever economic and political disrepair and to an even greater extent to that of Great Britain. For these reason it is Butler (1995) whom so crudely equates UK integration in Europe with Britain “chaining itself to a corpse” (Butler, 1995 in Pilkington, 2001: 3).

As is outlined by Baumann (1959) and Butler (1995) “A combination of an insular suspicion of continental entanglements ... and a strong dislike of constitutional ties” (Baumann, 1959: 362) were fundamental causes of Britain’s unwillingness to give up sovereignty. Post Second World War continental distrust was high. Britain viewed Europe and a liability rather than an asset and as Baumann continues to divulge, Britain perceived “countries such as France and Belgium as not the most reliable of allies (Baumann, 1959: 362). Such conceptions of sovereignty were enforced by default of the fact that Britain was not occupied during the war. This added to a stubbornness of attitude. Having fought for so arduously to maintain sovereignty during threat of invasion for the British public by large it was inconceivable that independence should be given away. Shlaim (1978) places great emphasis on different wartime experience as the catalyst for Euro divides. For Shlaim (1978) the “value of national sovereignty was (in Britain) vindicated by the war” (Shlaim, 1978: 102).

At this point Britain and the Labour government’s policy with regard to sovereignty comes under criticism. Britain had “an almost instinctive aversion to ... participation in continental schemes of integration” (Baumann, 1959: 360). This can be construed as a criticism of British governance in general. It pervaded a willingness to dismiss concepts of unity on the premise of vain principle instead of factual pragmatics. Thus, Britain can be projected as inherently stubborn and from a European perspective a very difficult partner to work with. Britain in principle would not subject itself to the concept of a European community during these post war years and as such Britain manifested itself as an inherently obdurate partner. In this light the pragmatic benefits of forging a community were eclipsed by British principle and this forms an inherent criticism of British European policy.

In addition to this emerges the criticism that Labour wanted to "counter the prevailing impetus to supra national integration". Yet it never reality provided a viable, pragmatic alternative to the supranational approach (Pilkington, 2001: 4).

British and its role as one of the ‘Big Three’

The craving for continued international power and prestige forms further justification of British policy with regard to its plight for a global role. Britain, post Second World War, sought to retain its former position as a global power and this is a prime reason behind Britain’s pursuit of independence. Britain still saw its potential as one of the ‘Big Three’ powerhouse nations along side the Soviet Union and its ally, the USA. This was due in large part to war success that enabled Britain to continue its global self-perception. This was a psychological facet the invaded countries of mainland Europe did not have. In relative defeat Western Europe sought unity. In relative victory Britain sought sovereignty and a role on a global scale. Thus the war enforced an unwillingness to settle for a continental rather that international role. Although in hindsight Britain was to no longer retain global influence, the precursor of a successful War effort enabled the continuation of this belief.

In Europe Britain saw it's self to be dropping off the main stage and of course did not was simply to be just part of a wider functional continent but to be a power within itself. Shlaim (1978) notes Britain’s simple choice; “was Britain to continue to play her traditional imperial role or was she to divest herself into the burdens and costs ... (of) a more modest regional role in Europe” (Shlaim, 1978: 98). The point it thus made that Europe was seen as a lesser option than a potentially prestigious global role.

However, what hindsight depicts is that Britain, from her immediate post war vantage point, did not fully conceive the deep-seated changes to her international status. To unite with Europe would be a step down from her past; a step successive UK government's had not been inclined to take especially not a Labour who reveled in wartime success. Historically Britain had held a global world position. However, the war the cards had been reshuffled and the power basis had changed; a change in power that Britain did not fully realize. In deed she was not willing to accept the reality of a world in which she was no longer a central power.

