There are growing concerns about the ‘pre-cooking’ of government policy. Policy is formed outside of Cabinet through informal meetings between the Prime Minister and other Ministers, advisors or civil servants. The Prime Minister can therefore formulate policy with the aid of whoever he chooses, and then take it to Cabinet to be approved.
The debate on the reduction of Cabinet’s power is by no means new. Crossman traces the beginnings of the changes to 1867. He saw the development of the party system and the growth of the civil service as the two main factors. Both of these developments involved increased centralisation, with the Prime Minister ultimately in control. The effect of the party system is that the Prime Minister stands at the head of both the administrative and political arms of government, confusing the roles of Party Leader and head of government.
Tony Benn described the Prime Minister’s most important power as her ability to appoint and dismiss Cabinet Ministers. To back this up, she has power over Ministerial conduct through the Ministerial Code. It is arguable therefore that the Prime Minister can persuade cabinet colleagues to accept her opinion with the threat of losing their job.
During the 1980s while Margaret Thatcher was in office, many commentators saw the role of British Prime Minister as becoming ‘Presidential.’ Johnson (1990) went as far as ‘quasi-monarchical,’ referring to Thatcher’s use of the royal ‘we,’ the way in which she acted as the mother-of-the-nation at national tragedies and her taking of the salute on military occasions. He also referred to the way she wielded power, making dramatic reductions in the number and length of Cabinet Meetings, springing policy upon other Ministers without discussion and often speaking of government actions as her own personal decisions.
The principle of Cabinet collective responsibility, as laid down in the ministerial code, is argued by some to strengthen the position of the Prime Minister in cabinet. This doctrine states that while ministers may express their opinions at will in private, once a decision has been made, all ministers must accept it. A minister can then no longer publicly speak on issues for themselves, and must maintain a united front with the rest of the cabinet. Any minister who is unable to publicly agree with a cabinet decision must resign from government. Resignation is likely to be a ministers last possible choice, and a difficult decision to make. It can therefore be argued that this strengthens the Prime Minister’s position, as any dissenting minister must either resign or accept a decision. Once the decision has been accepted, ministers who privately disagree are unable to criticise it in public.
Some might argue the opposite however, that the principle encourages collective decision-making. The confidentiality of cabinet meetings means that ministers may openly argue issues with which they disagree, knowing that what they say won’t leave the room.
Foley (1994) was a firm believer that the British premiership has become presidential. He isolated a number of parallels between the role of the American President and the modern British Prime Minister. Firstly, he pointed at ‘spatial leadership,’ tactics employed by American Presidents to try and distance themselves personally from the post of President. John Major made a good example of this happening in the UK when he attempted to criticise the bureaucracy in government, and give the impression that he was on the same side as the average woman on the street. Similar to this point, Foley noted ‘the cult of the outsider,’ both politically and socially, within American Presidents. By distancing themselves from the government machinery, a Prime Minister/President can play populist politics while ignoring their colleagues.
The British Prime Minister, similar to the American President now takes a very public role, exploiting the establishment of TV as the most prominent medium to address themselves directly to the public. In this way they can form a relationship directly with the public, again bypassing their colleagues. The advancement of mass media has also leapt upon the idea of political personalities. Party Leaders are seen to be the embodiment of their party’s characteristics and ideas, and a leader’s personality appears central to their performance.
Even if our government isn’t presidential, there is plenty of plain evidence to show the reduction of cabinets power. The growth of the Prime Minister’s office and its staff is an obvious reason. The number of ‘special advisors’ to the Prime Minister has risen from around 6 during Thatcher’s office to 80 under Blair. Also, cabinet committees are increasingly used, issues being discussed by a select group of relevant ministers. Cabinet plays very little role in discussion of policy.
There are however still a number of constraints cabinet still has over Prime Ministerial power, enough for some to suggest that we do essentially still have cabinet government.
A Prime Minister may be free to appoint who she wishes to her cabinet, but there are usually practical limitations. There are often expectations from other MPs as well as the public, and some major figures might seem difficult to include. There is a need to keep some political balance within cabinet, and it is likely that the Prime Minister won’t want to encourage any alternative power bases. There is also the need to maintain a united party front. The dismissal of important ministers doesn’t show the electorate a united party. It is equally important to maintain parliamentary support, and a cabinet which is unpopular with its own parliamentary party is unlikely to make any ground.
Similarly, there are limits to how far the Prime Minister can intervene on specific policy areas. One human simply can’t be everywhere and know everything. Most expertise and specialisation is located within individual departments, and this is where the bulk of policy is created. So it is difficult for Prime Ministers to directly interfere with much of government business.
Margaret Thatcher’s downfall provides one of the strongest cases for the need to keep cabinet colleagues on side. Heseltine stormed out of a cabinet meeting in 1986 over a difference in opinion, claiming he was unable to stick to the principle of collective responsibility. Similarly, Howe resigned from government in 1990 as he could no longer support the government’s policy on Europe. Both these cases raised doubts that the resignations were primarily because of a policy disagreement. It seems much more likely that they were manifestations of power struggles and personality clashes. Lawson resigned as Chancellor in 1989 after disagreements with Thatcher’s personal economic advisor, Alan Walters. These major rifts in the party brought doubts about the wisdom of keeping Thatcher as party leader, and a leadership challenge was mounted in 1990, ultimately leading to Thatcher’s downfall.
Relationships between the Prime Minister and cabinet aren’t static, and power can change hands depending on the situation. One important factor to the amount of power a Prime Minister can wield is their individual personality and leadership style.
Norton (1987) created a classification model for Prime Ministerial style. He suggested four categories; innovators, reformers, egoists and balancers.
Innovators are ideologically motivated, and pursue power in order to achieve a certain goal which they have formulated. Reformers are similarly ideologically motivated, however the goal they pursue is one which their party has previously formulated. They are necessarily on a personal mission. Egoists seek power purely to satisfy their own ego. They wish to obtain power merely so that they are the one exercising it, with no future vision in mind. Balancers don’t necessarily purposely seek power for themselves, but once they have it tend to focus on maintaining stability and keeping the peace.
Innovators such as Thatcher are unlikely to leave their decisions open to much discussion by cabinet. She lead from the front, expecting her party to follow. Balancers such as John Major are less likely to approach cabinet with formal ideas, and rely more on the contribution of their colleagues.
Norton accepted that these categories are far from mutually exclusive, and a Prime Minister may fall into two or more of them, and not necessarily remain in the same categories throughout their premiership.
Although most commentators would agree that personality style is important, many would point to more influential external factors to explain the differences in Prime Minister’s roles. For example, John Major might have been a stronger leader if his party wasn’t divided and if the country’s economy hadn’t plummeted.
Few commentators would deny the decline in the power and influence of the cabinet as a grouping. However as department heads, the most important of the Prime Minister’s cabinet colleagues probably do provide the most significant constraint upon the Prime Minister. Although possessing considerable influence, it is ultimately the job of individual departments, and not the Prime Minister to formulate policy. This is more out of practicality than anything else. As the case of Margaret Thatcher showed, major rifts within cabinet don’t prove popular with the parliamentary party, and it is of an utmost important to maintain a united cabinet. Therefore the power and influence of cabinet colleagues probably do provide the most significant constraint upon British Prime Ministers.
Bibliography:
British Politics in Focus
British Politics Today
