The Schumann Plan (1950) came from the ideas of Jean Monnet, and was French in origin. In post war Europe, France was very nervous of West Germany, and wanted guarantees that it would not become an aggressor for a third time. The best way to do this, from both the French and the American viewpoints, was to integrate West Germany back into Europe. France had previously considered a customs union in Europe without Britain participating was dangerous, however “...the West German economic recovery which sucked in imports from France, Holland and Belgium…” (Dedman, 2000, p42) changed their minds, with some sort of economic union now appearing to be “…a political and economic necessity...” (Dedman, 2000, p43). West Germany too was willing to enter into economic union with France and Europe, since it was the only way West Germany could ever be brought back into the fold: “…stability and union within Western Europe rested ultimately upon a rapprochement between France and West Germany.” (Urwin, 1995, p44). The Schumann Plan duly delivered. It proposed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), thus linking France and West Germany economically whilst also reassuring France by pooling the two most essential resources West Germany would need should it go to war again. This was a step closer to federal union in Europe – the ECSC allowed no veto, and involved loss of sovereignty for the participants. Only 6 countries joined, though, Britain being the most notable of those who did not take part: nonetheless, the ECSC consolidated the vital Franco-German relationship – according to Henig (2002, p25) “…henceforth the course of European history, and with it the prospects of unification, revolved around the ebb and flow of that relationship.” Thus the Schumann Plan had a very significant impact on post war integration.
The Pleven Plan (1950) took integration a step further than the Schumann Plan, with further loss of sovereignty, by aiming for the creation of a European Defence Community (EDC), operating a common European army and using a common budget and institutions. The EDC was designed to allow West German rearmament, though on unequal terms: all West German units were to be placed under integrated command. America, unlike France, had wanted to rearm West Germany through NATO, and the Pleven Plan, once again originating in France, was the “…compromise that would both satisfy the United States and assuage European fears…” (Urwin, 1995, p61). Even so, France consolidated its position through external treaties with Britain and the USA, causing some friction – “…it is a moot point how long this bias would have been tolerated by West Germany.” (Urwin, 1995, p63). The treaty led on to discussion of a European Political Community (EPC) – it was considered that the EDC and the ECSC needed a controlling body; also that a common army without a common foreign policy was awkward; and so the EPC was presented in 1953 as “…nothing less than the beginning of a comprehensive federation to which the ECSC and the EDC would be subordinated.” (Urwin, 1995, p64). However, the EPC stood or fell with the EDC, which was having ratification problems – the Benelux countries had trouble passing it, as did Germany. Italy put off ratification until France had done so: however, France, its proposer, rejected it. From the ensuing collapse, only the ECSC remained as a viable European body. The collapse of the most far-reaching plan, in integration terms, led to setbacks – “An alternative to the EDC had to be found.” (Urwin, 1995, p69), and the USA went back to its original plan of rearming West Germany through NATO. The Pleven Plan was thus significant in demonstrating that the countries of Europe were not yet ready for high level integration.
In conclusion, all three of the Marshall Plan, the Schumann Plan and the Pleven Plan were significant, in some way, to European integration in the period 1945 to 1954. The Pleven Plan was significant in that it showed that integration in terms of high politics was a little too much for Europe at the time; the Schumann Plan was arguably the most significant of the three, since it paved the way for the creation of the European Economic Community a few years later; but the Marshall Plan was nearly as significant, since it united the whole of Western Europe and demonstrated that integration was the best way forward in the post war years. Thus Marshall Aid was quite significant to moves towards European integration between 1945 and 1954.
Bibliography:
Dedman, M. J. (2000), The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-95: A History of European Integration, Routledge, pp34-92
Henig, S. (2002), The Uniting of Europe: From Consolidation to Enlargement, Routledge, pp22-29
Lundestad, G. (1998), “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997, Oxford University Press, pp29-39
Urwin, D. W. (1995), The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945, Pearson Education Ltd., pp13-22, 43-57 and 60-68