At this point British policy is open to further criticism. In reality Britain’s “former greatness had been swept away by a revolution in the global distribution of power” (Shlaim, 1978: 96). As McNeill noted at the time, “the United States became heir to Britain’s world position” (McNeill, 1944 in Shlaim, 1978: 97). In a phase of economic deficit after since the Second World War, this was certainly the case. Britain no longer wielded the power it once did. This was a fact the Labour government and Britain seamed unwilling to accept. As Shlaim notes, “Her status as one of the ‘Big Three’ rested on past achievements and she remained one of the supreme arbiters of the world by courtesy only” (Shlaim, 1978: 99). Thus as Newman too argues, British notions of continued global power were simply “delusions of grandeur” (Newman, 1997: 6) and a Britain that quite simply had an overly high opinion of it’s self. It is thus evident that the adjustment to the status of a second-rank power was uneasy, indeed initially rejected and in this context that a somewhat disillusioned Britain refused a role in Europe. As Bullock aptly asserts, the British government “continued for some years to assume that they would recover ... their status as a world power-a psychological fact which was to have a powerful effect on their attitude towards European unity” (Bullock, 1971: 2).

Thus is explained why the Labour government did not seek to play a perceived ‘lesser’ role in Europe. It was the perception of Europe being a lesser role that was pure ignorance of the government of the time. Of course this was all to change with events of the Suez affair in the 1950’s when Britain would attain realisation of its muted global position. In this light such writers as Bullock and McNeil have argued that Britain should have attained realisation of her depleted global powers earlier. Then, perhaps, Britain would have realised that Europe was not in fact a ‘lesser’ offer but a future in which she should participate.

The Commonwealth relationship

A final validation of Britain’s unwilling foreign policy in Europe relates to the Common Wealth and a British desire to create a ‘special relationship’ with the US. These were both integral components of Labour’s utopian visions for Britain's future; a future not bounded to a single continent but one of global significance and influence. Churchill, in 1951, clearly prioritized British aims: “Our first objective is the unity and the consolidation of the British Commonwealth ... Our second ‘the fraternal association of the English-speaking world (i.e. the United States); and third, United Europe”. In short, Europe had been put at the bottom of pile with prevalence given to the maintenance of Britain’s global status for reasons that will thus forth be discussed.

For Britain the links with the Commonwealth have been of great historical importance. During this post War 1945-1949 period Britain was adamant to re-assert these commonwealth ties. On a pragmatic basis overseas trading was still integral to the British economy. For the immediate future the Commonwealth could satisfy Britain’s need for the import of foodstuffs and raw materials that were so essential to the British economy. Trading with the Commonwealth was also deemed a safer bet than trading within Europe. West European nations were rebuilding their economies almost from scratch and experiencing a severe turbulence that Britain had the option of avoiding. As Baumann (1959) through setting up long-term bulk purchase agreements and financial links based on the common use of sterling Britain sought to attain economic advantage. In doing so it was able to withdraw from the participation of any form of European Economic Union and the Labour government gained three benefits: Britain’s separation from a federalist European Community to which it did not favor, the benefits associated with bulk trading links with the commonwealth, and a maintained a global presence.

In a Commonwealth Relations Conference in 1949 Britain’s links with its by gone imperial empire were further strengthened. It was concluded that the key to the continuation of a commonwealth relationship was the sovereign independence of Britain. If Britain affiliated itself with Europe the Commonwealth relationship would effect be rendered void. The Commonwealth was a relationship that held true to romantic visions of Britain’s past and a relationship that more importantly enabled Britain the opportunity to continue to play a role on the global scale. As Baumann aptly remarks, “It was the ‘common wealth experiment’, not the ‘European idea’, which spurred the imagination of the British and aroused their active interest” (Baumann, 1959: 356).

An important point to be made is that by having the alternative of trading with the commonwealth, integration into European federation was not essential to the degree of other Western European nations. This is a chief concern regarding British foreign policy as a whole; it had options. On a purely pragmatic basis it could ‘afford’ to be an ‘awkward partner’. The ‘Commonwealth option’ enabled Britain to act out its aversion towards the formation of a federal Europe, and thus it did.

The British globally orientated policy can be criticized. In seeking the best of both worlds Britain actually ended up with very little. It became an outsider in Europe (from which it lost out financially), and in exchange attained second-rate global position that was held up only by prestige from it’s past and “dependant on American goodwill” (McNeill, 1944 in Shlaim, 1978: 97). British policy had thus left the United Kingdom in a rather uncomfortable intermediate position. Britain had no real credibility as a leader or influencer of European Policy once it gave precedence to the Common Wealth and it’s ‘special relationship’. She looked first to the Commonwealth, then to the United States and entirely left Europe at the bottom of the pile. In-spite of this Britain was still being and ‘awkward partner’ and holding up European Union when perhaps it was now not it’s place to do so. It has thus been argued that Britain, unreasonably sought everything it’s own was and should not have felt hard done by when Europe too sought it’s own direction. As Newman (1996) remarks Britain, in this light, should have taken charge within the European community. Only then, from the inside, could “an alternative Community which was more accommodating to her needs could have been established” (Newman, 1997: 4). Thus had Britain contented with a European role it, in the longer term, would have amassed greater power, and in a community that could still be shaped to its own needs.

With regard to Britain’s objective to rebuild Commonwealth relations, it is evident by that Britain never sought to partake a serious role in the building of Europe. Yet in spite of this fact Britain was still intent on ensuring Europe did not unite and progress. This highlights inherent contradictions and double standards in British policy: Britain sought it’s own path and yet was still aggrieved when European nations to sought their federalist future (Newman, 1996). In such light British policy can be further criticized.

Conclusions

The course of this essay has sought to outline the complex itinerary of events leading to Britain’s nonparticipation in the forth coming European Community. Ironically it was British policy from 1945 to 1947, directly after the war that set in motion the first moves towards the integration of Europe; a movement it would eventually distance and separate itself from.

The essay has sough to depict the important events of the OEEC and Council of Europe as the major benchmarks of an anti-integration British policy. As has been endeavored to highlight, this latter 1948-49 period comprised of Britain and mainland Europe’s utterly separate conceptions of how the future organization of the continent should be run. Britain and the rest of Europe had sought two utterly opposing continental ideals: intergovernmental ideals verses supranational and federalist conceptions of organization.

These events that the first part of the essay has highlighted are of immense importance. They have set the trend of uneasy relations to come between Britain and the mainland. While Britain has entered the European Community, it still lags behind with regard to the adoption of the ‘Euro’ and still displays some of the same uneasy conceptions of integration that so permeated the Labour government of almost fifty years previous. Thus, as the essay has highlighted, from the onset Britain/Europe relations were on a ‘wrong footing’. It is these beginnings that have continued to set the pattern of this relationship for years to come.

The second part of this essay endeavored to discuss the reasons behind diverging Britain/Europe policies. Of notable importance was Britain’s untarnished self-perception of itself as a global power. Britain believed that it could go re-establish itself as a world power. This ideal would be rendered void if she pursued integration into a broader pooled European Community. More reaching than this explanation of European rejection was a shear despise of hading autonomy and sovereignty over to a federalist European body of governance. Historically Britain had never been accountable to a higher body and Labour was not going place the country in such a position now.

The essay has sought to balance empathy of Britain’s European policy with subsequent criticism. Hindsight tells us clearly that Britain should have joined a closer bond with Europe and that clearly Britain was wrong to abstain from European negotiation. Britain rejected Europe in search of a more glamorous global role that simply no longer existed. The British government’s policy was also led in large part by the principle of handing over power. Perhaps it should have thought more in terms of the realistic and practical benefits that a united community could offer.

To draw one final conclusion, so much of Britain’s foreign policy was linked inherently with fear. Bevin splendidly purveys this fear with regard to a loss of sovereignty threatened from the formation of the Council of Europe; “If you open that Pandora’s box you never know what Trojan horses will jump out” (Bevin, 1949 in Pilkington, 2001: 9). The British government feared a loss of sovereignty; it feared the implications of federalist rule and above all feared an inevitable stand down in global influence, stature and a retirement from the world stage. For all these reasons Britain sought to distance its political agenda from that of its own continent.

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